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PROJECT 
EDUCATION AND THE LAW: STATE INTERESTS 
AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
No government activity exerts a more pervasive influence on 
Americans for a longer period of their lives than the regulation of 
education. The state seeks through its educational system to achieve 
two goals: the development of the basic reading, writing and other 
academic skills that any productive member of society must possess; 
and the inculcation of values deemed essential for a cohesive, har-
monious and law-abiding society. Basically, through uniformity and 
standardization of the education experience the state attempts to 
guarantee that children will not become liabilities to society and that 
a minimal acceptance of shared values and norms will be attained. 
These ends can be achieved only through a certain degree of educa-
tional "egalitarianism"-that is, through a common exposure of all 
children to values that educational decision-makers deem essential. 
To explore the significance of the educational system in shaping 
our social order, the Michigan Law Review has chosen education law 
as the subject of this year's Project. 
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This Project focuses on how the "collectivist" functions of the 
educational system, 1 which are to inculcate community norms and 
a minimum scholastic ability, may conflict with, and then ultimately 
be reconciled with, rthe interests that parents, students and teachers 
have in defining the particular norms and in seeking to preserve auton-
1. For a fuller discussion of the meaning of the term "collectivist," see note 48 
infra and text at notes 43-52 infra. 
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omy fu-om ,the standards J.mposed by eduoational authorities. It will be 
demonstrated that these interests in autonomy, which are identified 
in the Project as being "pluralistic,"2 do not necessarily repudiate 
goals of the established decision-makers3-the development of respon-
sible, stable, self-sufficient, •and capable citizens ,able to live •and func-
tion together. Pluralistic interests can, in fact, reflect varied ideologi-
cal content; ,they may be advanced either in favor of or in opposition 
to such controversial programs as sex education and religious observ-
ance in schools. What unites these pluralistic interests is that :they 
are all -associated with individuals or groups seeking, in various con-
teXJts, rto avoid the specific means of impar.ting ,academic skills and of 
socializ,ation that a given educational system is using. 
A. Background: Institutions of the Educational System 
A survey of the institutional framework within which educational 
policy decisions are made reveals that the initial accommodation of 
interests is performed by the state legislature; pursuant to its re-
served power to control education, the legislature formulates general 
policy and frequently delegates to local community institutions broad 
powers to effectuate that policy. It is within these local institutions 
that the community ·articulates its values •and desired norms and 
translates them into affirmative goals and practices of the school 
system. When the formulation ·or effectuation of these values intol-
erably infringes on the interests of one or more groups in society, 
recourse may be had either .through judicial intervention or through 
the exertion of political and economic pressure. 
1. The Authority of the States 
The several states have plenary power in the sphere of educa-
tion4 so long as they do not violate provisions of the United States 
2. See note 54 infra and text at notes 53-59 infra. 
3. See section I-A infra. 
4. Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974); State 
v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N.E. 946 (1890). The plenary power of the states 
derives from the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution, which reserves 
all powers not specified in the Constitution to the states. Because the Constitution 
is silent on the issue of education, and because it does not prohibit the states from 
maintaining systems of public education, the tenth amendment effectively reserves 
public education to state control. See, e.g., L. GARBER, HANDBOOK OF ScHOOL LAw 
4 (1954); Comment, Compulsory Education in the United States: Big Brother Goes 
to School, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 349, 351-53 (1972). 
State control over education typically originates in a state co·nstitutional provision 
for the encouragement of education. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 1; N.C. CONST. 
art. IX, § 1. Some state constitutions further provide for public educational systems. 
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2; N.C. CONST. 
art. IX, § 2; PA. CONST. § 44. Such provisions are held to vest state legislatures 
with broad authority over education. See, e.g., Child Welfare Soc. v. Kennedy 
School Dist., 220 Mich. 290, 296-98, 189 N.W. 1002, 1004-08 (1922); Coggins 
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Constitution. 5 In delegating considerable educational policymaking 
v. Board of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E.2d 527 (1944). This authority generally 
results in extensive state legislation, including regulation of both private and public 
schools. See, e.g., School Code of 1955, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.l-.329a, 
as amended, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.329c-.330v (1976) (public schools); 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 388.551-.558 (1967) (private schools); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 100.01-.80 (Supp. 1975). 
5. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) 
("[T]he education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter 
belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part o( Federal au-
thority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case 
of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the 
land"). 
Although education is primarily a state function under the tenth amendment, the 
federal government also exerts considerable influence on educational policy. It can 
levy and collect taxes for educational purposes pursuant to its delegated power to pro-
mote the general welfare of the United States, see generally United States v. Gettys-
burg Blee. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), and can specify how funds accepted by a state 
pursuant to a federal program must be spent. Failure of the state to comply with the 
federal standards may result in termination of the assistance. See Steward Mach. 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). However, because the method of financing edu-
cation, the distribution of money among districts, and the policies and procedures 
involved in organizing districts are within the realm of state authority, see note 4 
supra, the federal government can assert a national interest in education only by 
tying federal outlays to desired state reform. See THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. ON 
ScHOOL FINANCE, ScHOOLS, PEOPLE & MONEY: FINAL REPORT xxi (1972), 
The federal government first became involved in education by providing funds 
for school lunch programs in the 1930s. During World War II and the Korean 
War, the federal role increased when Congress passed legislation to assist communi-
ties that were financially overburdened by increased school enrollments due to the 
proximity of war factories and military installations. See A. LAPATI, EDUCATION AND 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 20-22 (1946). The National Defense Education Act 
of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580, further increased the federal role by 
providing federal aid for specific educational purposes and types of instruction. Al-
though the Act did not alter the fact that primary responsibility for education rests 
with the states and localities, it did recognize for the first time that the federal gov-
ernment has a major role in encouraging and assisting the states to meet national 
educational goals. See H.R. REP. No. 2157, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958). To 
help achieve the objectives of the Great Society programs of the 1960s, Congress 
passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 
79 Stat. 27. The ESEA represented a fundamental change in federal policy; instead 
of providing federal aid for specific purposes or types of instruction as did the 
NDEA, the ESEA provided federal aid on a general basis. See A. LAPATI, supra, 
at 35. Generally, federal programs are not designed to promote changes in decision-
making at the local level. Instead, federal efforts primarily encourage experimenta-
tion and innovation. Few such programs are intended to increase participation. See 
M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, SIX URBAN ScHOOL DISTRICTS 194-200 (1968). 
Federal educational programs are administered by the Office of Education 
(USOE), which is directed by the Commissioner of Education. The Office is re-
sponsible to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which presents re-
ports and evaluations to Congress on all federal educational programs. The authority 
of the USOE is specific: to utilize the services and agencies of the national govern-
ment in order to expedite federal educational programs. See generally A. LAPAn, 
supra, at 7-13. 
To what extent federal programs have succeeded in meeting specific educational 
objectives is uncertain. One observer who has analyzed the implementation of Title 
I of the ESEA has concluded that the limited capacity of federal and state agencies 
to carry through with the federally initiated reform has left local schools fairly free 
to function according to their own priorities. Murphy, Title I of ESEA: The Poll-
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authority to local agencies, 6 states have "not surrendered their pre-
rogatives, but have merely determined the machinery by which the 
state function shall be performed. "7 
Only rarely have legislatures taken a broad interest in formulat-
ing and controlling educational policy. 8 Most states have left such 
matters to administrative agencies and various elected bodies at the 
state and local levels. At the summit of the administrative hierarchy 
is a board that has been established in all the states. 0 The powers 
of the various state boards differ. In some, the board may control 
all aspects of the state's educational program; in others, wide delega-
tion to local agencies may limit the board to a very narrow range 
of activities. While the boards are responsible for implementing leg-
islation and ,also possess ·policy-making discretion,10 out of deference 
to local institutions this policy-making power is rarely exercised.11 
All states also have a superintendent of schools who typically per-
forms such functions as the enforcement of laws, adoption of regula-
tions, distribution of funds and financial accounting. In recent years, 
the state superintendents have been given greater responsibility for 
research and development and for general supervision of the 
schools.12 An institution at the state level, usually referred to as the 
tics of Implementing Federal Education Reform, in EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL 
STRUCTURE 64, 89 (Harv. Educ. Rev. Reprint No. 6, 1971 ). 
6. See text at notes 31-33 infra. 
7. E. BOLMEIER, THE ScHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 63 (1968). 
8. C. FITZWATER, STATE ScHOOL SYSTEMS: PATTERNS AND TRENDS 4-5 (1968). 
California offers the leading example of a state legislature that has taken a major 
interest in education policy. See generally CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 1-45047 (West 
1969-1975-1976); J. KOERNER, WHO CONTROLS AMERICAN EDUCATION? 81-82 (1968). 
9. The state board is provided for either in the constitution or in specific legisla-
tion. w. KEESECKER, STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION AND CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFI-
CERS 11 (1950). See generally note 4 supra. The members of the board are gen-
erally either appointed by the governor (32 states) or directly elected (11 states). 
C. FITZWATER, supra note 8, at 50; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON ScHOOL FINANCE, 
supra note 5, at 122-23. See L. PETERSON, R. ROSSMILLER & M. VOLZ, THE LAW 
AND PUBLrC SCHOOL OPERATION 14-16 (1969). See also F. BEACH & R. WILL, THE 
STATE AND EDUCATION (1955). 
10. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 14-16. 
11. One survey of curriculum requirements has revealed that few states, either 
through the legislatures or the boards, have strict standards. Instead, most curricu-
lum decisions are left to the localities. Almost all states require instruction on the 
dangers of alcohol and narcotics. However, only a slight majority require study of 
United States history, only half require physical education, and less than half require 
instruction in other specific subjects. See Marconnit, State Legislatures and the 
School Curriculum, 49 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 269, 272 (1968). However, California, 
Indiana and Iowa require instruction in 30 different subjects. See CAL. Eouc. CODE 
§§ 8551-53, 8571 (West 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-10.1-3-1, -4-1 to -9 (Burns 
Supp. 1976); IowA CODE ANN.§ 257.25 (Supp. 1976). 
12. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 16-17. The superintendent is appointed by 
the governor in 5 states and by the state board in 25 states; in 20 states, however, 
the superintendent is directly elected, sometimes on a partisan basis. THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMN. ON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 122-23. 
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"department of education," consists of supporting personnel who as-
sist the superintendent in his administrative duties. 
Many of the functions performed at the state level, such as the 
distribution of research data and the publication of journals, merely 
aid the schools in their daily operations.13 These have little direct 
impact on the student and thus rarely lead to conflicts among the 
various interests within the educational community. Other, typically 
regulatory, state functions are designed, however, to serve collectivist 
interests in education. Most important are the controls on citizens 
that devolve from the legislature. Thus, socialization of all children 
is assured by compulsory education requirements, 14 while the partic-
ular values and standards of achievement sought through socializa-
tion are defined by state curriculum requirements.111 Moreover, 
states have other, less direct means of defining the community norms 
that the educational system is designed to further. For example, all 
states require teachers to be certified.16 Licensing requirements 
narrow the class of individuals that will be allowed to teach to those 
who possess traits considered worthy of being nurtured in students. 
Thus, successful applicants must have a good, moral character, 17 
though what activities or traits satisfy this requirement is often un-
certain.18 In addition, minimum education requirements for teach-
er's certification10 are typically prescribed by a state administrative 
13. See Layton, Historical Development and Current Status of State Departments 
of Education, in STRENGTIIENING STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION 5, 10 (R. 
Campbell, G. Sroufe & D. Layton eds. 1967). 
14. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.731-.746, .754 (1976); N.Y. Eouc. 
LAW§ 3205 (McKinney 1970). 
15. State constitutions sometimes require instruction in certain areas deemed to 
be particularly important. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (1955) ("There shall 
be taught in the elementary schools only fundamental branches of study, including 
instruction upon the constitutional system of State and national government and the 
duties of citizenship"); N.D. CoNST. art. VIII, § 149 (instruction to be given to 
inculcate "vital importance of truthfulness, temperance, purity, public spirit and re-
spect for honest labor of every kind"); OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 ("Legislature 
shall provide for the teaching of the elements of agriculture, horticulture, stock feed-
ing, and domestic science ..• "); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12 (duty of legislature 
"to cherish literature and science"). 
16. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.85~-.852 (1976); N.Y. Eouc. LAw 
§ 3001 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See generally H. PuNKE, THE TEACHER AND nm 
COURTS 65-144 (1971). Cf. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1976, at 34, col. 1 (city ed.) (pro-
posal for licensing of teachers). 
17. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 485. 
18. The technique of defining fitness by isolating characteristics of unfitness is 
frequently used. See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 
5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) (homosexuality); 
Wood v. Goodman, 381 F. Supp. 413 (D. Mass. 1974), a/fd., 516 F.2d 894 (1st Cir. 
1975) (mem.) (offensive language and striking a pupil); Application of Bay, 233 
Ore. 601, 378 P.2d 558 (1963) (grand larceny conviction ten years earlier). 
19. See, e.g., CAL. Ao. CooE tit. 5, §§ 5900-91 (1976); MICH. AD. CODE, Rule 
390.1101-.1199 (Supp. 1966-1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1792-93 (Cum. Supp. 
1975). 
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agency.20 Such standards are intended to guarantee that teachers 
possess a minimum level of competence. 21 They exemplify the 
state's interest in ensuring that students in all localities achieve a cer-
tain level of academic prowess through their exposure to teachers 
with adequate credentials. States also prescribe certain standards 
for such facilities as buildings,22 libraries,23 and equipment.24 This 
exercise of control over the quality of the student's environment is 
perfectly consistent with the state's interest in academic achieve-
ment. 25 Yet the state may actually go further and impose require-
ments, such as the displaying of an American flag in each school, 26 
that advance the state's interest in inculcating patriotism in the 
young. 
Despite these examples of control at the state level, the manage-
ment of the educational system for the most part occurs at the local 
level. In recent years, state concern has been largely focused on 
increasing financial support for programs managed by the local com-
munities. Great differences in wealth and resources exist among 
communities27 and some districts are unable to support an adequate 
system of public schools without state aid. 28 Thus, much of the state 
effort in education in the past few years has been directed at these 
20. The New York legislature, for example, has delegated this authority to the 
commissioner of education. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3004 (McKinney Supp. 1975). 
21. See An Act To Establish an Alternative Standard for Teacher Certification, 
2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 147, 150 (1965). 
22. See, e.g., CAL. Eouc. CODE § 1530 (West 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-5-32-1 
to -33-1 (Burns 1975). 
23. See, e.g., CAL. Eouc. CODE§§ 27000-28802 (West 1976); MICH. COMP. l.Aws 
ANN. §§ 340.901-.914 (1976). 
24. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 35-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); MICH. 
COMP. LAws ANN.§ 340.298a(l)(b) (1976). 
25. See generally E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION 107-27 ( 1970). 
26. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. § 340.367 (1976): "Each district shall 
purchase a United States flag of a size of not less than 4 feet 2 inches by 8 feet 
• . . and shall display said flag . • . [at] a conspicuous place upon the school 
grounds thereof, at all times during school hours . • . ." 
27. See authorities cited note 689 infra. See generally A. LAPATI, supra note 5, 
at 142-47. 
28. One analysis of this problem uses the illustration of two students living across 
the street from each other, one in the Oakland, California, school district and the 
other in Emeryville. Because of this slight locational difference they attend separate 
schools, resulting in expenditures of $600-$700 for the first child and nearly three 
times that amount for the second. The authors note that these figures are neither 
the highest nor the lowest in the State of California. As a final irony, the tax rate 
for Oakland is nearly twice that of Emeryville. J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGAR-
MAN, PRIVATE WEALTii AND THE PUBLIC EDUCATION xviii-xix (1970). 
One proposed solution to the problem is a statewide equalization with the state's 
share of the funds depending on the tax rate of the district. Simon, The School 
Finance [)ecisions: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 
409,414 (1973). 
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problems, 29 but enormous discrepancies in expenditures per pupil 
remain.30 
2. The Nature of Local Control 
Historically, Americans have considered schools to be an exten-
sion of the local community.31 Thus, although state legislatures pos-
sess plenary power over the educational system, 32 local initiative with 
respect to education is so highly regarded that most states have dele-
gated extensive authority over the actual administration of the 
schools to local institutions. 33 States have divided their territory into 
"school districts" that perform the sole function of establishing and 
maintaining the public schools. 34 Boards of education, commonly 
referred to as school boards, have been created as the governing 
body of the school district and are typically responsible for the day-
to-day operation of the public schools. 35 
Although the diversity of state statutory schemes makes it diffi-
cult to generalize about school 1board composition and authority, 
it is clear that the school board is -intended ,to be the instrument 
for the public's expression of educational policy. That educa-
tional decision-making is regarded as requiring closer ,ties ,to the pub-
lic than other governmental functions is demonstrated by the unique 
status accorded most boards. For example, school districts are usu-
ally distinct from their corresponding political units-village, city, or 
29. For a discussion of the effort of Texas to ensure an adequate statewide sys-
tem of public education, see San Antonio Jndp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 t U.S. 
1, 6-14, 44-46 (1973). . 
30. See San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. J, 15 (1973) 
(discrepancies in expenditures per pupil between school districts does not violate 
equal protection clause if state supports adequate statewide system of public educa-
tion). 
31. 2 EDUCATION IN TIIE STATES: NATIONWIDE DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1900, at 134 
(E. Fuller & J. Pearson eds. 1969). 
32. See text at note 4 supra. 
33. See e.g., CAL. Eouc. CODE §§ 1001-1086 (West 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 
20-5-2-1 to -3 (Burns 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.561-.641 (1976); sec 
2 EDUCATION IN THE STATES: NATIONWIDE DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1900, supra note 
31, at 73; E. BoLMEIER, supra note 7, at 63. 
34. See Prescott Community Hosp. Commn. v. Prescott School Dist. No. t, 57 
Ariz. 492, 115 P.2d 160 (1941); Ridge v. Boulder Creek Union Jr.-Sr. High School 
Dist., 60 Cal. App. 2d 387, 140 P.2d 990 (1943); Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 
377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974); Campbell & Gilbert, The Governance and 
Political Implications of Educational Finance, in ScHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION! 
THE COURTS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 199, 204 (J. Pincus ed. 1974). 
As of 1970 there were about 17,500 school districts operating schools in the 
United States. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN .. ON ScHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 126-
27. The consolidation movement of the past 25 years has significantly reduced the 
number of districts. G. JOHNSON, EDUCATION LAW 15 (1969). 
35. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 225. See also N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND 
THE PUBLIC ScHOOLS 147-48 (2d ed. 1955). 
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county-even though the boundaries may be identical. 30 In states 
in which the school board is elected directly by a district's voters, 37 
the contests are held separately from those for municipal government 
offices38 and are almost always conducted on a nonpartisan basis.39 
The severing of education from general local politics caused by 
,these distinctions40 is generally respected by municipal officials, who 
avoid direct involvement in educational matters. 41 
B. State Interests and Individual Rights: An Overview 
Educational policy can never satisfy all the needs and desires of 
all members of society. Ideally, the various state and local institu-
·tions charged with formulating and implementing policies ·reflect the 
values and norms of ,the "people" as well as ,possible, considering 
,the limitations of "pure democracy" in any complex society. Inevita-
bly, however, groups or individuals do feel that governmental insti-
tutions are not responsive to them and that the achievement and 
socialization aims of any educational system are incompatible with 
-their personal interests ·and rights. 
At times, such dissatisfactions are reflected in efforts either to 
reorganize the decision-making institutions or to reallocate power 
within the process. More often, however, individuals and groups 
challenge certain practices and policies of the school system itself. 
These challenges do not question the basically democratic nature of 
the system for developing and implementing educational policies. 
Instead, the visible assertion of these complaints exemplifies the in-
evitable tension between the majority's goals and its methods of im-
plementing them, as articulated through state legislatures or through 
local school boards, and the interests of individuals and groups that 
wish to deviate from the majority in a particular context. . 
The organization of the Project preserves the demarcation be-
tween challenges to practices within the system and attempts to alter 
the system itself. Sections II and III focus on judicial intervention 
36. See N. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 93-94. 
37. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT, CODE § 20-4-8-18 (Bums 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-2022 (1973); N. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 111-12. 
38. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 277.1 (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 340.519 (1976). 
39. G. LANOVE & B. SMITH, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION 12 
(1973). 
This does not mean school board contests are not affected by local politics. See 
F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 463 
(1970); Eliot, Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics, 53 AM. PoL. Ser. 
REV. 1032, 1040 (1959). 
40. See Lyke, Representation and Urban Schoolboards, in COMMUNITY CONTROL 
OF ScHOOLS 138, 155-56 (M. Levin ed. 1970). 
41. This may not be true in large cities. See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, 
supra note 39, at 463. 
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required when majoritarian educational institutions infringe on the 
interests of groups and individuals in maintaining their autonomy. 
Section IV focuses on efforts of groups or individuals to protect their 
rights through reorganization of the institutions that define commu-
nity norms and values and through exertion of organized pressure 
on educational decision-making institutions from other sources 
within the community. 
Specifically, section II discusses conflicts over access to educa-
tion. It first explores the nature and underlying purposes of the 
state's compulsory education requirement. It then analyzes the 
problems that arise when individuals, in pursuit of equal education 
opportunities, seek not an exemption from compulsory education but 
greater access to public schooling. 
In this section, the central theme is the accommodation of soci-
ety's collectivist interest in standard socialization of students to 
core consensus values with the pluralistic interest of groups and indi-
viduals in diversity of belief and action. The judicial role is to 
achieve a balance that best protects the welfare of both the individual 
and society. In section II this process is predominantly a contest 
between educational decision-makers who purportedly represent the 
"state's" interest and parents who seek either to shelter their chil-
dren from socialization in the public schools or to gain access to that 
socialization experience. 
Following the determination of who receives an exemption from or 
greater access to education, section III of the Project explores the 
scope of individual rights within the educational system. Two 
broad areas of controversy, challenges to the academic curriculum 
and to noncurricular activities, are discussed. In this section, the ac-
commodation of parental and state interests described above is com-
plicated by the need to consider the interests and rights of other par-
ties, primarily teachers :and students. These include the freedoms of 
religion, speech and personal expression, the right of nurture and 
the right -of privacy. An -additional complication arises from the fre-
quently expressed interest of still another group-school administra-
tors-in the smooth and efficient operation of the system. The ed-
ucational system's tendency toward uniformity and standardization is 
strengthened by the imperatives of administrative "necessity," which 
often generate conflict with the rights of individuals. 
Finally, section IV demonstrates how various members of the ed-
ucational community seek to advance their interests by altering an 
institutional structure they consider unfair or unrepresentative or. by 
exerting external pressure through organized demands on the sys-
tem. Advocates of school district decentralization, for instance, 
complain that the purportedly democratic school system is struc-
turally unable to accommodate the interests of large segments of the 
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population, either because it is composed of over-sized units or be-
cause of bureaucratization. Decentralization is a demand for power; 
it is a rejection of the basic fairness of the decision-making and en-
forcing process in :the field of education. Unionization of teachers 
is also analyzed as a similar effort to exert pressure on the institutions 
charged with education and to reallocate power within the system. 
The Project's analysis of the issues summarized above does not 
purport to offer a conclusive reconciliation of the diverse, competing 
interests of the members of the educational community. Instead, 
the discussion sketches :the contours of the various conflicts and pro-
vides an analytical framework with whioh it:o probe questions of greaJt 
importance for American society. 
II. THE STATE'S REQUIREMENT OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION 
AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO EDUCATION 
The system of universal compulsory education is such an integral 
part of American society42 that its underlying assumptions _are rarely 
questioned. 43 Yet conflicts arise both when the state ~eeks to force 
42. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Yudof, Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 411, 411-12 (1973). 
As the Court in Brown stated: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to 
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional tralning, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubt-
ful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education. 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See San Antonio Indp. School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 221 (1972); Davis v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 
(E.D. Mich. 1970). 
43. The first state compulsory education law was passed in Massachusetts in 
1852. Ch. 240, §§ 1, 2, 4 [1852] Mass. Laws (now MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 76, 
§ 1 (Supp. 1976) ). By 1918, all states had enacted compulsory education laws. 
Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 1, 4 (1955). 
See generally F. ENSIGN, COMPULSORY ScHOOL ATTENDANCE AND CHILD LABOR 
(1921); M. KATZ, CLASS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ScHOOLS 45-48 {1971); Rothbard, 
Historical Origins, in THE TwELVE YEAR SENTENCE 11-32 (W. Rickenbacker ed. 
1974). 
Compulsory education laws typically require regular attendance at either private 
or public schools. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (1973). Some statutes 
require school instruction or its equivalent. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 
(1968). Although the various state statutes establish similar basic requirements, they 
differ both in language and detail. For a compilation of laws effective as of 1966, 
see A. STEINHILBER & C. SoKOLOWSKI, STATE LAw ON CoMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 
(1966). 
Concerned over the pressure to integrate public schools, Mississippi, South Caro-
lina, and Virginia repealed their laws in the 1950s. Law of April 11, 1924, ch. 283, 
§ 161, [1924] Miss. Laws 464 (repealed 1956); Act of May 15, 1937, No. 344, 
[1937] S.C. Acts 556 (repealed 1955); Act of March 27, 1918, ch. 412, § 1, [1918] 
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public education upon those who do not want it44 and when individ-
uals demand greater access to the benefits of public education than 
the state is willing to provide.45 Increasingly, individuals have re-
sorted to both federal and state courts for the resolution of these dis-
putes.46 
Underlying these conflicts between individuals47 and the state is 
a fundamental tension inherent in virtually any system of public ed-
uoation. Public education is intended primarily to serve the collectiv-
ist function of promoting equality of attitude and of experience, thus 
advancing social uniformity and national cohesion. 48 Both the indi-
Va. Acts 752 (repealed 1959). Virginia has since reinstated its compulsory attend-
ance law. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.275-1 (1973). The fact that fear of racial integra• 
tion prompted some states to abandon compulsory school attendance is evidence that 
compulsory schooling facilitates a generally valued social integration. See Rothbard, 
supra, at 21-22 ("educationists of the mid-nineteenth century saw themselves as using 
an expanded network of free public schools to shape and render uniform all Ameri-
can citizens, to unify the nation, to assimilate the foreigner, to stamp all citizens as 
Americans, and to impose cohesion and stability on the often unruly and diverse 
aspirations of the disparate individuals who make up the country"), See also D. 
TYACK, 1iIE ONE BEST SYSTEM (1974). The "melting pot" effect of compulsory 
schooling is not examined in this section of the Project, although the degree to which 
education may legitimately be used to further achieve it will be emphasized, 
44. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
45. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (remedial language instruc-
tion); San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (monetary 
expenditures per pupil); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racially 
integrated public schools); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) 
(admission of and special instruction for the mentally retarded in public schools), 
46. The recent intrusion of the courts into the realm of educational policy began 
with the application of the equal protection clause to public schools in Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See notes 273, 284 infra and accompanying 
text. See generally D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND TIIE LAW 
(1974). 
47. For the purpose of this section of the Project, parental and children's inter-
ests in education are assumed to be identical and are together called the individual 
interest. For discussion of a child's legal interest in education, see Knudsen, The 
Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1506 (1974), See generally Forer, 
Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1151 (1969). 
48. As one observer noted, "the equality on which our institutions are founded 
cannot be too intimately interwoven in the habits of thinking among our youth; and 
it is obvious that it would be greatly promoted by their continuance together, for 
the longest possible period, in the same schools of juvenile instruction , • • ," C. 
MERCER, A DISCOURSE ON POPULAR EDUCATION 76 (1826), quoted in L. CREMIN, 
THE AMERICAN COMMON ScHOOL: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 87 (1951), See note 
43 supra. See also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 222-24 (D. Mass. 1975), 
aftd., 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976). 
"Collectivist," as used in this Project, is synonymous with "integrationist," and 
refers to that pertaining to the "collective." "Collective" is defined as that (1) "in• 
volving . . . all members of . • . [a] group as distinct from • . . individuals"; 
(2) "marked by ... similarity ..• among all the members of a group (as a whole 
society)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 444-45 (1971). "In-
tegration" is defined as "the act, process, or an instance of integrating • • . a unifica-
tion and mutual adjustment of diverse groups or elements in a relatively coordinated 
and harmonious society or culture with a consistent body of normative standards," 
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vidual and society benefit when each individual achieves the aca-
demic competence needed for political literacy and economic self-
sufficiency49 and acquires sufficient social awareness to assure his 
adherence to fundamental societal norms. 50 Through its academic 
and socialization functions, 51 public education substantially furthers 
these goals, but it naturally tends to do so through standardization 
of the educational experience. 52 This tendency infringes upon the 
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children53 and 
therefore necessarily conflicts with the freedom of choice and the 
cultural diversity of a pluralistic society.54 
In all cases involving state-individual conflicts over compulsory 
education and access to education, the courts must accommodate the 
collectivist interest of achieving academic and socialization goals and 
the pluralistic interest of preserving autonomous spheres free from 
Id. at 1174. Thus, the realization of collectivist goals necessarily includes a process 
of integration. 
49. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). 
50. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bongart, f5 N.J. Misc. 80, 82, 189 A. 131, 132 (Juv. 
& Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937) ("[I]t is within the police power of the state to compel 
every resident of New Jersey so to educate his children that the light of American 
ideals will permeate the life of our future citizens"). See also H. MANN, REPORT 
FOR 1848, in 4 LIFE AND WORKS 278 (1891) -("Had the obligations of the future citi-
zen been sedulously inculcated upon all the children of this Republic, would the pa-
triot have had to mourn over so many instances where_ the voter, not being able 
to accomplish his purpose by voting, has proceeded to accomplish it by violence 
... ?"). 
51. The distinction between the academic and socialization functions of educa-
tion, more conceptual than descriptive, is most clearly conveyed by example: Mathe-
matical instruction exemplifies the academic function, while the experience of social 
group interaction that necessarily arises from school attendance illustrates the so-
cialization function. Both purposes of education are advanced through the choice 
of curriculum and instructional methods. 
52. "For reasons which may have been valid in the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
schools were given the mandate to teach children a common language, common 
political and economic goals and common standards of behavior. In the process 
of monopolizing most of the child's time and energy . . . today's schools still en-
courage an unnecessary degree of cultural and psychologic uniformity . . •• " R. 
KAY, OUR AMERICAN EDUCATION SYSTEM 8 (1969). 
53. The common law has always recognized a natural right of parents to control 
the education of their children. See, e.g., Gordon v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal. App. 
2d 464, 480, 178 P.2d 488, 498 (1947); Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875); 
School Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 4, 103 P. 578, 579 (1909). 
54. See R. KAY, supra note 52, at 8 ("[Public schools] still risk destroying a 
healthy diversity in points of view, in styles of life, in underlying value commitments 
and innate capacities"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (public schools 
conflicting with the integrity of an Amish community). 
WEBSTER'S THnu> NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 1745, de-
fines "pluralism" as "a state or condition of society in which members of diverse 
ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain an autonomous participation in 
and development of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines 
of a common civilization." Parental control over the education of their children 
is a central tenet of pluralism, for through such control parents maintain the autono-
mous development of their families and cultural beliefs. 
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the uniformity of universal public education. 65 During the course 
of litigation, both the state and individuals may appeal to either col-
lectivist or pluralistic interests to justify their positions. Thus, when 
the state attempts to compel education, it asserts the intellectual and 
socializing interests in public education;56 in response, the individual 
asserts his interest in being free from the standardizing effects of 
state-imposed educational requirements.u7 Conversely, when indi-
viduals attempt to force the state to grant them greater educational 
benefits, they frequently do so in terms of equality of educational 
opportunity;58 the state responds by emphasizing the importance of 
local control of public schools to parental participation in educational 
decision-making. 59 
This section of the Project analyzes how courts have responded 
to the assertions of countervailing collectivist and pluralistic interests 
in education. It concludes that, despite the dissimilarity in remedies 
sought, courts have accommodated these conflicting values consist-
ently, both in cases in which the individual seeks to escape from 
state-imposed educational requirements and in cases in which the in-
dividual seeks to compel the state to confer increased educational 
benefits. It is submitted that in both controversies, courts have al-
lowed core collectivist interests to be realized through education but 
have not permitted collectivist interests, whether invoked by the state 
or by individuals, to supersede entirely the countervailing interests 
of pluralism. Thus, it appears that whenever practical within a 
framework of state control, 60 courts ensure the participation of par-
ents in the process of educational decision-making. 61 
A. The Conflict over Compulsory Education 
Courts have been forced to accommodate these antagonistic in-
terests in education both in statutory and constitutional challenges 
to state compulsory education laws. In each case, pluralistic inter-
ests have been asserted in terms of a parental right to control the 
55. The conflict between collectivist and pluralistic values is deeply ingrained in 
American history and institutions. See Diamond, The Declaration and the Constitu-
tion: Liberty, Democracy, and the Founders, 41 THE PuBLIC INTEREST 39 (1975). 
See also Ravitch, Integration, Segregation, and Pluralism, 45 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 
206, 214 (1976). 
56. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 82-84, 189 A. 131, 132-
33 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937). 
51. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 519 (1925). 
58. See, e.g., San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
59. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. 
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 245-48 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
60. See note 4 supra • 
. 61. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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upbringing of their children. In constitutional challenges, 62 parents 
have sought to educate their children without any sort of interfer-
ence. In contrast, parents in statutory challenges63 generally have 
not contested the legality of basic state-imposed education require-
ments, but have urged that these requirements be fulfilled in an un-
regulated, noninstitutional setting. 6' 
This discussion will focus on the constitutional limits that have 
been imposed upon the state's power to regulate education. How-
ever, a brief examination of various judicial responses to statutory 
claims of parents who seek to educate their children at home illus-
trates the conflict between pluralistic and collectivist interests65 that 
also confronts the courts on the constitutional level. Such statutory 
challenges have compelled courts to define the kind of educational 
experience that fulfills the state's interests. 66 Since the goal of aca-
demic achievement is rarely questioned in these cases, 67 the focus 
has been on the socialization function of education. 
62. See, e.g., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. III. 1974). 
63. See, e.g., State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County 
Ct., L. Div. 1967); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State 
ex rel. Shoreline v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 
363 U.S. 814 (1960). Often, both constitutional and statutory challenges are made 
in the same suit. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685, 
appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 
(1929). 
64. The unregulated setting can range from the education of one's children in 
the home, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109 
(1955), to private but unapproved schools, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 
Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402 (1893). 
65. "To many who support compulsory schooling, the use of compulsion is neces-
sary to bring up the young to respect and practice the virtues and customs of the 
society. To the critics of compulsory schooling, it is precisely this coercive intrusion 
of the collective into the life and mind of the individual that represents the most 
damnable feature of compulsory schooling." Introduction, THE TwELVE YEAR SEN-
TENCE 2 (W. Rickenbacker ed. 1974). 
66. A few compulsory education statutes, however, contain a provision allowing 
for education in the home. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A) (2) 
(Baldwin 1976 Supp.). 
Courts sometimes avoid the question of whether home education fulfills the state's 
interests by making technical distinctions. For example, if the statute requires at-
tendance at approved private schools, courts have held that home education does not 
satisfy the state interest solely on the ground that the home has not been approved 
as a private school rather than on the ground that the term "private school" can 
never be construed to include instruction at home. See State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 
146 A. 170 (1929); State ex rel. Shoreline v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 
P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960). Contra, State v. Coumort, 69 
Wash. 361, 363, 124 P. 910, 911 (1912). 
67. Courts are very reluctant to allow academic instruction lower in quality than 
that provided in the public schools. See People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 578, 
90 N.E.2d 213, 215-16 (1950) ("No parent can be said to have a right to deprive 
his child of education advantages at least commensurate with the standards prescribed 
for the public schools, and any failure to provide such benefits is a matter of great 
concern to the courts"). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) 
(White, J., concurring). 
1388 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1373 
Two New Jersey cases, 68 both interpreting the same statute but 
decided thirty years apart, reveal the wide divergence in judicial per-
ceptions of the nature of socialization warranted by the state's collec-
tivist interests. The New Jersey compulsory education law requires 
public or private institutional education or its equivalent. 00 The 
issue presented by such a statute is whether social as well as aca-
demic equivalency is required. In Stephens v. Bongart,10 decided 
in 1937, the phrase "equivalent education elsewhere than at 
school"71 was interpreted to exclude home education. The court 
clearly viewed education as primarily society's responsibility;72 based 
on its observation that "the instilling of worthy habits and attitudes, 
appreciation and skills is far more important than [the] mere impart-
ing of subject matter,"73 it concluded that an institutional setting was 
necessary to socialize children properly. In the 1967 case of State 
v. Massa,14 however, another New Jersey court concluded that 
"equivalent education elsewhere than at school" did not require so-
cial equivalence that could be achieved only through group instruc-
tion; otherwise, it reasoned, the phrase "elsewhere than at school" 
would be meaningless because only public education or equivalent 
private-school education -w.ould suffke. 75 The court therefore re-
jected Stephens and held that the statute did not require social con-
tact and development equivalent to that obtained through public ed-
ucation. 76 
A result identical to Massa was reached by the Illinois supreme 
court under a statute that, unlike New Jersey's law, required educa-
tion in a public or private school. 77 The issue was whether th~ home 
68. State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct., L. 
Div. 1967), and Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. 
Rel. Ct. 1937). 
69. N.J. SrAT. ANN, § 18A:38-25 (1968). 
70. 15 NJ. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937). 
71. N.J, SrAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (1968). 
72. 15 N.J. Misc. at 84-85, 189 A. at 133 ("[T]he natural right of the father 
to the custody of his child cannot be treated as an absolute property right, but rather 
as a trust reposed in the father by the state, as parens patrie for the welfare of 
the child"). See Allison v. Bryan, 21 Okla. 557, 569, 97 P. 282, 286 (1908) 
("The rights of the parent in his child are just such rights as the law gives him; 
no more, no less"); Ex parte Crouse, 54 Pa. 9, 11 (4 Whart. 1839) ("It is to be 
remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge 
of its members, and that of a strict right, the business of education belongs to it"), 
73. 15 N.J. Misc. at 92, 189 A. at 137. 
74. 95 N.J. Super. 382,231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct., L Div. 1967). 
75. To avoid rendering the phrase "elsewhere than at school" meaningless and 
thus to reach its result, the court, relying on Rainbow Inn, Inc. v. Clayton Natl. 
Bank, 86 N.J. Super. 13, 205 A.2d 753 (App, Div. 1964), applied the rule that, if 
possible, a court must interpret a statute in such a way as to uphold the statute's 
validity. 95 NJ. Super. at 390,231 A.2d at 257. 
76. 95 NJ. Super. at 390, 231 A.2d at 257. 
77. ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (1973), 
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could qualify as a private school under such a statute. 78 In People 
v. Levisen, 79 the court held that the defendant's home was a private 
school despite clear legislative history to the contrary.80 The court 
determined that the role of compulsory education was merely "to en-
force the natural obligation of parents to provide an education for 
their young, an obligation which corresponds to the parents' right 
of control over the child."81 Thus, it concluded that, if academic 
standards were satisfied, 82 the manner and place of education was 
a matter of parental discretion. 83 The court clearly viewed the 
state's basic collectivist interests as limited to the academic compo-
nent of education and thus interpreted the act narrowly to restrict 
the scope of state regulation. 
These statutory cases are ostensibly judicial attempts to interpret 
the legislatively intended scope of compulsory education laws. In 
reaching conflicting conclusions, however, the courts have manipu-
lated canons of statutory construction and selectively read legislative 
history to achieve an accommodation between state goals and indi-
vidual interests that they considered appropriate. 84 Yet while these 
78. See People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685, appeal dismissed, 
347 U.S. 972 (1953); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State 
v. Petterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550 (1904); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 
146 A. 170 (1929); State ex rel. Shoreline v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 
P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960); State v. Coumort, 69 Wash. 
361, 124 P. 910 (1912). . 
79. 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). 
80. 404 111. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215; see Comment, Private Tutoring, Compul-
sory Education and the Illinois Supreme Court, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 105-06 (1950). 
81. 404 Ill. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
82. The parents, Seventh-Day Adventists, established regular daily hours for in-
struction, recitation and study. Tests proved the child to have average academic 
proficiency for her age. 404 Ill. at 576, 90 N.E.2d at 214. 
83. 404 Ill. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215. See also Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 
Ill. 303, 308 (1877); Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875). The position that 
parents should have a primary role in directing the education of their children was 
endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. RES. 217 [Ill], art. 26 (1948) ("Parents have a prior right 
to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children"). 
84. The statutory interpretation in the two New Jersey cases, Stephens v. Bongart, 
15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937), and State v. Massa, 
95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct., L. Div. 1967), provides a 
good example. In Massa, in order to limit the scope of the collectivist socialization 
interest, the court relied heavily on the rule that a statute should not, if at all possi-
ble, be interpreted to render one of its provisions inoperative; in Stephens, however, 
the court had ignored the fact that its interpretation of the statute requiring institu-
tional education rendered certain language of the statute meaningless. 
A further example is provided by the legislative history of the statute interpreted 
in People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 20 N.E.2d 213 (1950). The statute originally 
provided for home education. The option was eliminated in 1929 in an amendment 
that incorporated all other previous legislation on school attendance. Under a rule 
of statutory construction, expressly adopted by Illinois courts, portions of an old stat-
ute not repeated in its successor are· automatically repealed. See Comment, supra 
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cases ,all -address ithe question whether the socializing influence of 
institutional education should be deemed a basic colleotivist interest of 
the state, they do not discuss -the constitutional issue of what accom-
modation the states, if they do in fact intend to compel institutional 
schooling, are required to achieve between collectivist and counter-
vailing pluralistic interests. 
As a general rule "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State, 
having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose 
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic educa-
tion."85 State and federal courts have almost universally upheld the 
constitutionality of compulsory education requirements that have 
been challenged as violative of the parents' right to control the up-
bringing of their children.80 However, in two cases, Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters87 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,88 the Supreme Court has 
declared that compulsory education requirements exceeded the 
bounds of permissible state regulation and thus has limited the power 
of the state to utilize education to achieve collectivist goals. 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,89 ,the Court held unconstitutional 
an Oregon compulsory education act that required public school at-
tendance. 00 The Oregon law had been enaoted by a popular refer-
endum after a volatile campaign during which public debate focused 
on the merits of social diversity. The stated goal of the act's nativis-
note 80, at 106 n.8. The court, ignoring both the legislative history and rule of 
construction, held home education to be an acceptable fulfillment of the statute's 
requirements. 
85. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). See State v. Bailey, 151 
Ind. 324, 329, 61 N.E. 730, 731-32 (1901) (natural rights of parent to custody and 
control of infant child are subordinate to power of state and may be restricted and 
regulated by municipal laws); DeLease v. Nolan, 185 App. Div. 82, 84, 172 N.Y.S. 
552, 554 (1918) ("The State is sovereign in the matter of the attendance of a child 
at school. The dominion of the State is absolute as far as attendance upon instruc-
tion is concerned . . . . The consent of the parent to the absence of the child has 
no effect upon this lawful dominion of the State"). 
86. See, e.g., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974): 
Concerned Citizens for Neighborhood Schools, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 
1233 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685, 
appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 
(1901); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929); Stephens v. Bongart, 15 
N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937): DeLease v. Nolan, 185 
App. Div. 82, 172 N.Y.S. 552 (1918); State v. Williams, 56 S.D. 370, 228 N.W. 
470 (1929). 
87. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
88. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
89. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
90. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act, ch. 1, § 1 [1923] Or. Laws 9, 
adopted November 7, 1922 under the initiative provision of the Oregon constitution, 
see generally note 4 supra, provided exemptions from public school attendance only 
"for children who are not normal, or who have completed the eighth grade, or who 
reside at considerable distances from any public school, or whose parents or guardians 
hold special permits from the County Superintendent." 268 U.S. at 530-31. 
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tic supporters, which included the Ku Klux Klan, was to extirpate 
pluralism in society by eliminating it in education. They envisioned 
a "common school" in which all children would receive a standard-
ized education and thereby develop a uniform outlook on social and 
political issues. Thus, the Oregon act manifested the collectivist in-
terest in education in its most extreme form. 91 
The law was challenged in the courts by two private schools, the 
Hill Military Academy and the Society of Sisters. 92 In holding the 
public school requirement unconstitutional, the Court did not ques-
tion the legitimacy of the state interests in academic achievement 
or in inculoating certain basic values in students, both of which could 
be adequately served by reasonable state regulation of all schools. 93 
What Pierce did say quite emphatically is that, while the state may 
seek to achieve individual equality and commonality of outlook 
through a moderate socialization program, it may not impose abso-
lute uniformity: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all Governments in 
this Union repose excludes any general policy of the state to standard-
ize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with 
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions.94 
91. See Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 
AM. HIST, REV. 74 (1968). 
92. These two private schools challenged the act in the courts after many groups 
had unsuccessfully campaigned against it. As one author has stated: 
A sense of outrage united an otherwise miscellaneous collection of opponents 
of the school bill. Religious leaders-Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish-deeply 
resented the implication that "sectarianism" was "unpatriotic." Businessmen 
feared increased taxes for new schools and a lower rate of investment and popu-
lation growth because of such "freak legislation". Minority groups, like Ne-
groes, Jews, and the foreign-born, detected totalitarian undertones in the argu-
ments of the bill's supporters. Private-school proprietors fought for their very 
existence. And citizens of many persuasions saw the tyranny of the majority 
in a Jaw that threatened religious freedom, parental duty, and constitutional 
rights. 
Tyack, supra note 91, at 86. 
93. No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to reg-
ulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and 
pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that 
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain 
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing 
be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. 
268 U.S. at 534. Thus, Pierce affirms the constitutionality of the state's promotion 
of collectivist socialization goals through compulsory school attendance. See Board 
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968) ("Since Pierce, a substantial body 
of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private 
schools, if it is to satisfy State compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which 
provide minimum hours of instruction . . . • Indeed, the State's interest in assuring 
that these standards are being met has been considered a sufficient reason for refus-
ing to accept instruction at home as compliance with compulsory education statutes") 
(footnotes omitted). 
94. 268 U.S. at 535. 
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Thus, the Court was able to accommodate the state's collectivist in-
terests in academic regulation and institutional socialization with the 
parents' pluralistic interest in affecting the socialization of their chil-
dren. 
In contrast to Pierce, in which the Court's recognition of this 
parental interest did not infringe on the state's control over the aca-
demic function of education, the facts of Yoder did not allow the 
Court a means of distinguishing the academic and socialization func-
tions of schools. In Yoder, the Court used the balancing test that 
the decision in Sherbert v. Verner95 requires in free exercise adjudi-
cations96 and held that a Wisconsin compulsory education statute,01 
in so far as it compelled education beyond the eighth grade, was un-
constitutional as applied to members of the Amish faith. 08 The 
Court determined that the fundamental Amish belief in nonworldli-
ness was totally incompatible with both the socialization and aca-
95. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that the first amendment 
free exercise right of the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
who was denied unemployment compensation when she could not find a job because 
of her refusal to work on Saturday, was unconstitutionally infringed. In so holding, 
the Court declared that state action indirectly interfering with the free exercise of 
religion could only be justified by a showing of a compelling need to regulate without 
exception. 374 U.S. at 403-04. 
In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger apparently interpreted the Sherbert test to require 
a balancing of the conflicting interests: "[W]e must searchingly examine the inter-
ests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education 
to age 16, and the impediment to those objections that would flow from recognizing 
the claimed Amish exemption. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner .... " 406 U.S. at 
221. "[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not 
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights 
and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause , , . ," 
406 U.S. at 214. 
96. See Note, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Develop-
ments, 1971 WIS. L. REV. 832, 836-40. 
97. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1975-1976). 
98. See 406 U.S. at 234. By so holding, the Supreme Court vindicated the Amish 
who had been convicted for violating the compulsory education laws. See State v. 
·Garber, 197 Kan. 567,419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Smoker, 177 Pa. Super. 435, 110 A.2d 740 (1955); Commonwealth 
v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951) (per curiam); Commonwealth 
v. Petersheim, 70 Pa. D. & C. 432 (Somerset County Ct. 1949), affd., 166 Pa. Super. 
90, 70 A.2d 395 (1950) (appellate court affirmed acquittal of particular defendant 
to avoid possibility of double jeopardy, but held tpere was no constitutional bar to 
prosecutions of the Amish for failure to comply with compulsory education laws). 
For discussions of the Amish conflict with public education before the Supreme 
Court decided Yoder, see Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old 
Order Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REV. 423 (1968); 
Erickson, The Plain People and the Public Schools, SATURDAY REVIEW, Nov. 19, 
1966; Littell, State of Iowa vs. the Amish, 83 CmusT. CENT. 234 (1966); Scalise, 
The Amish in Iowa and Teacher Certification, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 1 (1967); Note, 
The Amish School Controversy in Iowa, 10 ST. Louis U. L.J. 555 (1966); Note, 
The Right Not To Be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory Education, 53 
VA. L. REv. 925 (1967). 
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demic goals of public education beyond the eighth grade.99 This 
total incompatibility forced the Court to choose between the state's 
collectivist interests and the individuals' pluralistic interests; no mid-
dle ground was possible. Although the Court conceded that com-
pulsory education was a compelling state interest in the "generality 
of cases,"100 it concluded that the interests of individuals outweighed 
those of the state once the Amish students had received a "basic" 
education. tot 
The state in ·y oder asserted two major rationales for applying 
the full compulsory education requirement to the Amish. First, it 
advanced the collectivist argument that "some degree of education 
is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelli-
gently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom 
and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be 
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."t02 The Court 
accepted this formulation but held that, because of the unique char-
acter of Amish society, eight years of school was sufficient to fulfill 
the state's interest. toa In justifying its conclusion, the Court repeat-
edly emphasized the success of the Amish as a cohesive group within 
society: 
The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has en-
abled them to function effectively in their day-to-day life under self-
imposed limitations on relations with the world, and to survive and 
prosper in contemporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable 
and highly self-sufficient community for more than 200 years in the 
country. In itself this is strong evidence that they are capable of ful-
filling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without 
compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeop-
ardizing their free exercise of religious belief. to4 
Second, the state asserted its power as parens patriae to inter-
vene between child and parent to secure the benefit of secondary 
education for the child.105 In support of this contention, reliance 
was placed on Prince v. Massachusetts,1°6 which had allowed the ap-
plication of state child labor laws to prevent children of the Jehovah's 
Witness faith from publicly distributing pamphlets. The Court, how-
ever, interpreted Prince so narrowly as to apply only to situations 
99. 406 U.S. at 218. For general discussions of Amish society, see J. HOSTET-
LER, AMISH SOCIEIT (1968); J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGI'ON, CHILDREN IN 
AMISH SOCIEIT (1971); W. SCHREIBER, OUR AMISH NEIGHBORS (1962); E. SMl1ll, 
THE AMISH PEOPLE (1958). 
100. 406 U.S. at 221. 
101. 406 U.S. at 234. 
102. 406 U.S. at 221. 
103. 406 U.S. at 222, 22S. 
104. 406 U.S. at 225. 
10S. 406 U.S. at 229. 
106. ~21 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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dn which a substantial threat of "harm to •the physical or mental 
health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order or welfare 
is demonstrated or may ·be properly inferred."107 Conceding that po-
litical illiteracy and economic dependency were substantial threats 
to society, the Court held that the ,state possessed no power under 
Prince to alter the decisions of the Amish parents because the par-
ents had demonstrated that their children posed no such threat.108 
In rejecting the state's arguments, the Court recognized that the 
interests of pluralism secured for the Amish a right to be free from 
state-regulated education after the eighth grade. At the same time, 
the Court implied the existence of a core collectivist function in com-
pulsory education-a compelling state interest in requiring education 
to the point at which an individual no longer threatens to be a lia-
bility to society either politically, economically, or socially. Al-
though the state continues to have an interest in education beyond 
this threshold level, an interest in producing individuals who are in 
fact assets to society, the Yoder Court appeared unwilling to label 
this as compelling.100 
To recapitulate, Pierce focuses on the socialization function of 
formal education, which is of greatest significance to individuals who 
seek to preserve autonomy from governmental regulation, and estab-
lishes a limit beyond which collectivist goals will not be supported. 
Standardization of students is not a legitimate state interest in educa-
tion. Yoder, on the other hand, indicates a limit below which plural-
istic interests will not be recognized. The parental desire to control 
the upbringing of children is not a legitimate interest if it will pro-
duce individuals who may be economic or political liabilities to so-
ciety. 
With tlle holdings of Pierce and Yoder thus stated, it is now neces-
sary to consider their implications for current parental attempts to 
escape from the application of state compulsory education laws. The 
Pierce Court articulated two grounds for its holding: the "economic 
107. 406 U.S. at 230. In limiting Prince in this manner, the Court followed 
the "interpretation of Prince articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-
03 (1963). 
108. 406 U.S. at 234. 
109. In his concurring opinion, however, Justice White expressed his belief that 
the state has an interest in affirmatively developing the productive potential of its 
children: "A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the latent 
talents of the children but also in seeking to prepare them for the life style that 
they may later choose ..•. " 406 U.S. at 240. Apparently, if it could have been 
proved that as a result of an exemption to compulsory education beyond the eighth 
grade, these latent talents would not have been realized, Justice White would have 
found this state interest to be of a compelling nature and thus sufficient to override 
the parents' free exercise claims. However, Justice White, believing that an exemp-
tion would not stifle any latent talents of the Amish children, concluded that the 
legitimate state interest was not compe]]ing and that full compliance with compulsory 
education was not necessary. 406 U.S. at 240, 
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substantive due process" right of the private schools to conduct their 
business and the "personal substantive due process" right of parents 
to control their children. 110 Since the former theory has long been 
abandoned by the Court, 111 the present vitality of the case now rests 
on the parents' personal substantive due process rights, which are 
encompassed by the developing constitutional right of privacy.112 
The majority opinion in Roe v. Wade113 specifically indicated that 
the fundamental right of privacy protects the parental activities of 
child rearing and education.114 Accordingly, to the extent that the 
state's compulsory education requirements abridge this fundamental 
right, the state should seemingly be required to demonstrate that the 
legislation imposing such requirements is "narrowly and precisely 
drawn" in furtherance of a "compelling state interest."115 
110. The economic and personal substantive due process theories would appear 
to be alternate holdings, if the private schools had standing to assert the rights of 
parents. The Court did not explain how the schools could have had such standing; 
however, Pierce has been interpreted as involving an exception to usual standing 
rules. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). 
111. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); McCloskey, 
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An E:rhumation and Reburial, 1962 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 34, 38. 
112. See G. GUNTIIER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNsrITUTIONAL LAw 616-19 
(9th ed. 1975); Runyon v. McCrary, 44 U.S.L.W. 5033, 5039-40 (U.S. June 25, 
1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (The right of privacy, inhering in 
the "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, protects "freed om of choice 
in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contra-
ception, and the education and upbringing of children") (Douglas, J., concurring as 
to the unconstitutionality of a Georgia statute severely limiting abortion) (emphasis 
original). See generally Project--Government Information and the· Rights of Citi-
zens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1289-91 (1975). 
Significantly, in the recent case of Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), 
the Supreme Court, confronted with a police officer's challenge to departmental 
grooming standards, revived the terminology of substantive due process. Assuming, 
arguendo, that the individual's interest in matters of personal appearance are the 
same as his interest in "certain basis matters of procreation, marriage, and family 
life," 425 U.S. at 244, the Court, emphasizing the particular needs of the police 
department to regulate its personnel, held that no "liberty interest" was infringed 
if the regulation was not "so irrational that it could be branded 'arbitrary.'" 425 
U.S. at 248. See note 538 infra & text at notes 533-37 infra. 
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
114. 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citing Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) as authority); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
115. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 
637 (1969) ("strict scrutiny" analysis, mandated because of infringement of funda-
mental right, requires that statute be justified by compelling state interest and that 
statute prescribes least restrictive means of achieving end); Aptheker v. Secretary 
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964) (statute must be narrowly and precisely drawn). 
A challenge of parents to compulsory education based on a general interest in 
the upbringing of their children should require the same constitutional analysis as 
a challenge based on parents' interest in the religious upbringing of their children. 
The "strict scrutiny" standard, evoked when a statute infringes upon a fundamental 
right, is identical to the standard applied to a statute infringing upon the free exercise 
of religion. Both elements of the "strict scrutiny" standard have been applied in 
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Yoder's recognition that the state has a compelling interest in 
promoting certain academic achievements and in socializing children 
takes on added significance in light of this interpretation of Pierce. 
For a court to uphold the application of a state's compulsory educa-
tion statute to particular plaintiffs, the facts must show that the state's 
collectivist interests cannot be furthered through less restrictive 
means. In other words, the statute, as applied, must be drawn with 
sufficient narrowness and precision. Yoder indicates that in most 
cases the state will have no difficulty demonstrating the necessity of 
fulfilling its statutory compulsory education requirements.116 But 
the rationale of Yoder indicates that if particular parents can demon-
strate the existence of an alternative method of achieving the state's 
core collectivist interests, they should be able to gain an exemption 
from compulsory education.117 
Thus, the crucial question raised by Yoder is what alternatives 
to compulsory education ~ill satisfy these interests. In those states 
free exercise cases. See, e.g., ·sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (com-
pelling state interest); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940) (statute 
must be narrowly drawn). 
Despite the fact that Chief Justice Burger, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, expressly 
adopted a balancing test to determine the constitutionality of the statute that in-
fringed upon the free exercise rights of the Amish Yoder does not contradict this 
analysis. First, Burger cited as authority Sherbert v. Verner, which required that 
the statute be justified by a compelling state interest. See note 95 supra. Second, 
the balancing in Yoder is similar to a "strict scrutiny" analysis, which involves some 
balancing: The asserted fundamental right is inevitably used as a standard against 
which to judge whether the state interest is compelling. However, it must be noted 
that one court has concluded that the Yoder balancing standard is a substantive de-
parture from the compelling state interest standard. See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp, 
395,399 (D.N.H. 1974). 
Even though the constitutional analysis invoked by parental challenges to com-
pulsory education should be the same whether or not the parental challenge has a 
free exercise basis, parents' interest in the religious upbringing of their children will 
undoubtedly weigh heavier than a general nurture interest in the balnncing of the 
asserted parental and state interests. Yoder provides an example of this phenome-
non. See text at note 121 infra. 
116. The application of this constitutional interplay between Pierce and Yoder 
can best be shown in the context of a specific example. In Scoma v. Board of Educ., 
391 F. Supp. 452 {N.D. Ill. 1974), the plaintiff-parents sought a declaratory judgment 
against the Board's enforcement of the Illinois compulsory education statute. The 
plaintiffs, relying on Pierce, asserted that they had a fundamental right "to be pro-
tected in their family privacy and personal decision-making from governmental intru-
sion." 391 F. Supp. at 460, quoting Complaint for Plaintiff. The court found that 
the parents asserted no fundamental right "within the bounds of Constitutional pro-
tection," 391 F. Supp. at 461, and thus upheld the statute's constitutionality on the 
ground that "the state need not demonstrate a 'compelling interest'; it must act only 
'reasonably' in requiring children to attend school." 391 F. Supp. at 461. Although 
the result in Scoma would appear to be correct, but see note 119 infra, the court's 
determination that the asserted parental right is not fundamental is erroneous in light 
of Roe and Doe, see note 112 supra. The state should have been required to demon-
strate a compelling interest in compulsory education, see text at note 115 supra, a 
demonstration that Yoder indicates will be routine in most cases. 406 U.S. at 221. 
117. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-26 (1972); Knudsen, supra note 
47, at 1512. 
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that permit "home education" because their legislatures consider 
only the academic interest to be compelling, it is relatively easy to 
show that a noninstitutional alternative has satisfied core collectivist 
goals in education. For example, whether state requirements such 
as curriculum content are met in the alternative setting can be readily 
determined, and a child's,rate of academic achievement can be easily 
measured. 118 However, in the majority of states, which consider social-
ization a compelling interest in education, the task of determining 
whether the alternative meets Yoder's nonliability-to-society stand-
ard is more problematic. Socialization requirements are intapgible 
and difficult to measure. As a result, courts must generally rely on 
legislative standards that typically define socialization to require an 
institutional setting. Thus, the perceived inadequacy of the nonin-
stitutional alternative in fulfilling the socialization requirement is the 
major obstacle to parental attempts to remove their children from 
traditional public education.119 
In Yoder, the Amish were allowed an exemption from the com-
pulsory education requirement only after they had persuasively dem-
onstrated that their scheme of alternative education beyond the 
eighth grade fulfilled core collectivist interests. In fact, the opinion 
indicated that the Amish community was perhaps better able than 
outsiders to achieve the goals of obedience to law and self-suffi-
118. See note 82 supra. 
119. The home education alternative to institutional education, recognized in 
some states either specifically by statute, see note 55 supra, or by judicial construc-
tion, see text at notes 55-84 supra, has interesting constitutional implications. The 
cases allowing for home education clearly demand that the noninstitutional alterna-
tive establish adequate academic standards. See note 67 supra. Rather than recog-
nizing that home education fulfills collectivist socialization interests, however, these 
cases simply hold that the compulsory education statute fails to assert a compelling 
state interest in the socialization function of education. It follows that if institutional 
socialization is not deemed a compelling state interest, then the state's core collecti-
vist interests in education are limited to state required academic instruction; thus, 
under the rationale of Yoder, if there is an educational alternative satisfying state 
academic requirements, then the state is denied the power to compel institutional 
education. 
Such an elevation of the home education alternative to the status of a constitu-
tional right is the issue with which the federal district court in Scoma v. Board of 
Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974), should have been concerned. Plaintiff-
parents sought a declaratory judgment that the Illinois compulsory education statute 
was unconstitutional as applied to them. See note 116 supra. As the Illinois Su-
preme Court declared in People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950), 
see text at notes 79-83 supra, the Illinois compulsory education statute is primarily 
concerned with the academic education of the state's children; the socialization of 
children is left for parental direction in the choices of manner and place of instruc-
tion. Under this law, had the district court applied the doctrinal analysis dictated 
by Pierce, Roe and Yoder, see text at notes 111-17 supra, the sole issue as to the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to the Scomas would have been whether 
the home instruction provided by the Scomas satisfied the state's compelling interest 
in the academic function of education. However, the court, avoiding the issue, relied 
on the traditionally cited but outdated cases that hold compulsory education to be 
within the reasonable exercise of a state's police power. See 391 F. Supp. at 461. 
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ciency, even though the means used by the Amish involved auton-
omy from state regulation.120 However, the carefully chosen lan-
guage and the unique fact situation of Yoder indicate that the range 
of noninstitutional alternatives that can satisfy the socialization re-
quirement and thereby fulfill the state's asserted interests in educa-
tion is narrow indeed. First, the Amish did not challenge the re-
quirement of institutional education during the first eight years of 
schooling; rather, they only sought an exemption from the one 
or two years of state-mandated education beyond the eighth grade. 
Second, the Yoder Court, by repeatedly emphasizing the religious 
foundation of the Amish claim, strongly implied that the courts 
should not be receptive to parental claims that are not firmly rooted 
in a bona fide religious belief.121 Finally, and most significantly, the 
uniqueness of Amish culture itself makes it highly unlikely that other 
cultures will possess the characteristics that prompted the Court to 
grant an exemption in Yoder. Because the Amish were "a separate, 
sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community,»122 the 
Court assessed the individual's potential to be a social liability not 
within the framework of mainstream American society but rather 
within the Amish community itself. Moreover, the Amish could 
point to a history of more than 200 years in this country as an inde-
pendent and successfully functioning social unit.123 The Court indi-
cated that these factors compelled its finding that the additional year 
or two of compulsory education would yield the state "at best a spec-
ulative gain. "124 
In conclusion, it is doubtful that any extant religious or social 
group could satisfy the strict standards of Y oder.1211 Nevertheless, 
the case does establish a theoretical foundation upon which further 
exemptions to compulsory education could be built. If societal views 
evolve to the point at which institutional education is no longer per-
ceived to further core interests, 126 then Yoder would support a con-
clusion that the state interest in institutional education is no longer 
compelling. Once that conclusion is reached, parents who assert a 
fundamental right to control their children's education should be able 
to gain exemptions from state compulsory education requirements, 
120. See 406 U.S. at 224-25. 
121. 406 U.S. at 235. 
122. 406 U.S. at 225. See text at note 104 supra. 
123. 406 U.S. at 226-27. 
124. See 406 U.S. at 227. 
125. But see Knudsen, supra note 47, at 1512 n.36. 
1-26. The intellectual foundation for such an evolution exists. See generally I. 
BERG, EDUCATION AND Jons: THE GREAT TRAINING ROBBERY (1971); P. GOODMAN, 
COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION AND TI-IE COMMUNl1Y OF ScHOLARS (1964); I. ILLICH, 
DESCHOOLING Soc1E1Y (1971). 
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at least if they can demonstrate that society's remaining core collec-
tivist interests can be satisfied in a noninstitutional context. 
B. The Conflict over Equal Educational Opportunity 
The second type of conflict over the scope of universal education 
involves the demands of individuals for greater educational benefits 
than the state is willing to provide.127 Since the 1954 Supreme 
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,128 such claims for 
greater access, usually asserted under the equal protection clause, 129 
have substantially outnumbered individual efforts to secure exemp-
-tions from formal education. 
As noted above, individuals demanding greater educational op-
portunities in such cases assert the collectivist interest in equality of 
educational experience to support their claims, and the state re-
sponds by appealing to such pluralistic interests as "local control'' 
and parental input in educational decisions.130 The ultimate accom-
modation that the courts have achieved is very similar to that reached 
in the context of claims for exemption from compulsory education. 
An individual claim for increased access to the academic and social-
ization opportunities of public education is likely to prevail if it coin-
cides with the core collectivist interests of the state (i.e., achieve-
ment of sufficient political literacy, economic self-sufficiency, and so-
cial integration). However, an aspiration for educational opportuni-
ties exactly equal to those enjoyed by others is analogous to the 
127. See note 45 supra. 
128. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
129. The equal protection clause alone does not create an individual right to edu-
cation. Individual rights to education arise under the equal protection clause only 
when (1) a state maintains a tax-supported school system, and (2) the state laws 
governing such system infringe on an individual's right to equal protection of the 
Jaw. See Comment, supra note 4, at 351-52. 
In equal protection terms, the argument that will be. advanced in section II-B of 
the text is that a basic education sufficient to prevent an individual from becoming 
a liability to society is a fundamental right, see text at notes 13S-4O infra; any 
state interference with this right through discriminatory regulation or administration 
of public schools should invoke strict judicial scrutiny. The proposition that a basic 
education is a fundamental right includes both the academic and socialization func-
tions of education. However, the proposition will most likely only be an issue when 
the academic function of education is the primary concern. An allegation of a depri-
vation of adequate socialization will usually involve the suspect classification of race, 
which would require the strict scrutiny analysis. 
The argument in section II-B of the text will be that the individual's interest in 
basic socialization should be given greater weight in determining when a suspect state 
classification exists. See text at notes 187-204 infra. Of course, the most controver-
sial issue in the public school desegregation area has been the scope of the required 
remedy once an unconstitutional state classification has been found. On this issue 
the argument below is that the required scope of the remedy is tied to the provision 
of an adequate community-wide socializing experience through public education. See 
text at notes 212-49 infra. 
130. See text at notes S8-S9 supra •. 
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state's desire to standardize people asserted in Pierce, and the indi-
vidual asserting such a claim will generally lose. This section will 
first examine individual claims for increased academic opportunities. 
It will then analyze the desegregation cases as an example of individ-
ual demands for equal access to the socialization function of educa-
tion. 
l. Access to Academic Opportunities 
In. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 131 the 
Supreme Court established constitutional guidelines for the right of 
greater exppsure to academic opportunities in education. Specifi-
cally, the Court held that the Texas system of local property taxa-
tion was a constitutional method of financing public schools even 
though it resulted in unequal per pupil expenditures among the 
state's school districts. The Court held that there was no fundamen-
tal right to education132 and that the Texas financing system had a 
reasonable relation to the legitimate state interest in local control of 
education.133 
Conceptually, Rodriguez is the mirror image of Pierce.184 The 
individual claim for equal dollar expenditures per pupil can be 
viewed as a demand for standardization of the educational product 
closely akin to the state's demand in Pierce for compulsory attend-
ance at standardized schools. Not surprisingly, therefore, the local 
control rationale used by the Rodriguez Court to justify its denial 
of the claim for uniform expenditures protects parental input into 
public education just as Pierce protected parental direction of the 
education of their children. 
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez argued that a fundamental constitu-
tional right to education was· implicit in the right of free speech 
("[t]he marketplace of ideas is an empty forum for those lacking 
basic communicative skills"135 ) and in the right to vote (",a voter 
cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and 
thought processes have been adequately developed"136). The 
Texas school system indisputably provided every child with at least 
the "opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skiIJs necessary for the 
enjoyment of the right of speech and of full participation in the po-
litical process,"187 ·and the Rodriguez Court strongly implied that in-
dividuals have a fundamental right to such a level of schooling.138 
131. 411 U.S. 1 (1972). 
132. 411 U.S. at 37. 
133. 411 U.S. at 55. 
134. See text at notes 89-94 supra. 
135. 411 U.S. at 35. 
136. 411 U.S. at 36. 
137. 411 U.S. at 37. 
138. Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is 
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The Court held, however, that the Constitution establishes no funda-
mental right to education beyond this basic level. It concluded that 
while the Constitution guarantees these rights, it does not guarantee 
"the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice"139 
and, accordingly, it does not implicitly guarantee an opportunity to 
experience the most effective education. 
Thus, the individual apparently does have a fundamental right 
to education that coincides with the state's compelling interest in re-
quiring education. Both the right and the interest focus on consider-
ations of political literacy and economic self-sufficiency. Education, 
therefore, might be viewed as a reciprocal arrangement between the 
individual and the state for their mutual benefit. What a state can 
constitutionally compel, it ought to have a constitutional duty to pro-
vide, and, conversely, what a state cannot compel, individuals should 
not have a right to demand.140 
a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either 
right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures 
in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merits appellees' argu-
ment might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of 
educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis 
for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differ-
ences fa spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present case-
no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with 
an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment 
of the rights of free speech and of full participation in the political process. 
411 U.S. at 36-37. See Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet 
Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1105 (1973) ("In the case of exclusion from 
educational opportunity, we deal with a system of public education which does deny 
to some children all opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary to 
citizenship [and] therefore we deal with state regulation directly affecting freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution"); Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing 
the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO Sr. L.J. 
349, 362-64 (1975). For a discussion of the position that the equal protection clause 
is most helpfully viewed as a guarantee of a minimal level of certain social benefits, 
see Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
139. 411 U.S. at 36 (emphasis original). 
140. The suggested quid pro quo rationale for imposing upon the state a duty 
to provide a minimal education is still valid even if a state should decide not to 
compel edu~ation. This follows for two reasons. First, the indivdual's right to de-
mand should arise by virtue of the state's power to compel. The state can compel 
one to experience the opportunity of achieving a basic education; thus the individual 
should have the right to demand the opportunity of achieving a basic education 
whether or not the state chooses to compel. The state's decision not to compel is 
equivalent to the individual's decision not to demand. 
Second, the equal protection clause supports the imposition of such a duty on 
a state that provides public education, independent of the compulsory nature of such 
education. Assuming, under the strong implications of Rodriguez, that individuals 
have a fundamental right to seek knowledge and education sufficient to guarantee 
the meaningful exercise of the rights to vote and speak, then a state system of public 
education that interferes with this right is subject to a high degree of judicial scrutiny. 
Public education interferes with the right to pursue a basic education in three circum-
stances: when a child is excluded from public education, when a child is classified 
into an educational level beneath the child's intellectual ability and, finally, when 
a child unable to achieve a basic level of education from exposu.re to generally pro-
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The pluralistic interest that limited the plaintiffs' rights in Rodri-
guez, local control of schools, parallels the interest that limited the 
state's power in Pierce and Yoder, parental control over the educa-
tion of children.141 Pierce recognized the right of parents to direct 
the education of their children, at least to the extent of choosing be-
tween private and public schools.142 While the parents of children 
who attend public schools are unable to supervise the individual edu-
cation of their children, local control at least allows such parents 
some input into the educational decision-making process.143 As Jus-
tice Powell stated in Rodriguez, local control permits parents both 
the opportunity to generate increased revenues for the support of 
the public sohools that educate their children and, "[e]qually impor-
tant, . . . the opportunity . . . [to participate] in the decisionmak-
ing process that determines how these local tax dollars will be 
spent."144 Thus, the Court in Rodriguez achieved an accommoda-
tion between collectivist and pluralistic interests in academic educa-
vided public instruction is offered only such instruction. Therefore, a state that 
decides not to compel education, but classifies students in one of the above ways, 
ought to make a compelling showing of why it should not make available to each 
child the best possible opportunity for achieving a basic level of education. See Mills 
v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972); Dimond, supra note 
138, at 1121-26; Handel, supra note 138, at 367-74. Contra, Cuyahoga County Assn. 
for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 44 U.S.L.W. 2479 (U.S.D.C. Ohio, May 
5, 1976) (refusing to find a fundamental right to even a minimal level of education). 
141. The Court in Rodriguez clearly viewed local control of public schools as 
a manifestation of pluralism: 
In an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of the func-
tions of government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has sur-
vived .... 
. . • Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism 
also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy 
competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-State rela-
tionship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis 
identified as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's 
freedom to "serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments." No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity 
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public education. 
41 I U.S. at 49-50. 
142. See text at note 94 supra. 
143. It has been forcefully argued that local control of schools might have some 
degree of constitutional protection: 
I do not believe recognition of [the] right [to educate one's children as one 
chooses, which was recognized in Pierce,] can be confined solely to a parent's 
choice to send a child to public or private school. Most parents cannot afford 
the luxuzy of a private education for their children, and the dual obligation of 
private tuitions and public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons seek 
public education for their children should not be forced to forfeit all interest 
or voice in the school their child attends. It would, of course, be impractical 
to allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling. Yet the interest of 
the parent in the enhanced parent-school and parent-child communication al-
lowed by the neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressed by force of law. 
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 247 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). See also Wormhoudt, Supreme Court Decisions, in 
THE TWELVE YEAR SENTENCE 64-70 (W. Rickenbacker ed. 1974). 
144. 411 U.S. at 49-50. 
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tion 145 parallel to that which was achieved in the compulsory educa-
tion context. The state can regulate the mode of education and can 
itself be required to provide education until the goals of self-suffi-
ciency and political literacy are reached. But beyond that point, 
pluralism, whether manifested in enhanced local school board 
power or in direct parental control over the education of their chil-
dren, must prevail over the powers and duties of the state.146 
Although this collectivist-pluralist continuum provides an effec-
tive method of analyzing the countervailing interests in education, 
the determination of the -actual educational level at which the rights 
and duties in education should shift poses a difficult problem. The 
definitional problems inherent in concepts such as "political literacy" 
and "economic independence" have forced the courts in compulsory 
education cases to rely substantially upon the meanings given these 
terms by the states in their compulsory education requirements.147 
Similarly, the courts in equal educational opportunity cases have usu-
ally been forced to defer to the educational offerings actually pro-
vided by the state in determining what is meant by a "basic educa-
tion. "148 In Rodriguez, the Court recognized that no clear relation-
ship between educational input (including resources, methods, and 
policies) and educational results has yet been established.149 Thus, 
rather than defining the right to education in terms of either re-
sources or results, it did so in terms of the state's efforts to ensure 
145. "The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these two forces. 
While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and en-
courages a large measure of participation in and control of each district's schools 
at the local level." 411 U.S. at 49. One state court has also acknowledged this 
accommodation of interests in the educational program: 
Where one district may offer a richer program in music and dramatic arts, 
another may go beyond the State's requirements in science or social studies, or 
physical education or agriculture, and others may emphasize more than one field 
of student activity beyond the college preparatory phases. . . . These are 
choices which inhere in the idea of viable local participation in establishing, 
operating and funding the common schools. If these differences are of consti-
tutional dimension, there exists a remedy in equity to compel the particular 
school district or the state in a particular case to provide such services . . . . 
Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 191 (Wash. 1974). 
146. See text at notes 108-09 supra. 
147. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (indicating that 
Court, in generality of cases, would uphold state's system of compulsory education). 
148. See, e.g., Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. III. 1968), affd. 
sub nom. Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (]969). 
149. The relationship between educational inputs and educational outcomes has 
been called the education production function. See Yudof, supra note 42, at 422-
29. Although the production function of education has been extensively discussed, 
few definitive conclusions have been reached as to what actually accounts for educa-
tional achievement. See generally I. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J. Mc-
PoRTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFOLD & R. YORK, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-
TUNl1Y (1966) [hereinafter J. COLEMAN]; J. GUTIIRIE, G. KLIENDORFER, H. LEVIN & 
R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY (1971); Mosteller & Moynihan, A Pathbreaking 
Report, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUN11Y 347 (F. Mosteller & D. 
Moynihan eds. 1972). 
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that state-determined basic educational resources are available in all 
schools.150 In effect, this means that for most children, the funda-
mental right to an adequate education is merely the right to attend 
public schools. 
However, just ·as a unique showing of "self sufficiency" by the 
Amish in Yoder forced the state to alter its compulsory education 
requirement because the standard means of advancing collectivist in-
terests were not needed, unique showings of educational need may 
force a state to alter its functional definition of "basic education."1a1 
An example of a group with unique needs is provided by children 
whose native language is not English and who are thereby substan-
,tially more difficult to teach.152 Such non-English speaking students 
have in several cases sought to provide :them with a compensatory ed-
ucational program.153 They have asserted that a "basic education" 
provided solely in English does not permit them to achieve political 
literacy ·and economic self-sufficiency.154 The state has replied that in 
150. See 411 U.S. at 44-45. 
151. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Mills v. Board of Educ., 
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
152. A second group of children that possesses unique educational needs are chil-
dren with mental, emotional or physical handicaps. See generally Weintraub & Abe-
son, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 
SYR. L. REV. 1037 (1972). A right to a basic education for handicapped children 
is gaining recognition in both constitutional and legislative contexts. See Fiske, Spe-
cial Education ls Now a Matter of Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1976, § 12 
(Spring Survey of Education), at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.). Constitutional support for 
the right to a basic education can be derived from the equal protection clause, guaran-
teeing exposure to instruction adequate to create for the handicapped child the oppor-
tunity to achieve a basic education, or from the due process clause, guaranteeing 
proper procedural placement of a handicapped child within an educational system. 
See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875-76 (D.D.C. 1972); Dimond, 
supra note 138; Handel, supra note 138. The handicapped child's right to a basic 
education has been recognized in state and federal legislation. Forty-eight states have 
enacted laws mandating special education for handicapped children and enforcement 
appears to be growing. Fiske, supra, at 14, col. 5. See, e.g., MICH, COMP. LAws ANN, 
§§ 340.10-.12, 340.252b, 340.291a, 340.298c, 340.317a, 340.329c, 340.601-.601b, 340.-
613-.773a, 340.780k (1976). Congress recently passed the Education of All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, which requires states 
after 1977, to provide a "free, appropriate education" for all handicapped children. 
All Congressional requirements for education of the handicapped are now set out 
in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975). In light of these 
statutory developments, it is doubtful that courts, in the context of handicapped 
children, will have to address as a matter of constitutional law the implication of 
Rodriguez that a basic education is a fundamental right for equal protection or due 
process purposes. See Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846, 847 (E.D. Mich. 
1972) (plaintiffs' equal protection complaint held moot). See also text at note 177 
infra. 
153. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Morales v. Shannon, 516 
F.2d 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975); Serna v. Portales Municipal 
Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). 
154. The overlap between the academic and socialization functions of education, 
see note 51 supra, is manifest here. The claim is essentially that the inability to 
achieve adequate academic performance, caused by the linguistic obstacle, leads to 
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such cases responsibility for educatlional achievement must .rest not on 
society but on the individual.155 Because the collectivist interests as-
serted in such cases parallel those that prevailed in the compulsory 
education cases and were recognized by implication in Rodriguez, 
it seems that they should prevail in this context as well. While courts 
have consistently recognized in cases brought under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 that special courses for non-English speaking students 
are necessary means of achieving literacy and self-sufficiency,156 
they have differed on whether such student claims are supported by 
-the equal protection clause.157 
The basic issue in cases that assert a constitutional claim is 
whether similar treatment of persons not similarly situated necessar-
ily satisfies the equal protection clause.158 The plaintiffs in these 
cases generally do not contend that the state has acted to deprive 
them of educational opportunities; ,rather, they ·assert :that the state 
has an affirmative duty to ameliorate their linguistic disadvantage to 
ensure them opportunities equal to those of individuals who enter 
school without such handicaps. Such plaintiffs are faced with a diffi-
cult doctrinal obstacle to the establishment of a violation of the four-
teenth amendment. Equal protection claims require a showing of 
state action.159 
Courts have differed on whether claims that request compensa-
tory programs to ensure equal educational opportunities have suc-
cessfully demonstrated unconstitutional state action.100 In Lau v. 
Nichols, 161 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, finding no state ac-
social stigmatization; moreover the combination of poor academic achievement and 
social isolation prevents the educational training and experience necessary for inte-
grated participation in the political and economic mainstreams of American society: 
Undisputed evidence shows that Spanish surnamed students do not reach the 
achievement levels attained by their Anglo counterparts. . • . [A]chievement 
tests, which are given totally in the English language, disclose that [students with 
English language deficiencies] are almost a full grade behind [other] children 
• • . in reading, language mechanics and language expression . . • . 
. • • [C]hildren who are not achieving often demonstrate both academic and 
emotional disorders. They are frustrated and they express their frustration in 
lack of attendance, lack of school involvement and lack of community involve-
ment. Their frustrations are reflected in hostile behavior, discipline problems 
and eventually dropping out of school. 
Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1974). 
155. See text at note 162 infra. 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna 
v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). 
151. Compare Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 
1972) (violation), with Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973) (no violation). 
158. See Serna v. Portales, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D.N.M. 1972). 
159. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1973); Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
160. Compare Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), with Serna v. Por-
tales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). 
161. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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tion, denied the request of Chinese children in San Francisco for 
compensatory education in English: 
Every student brings to the starting line of his educational career dif-
ferent advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social, eco-
nomic and cultural background, created and continued completely 
apart from any contribution by the school system. That some of 
these may be impediments which can be overcome does not amount 
to a "denial" by the Board of educational opportunities within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment should the Board fail to give 
them special attention, this even though they are characteristic of a 
particular ethnic group.1 62 
In support of its conclusion that the plaintiffs had asserted the requi-
site state action, the Lau dissent argued that because the children 
were "functionally" excluded from education, 163 the state had acted 
even though it had not actually "classified" such students.184 The 
dissent emphasized that the state's system of universal compulsory 
education,165 which was based on English166 and which required 
mastery of English as a prerequisite to graduation from public high 
sohool, carried with it reciprocal responsibilities: 167 "The pervasive 
involvement of the state with the very language problem challenged 
forbids the majority's finding of no state action."168 In Serna v. Port-
ales Municipal Schools, 169 Spanish-speaking plaintiffs brought a sim-
162. 483 F.2d at 797. However, the court contradicted the above implication 
that the achievement of English literacy is essentially an individual responsibility 
and hence a pluralistic interest. It asserted that the "use of English as the language 
of instruction . . . is intimately and properly related to the educational and socializ• 
ing purposes for which public schools were established." 483 F.2d at 798. This 
assertion of collectivist interests in individual achievement of English literacy is 
meaningless if the state assumes no responsibility for "educating and socializing" iso-
lated cultural and linguistic groups. 
163. For a general presentation of the educational and legal problems concerning 
exclusion and "functional exclusion" from public schools, see D. KIRP & M. YuooF, 
supra note 46, at 628-43. 
164. See 483 F.2d at 805 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en 
bane). 
165. CAL. EDuc. CoDE § 12101 (West 1975). 
166. CAL. Eouc. CODE § 71 (West 1975). 
167. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 8573 (West 1975). 
168. 483 F.2d at 806; cf. text at note 191 infra. This argument finds some sup-
port in the Supreme Court criminal justice cases of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), which held that an indi-
vidual cannot be denied access to various aspects of the criminal justice system on 
account of lack of ability to pay, and which required the state to take affirmative 
action to provide access. Both criminal justice and educational systems are compul-
sory. An indigent convict cannot fully utilize the criminal justice system without 
money and a non-English speaking student cannot take advantage of an educational 
system without compensatory education. A convict's poverty is no more attributable 
to the state than is the language deficiency of non-English speaking students. How-
ever, the situations are distinguishable in terms of classification. Indigent convicts 
were actually deprived of access to state benefits; non-English speaking students were 
only functionally denied a state education. 
169. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). 
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ilar claim for a compensatory educational program. The court 
adopted a position on the state action issue similar to that advocated 
by ithe Lau dissent 1and, in effect, 'held thait the denigration of an in-
dividual's interests in education through the "promulgation and insti-
tution of a program . . . which ignores the needs of [non-English 
speaking] students does constitute state action."170 
Because no similar doctrinal obstacle to recognition of an indi-
vidual's interest in gaining sufficient education exists in claims based 
on federal legislation,171 courts in such cases have universally recog-
nized a statutory right to compensatory education for non-English 
speaking students.172 Thus, the Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols113 
chose not to reach the equal protection issue. Instead, it held that 
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964174 placed an affirmative 
duty on the State of California to ensure that the Chinese children 
of San Francisco received a "meaningful" education and thus had 
their collectivist interests in education satisfied.175 In so interpreting, 
section 601, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the reciproc-
ity rationale articulated by the dissenting Ninth Circuit judges that 
a "basic" education becomes a fundamental right when the state un-
dertakes to compel education: 
170. 351 F. Supp. at 1283. 
111. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). The 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare guidelines provide: "Where inability 
to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group 
children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school 
district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency 
in order to open its instructional program to these students." 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 
(1970). In addition, Congress has enacted The Equal Educational Opportunity Act 
of 1974, § 204(f), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1703(f) (Supp. 1976), which provides that no 
state shall deny equal educational opportunity by failing "to take appropriate action 
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its 
instructional programs." 
172. The appropriate remedy for non-English speaking students who have been 
denied a basic education appears to be within the discretion of the district courts. 
See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564-65 (1974) ("No specific remedy is urged 
upon us. Teaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak 
the language is one choice. Giving instructions to this group in Chinese is another. 
There may be others"); Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 
(10th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he trial court, under its inherent equitable power, can prop-
erly fashion a bilingual-bicultural program which will ensure that Spanish surnamed 
children receive a meaningful education"). The bilingual-bicultural program ordered 
in Serna recognized the necessity of accommodating the pluralistic interests of the 
Spanish surnamed in their own language and culture while satisfying the collectivist 
goal of a basic education for everyone. 
173. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) ("No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance"). See note 171 supra. 
175. See 414 U.S. at 566. 
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Under those state-imposed standards there is no equality of treat-
ment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, 
teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English 
are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education. 
Basic English skills are at the very core of what these public 
schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can 
effectively participate in the educational program, he must already 
have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public edu-
cation. We know that those who do not understand English are cer-
tain to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and 
in no way·meaningful.176 
The fact that courts can point to a statutory right to a meaning-
ful "basic" education would seem to explain, at least in part, why 
more courts have not recognized a constitutional right to compensa-
tory programs for non-English speaking students. Because they 
have been able to protect the interests of individuals in acquiring 
an education without extending the doctrine of state action, courts 
have not yet been forced to recognize the implication of Rodriguez 
that all individuals have a constitutional right to an academic educa-
tion sufficient to ensure their political literacy and economic self-suf-
ficiency.177 
2. Access to Socialization Opportunities: 
The Example of Desegregation 
Individuals have also asked the courts to recognize their funda-
mental right to take part in the socialization process inherent in a 
commonly experienced "basic" education. Indeed, the modern era 
of education litigation began with the Supreme Court's acknowledge-
ment in Brown v. Board of Education118 that racial segregation in 
the public schools caused Black students to suffer serious injury by 
denying them access to the mainstream of American society: "[T]o 
separate [minority children] from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to ,their status in ,the community that may ·affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely to be undone. "179 
176. 414 U.S. at 566. 
177. See,note 152 supra. 
178. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
179. 347 U.S. at 494. See Fischer, Race and Reconciliation: The Role of the 
School, in THE NEGRO AMERICAN 491, 493 (T. Parsons & K. Clark eds. 1967) (not-
ing "the unfortunate psychological effect upon a child of membership in a school 
where every pupil knows that, regardless of his personal attainments, the group with 
which he is identified is viewed as less able, less successful, and less acceptable than 
the majority of the community"). The passage in Brown concerning psychological 
effects of segregation has been interpreted both as an accurate empirical statement 
and as a specific expression of the morality underlying collectivist ideals. Compare 
Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. 
L. REV. 564, 568-70 (1965), with Yudof, supra note 42, at 456-59. Both interpreta-
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The socialization function of education is to inculcate certain atti-
tudes and behavioral patterns in the young180 so they will not become 
social liabilities. Exposure to a common educational experience is 
a means of establishing channels of communication between children 
of diverse backgrounds, fostering understanding, and thus prevent-
ing the development of feelings of inferiority that detract from an 
individual's ability to participate effectively in society. Attendance 
at integrated schools can create a sense of belonging which is argu-
ably a prerequisite to actually becoming a productive member of a 
cohesive and harmonious society.181 Thus, although individuals may 
seek access to greater socialization opportunities in a variety of con-
texts, 182 the vast majority of such claims have sought to compel racial 
desegregation of the schools. Since Brown, the courts have strug-
gled to define and protect the Black child's interest in undergoing 
socialization in the public schools-an interest that must be advanced 
if the schools are to perform their function as "melting pots" of so-
ciety.183 However, primarily because racial desegregation is an 
emotional issue, courts have not yet arrived at the same accommoda-
tion of the collectivist interest in equality of educational experience 
and the countervailing pluralistic interest of parents in preserving the 
"neighborhood school" achieved in other education disputes. 
The following discussion contends that the process of achieving 
an accommodation in the desegregation area has heretofore been im-
peded because courts, in determining the existence of constitutional 
violations, have tended to undervalue the interests of socialization, 
while in fashioning desegregation remedies, they have overemphasized 
these interests to the detriment of pluralism.184 This undervaluation 
has often led courts to deny the existence of constitutional violations 
tions attribute to Brown recognition of the legitimacy of an individual's interest in the 
socialization function of education and not merely prohibition of racial categoriza-
tion. See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 285-90 (1972); text at notes 189-92 infra. See 
also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 220-23 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Yudof, supra note 42, at 455-56; Franklin, The 
Two Worlds of Race: A Historical View, in THE NEGRO .AMERICAN, supra, at 47. 
180. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. 
181. See text at note 50 supra. 
182. For example, the claims of non-English speaking students for compensatory 
education reflect a desire for greater access to the socialization benefits of public 
education. See note 154 supra. 
183. Compare Cisneros v. Corpus Christi lndp. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973), with Higgens v. Board of Educ., 395 
F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1973), affd., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974). 
184. Professor Yudof presents two ethical principles, which he believes were the 
bases for Brown, as alternative rationales for directing desegregation: The "racial 
neutrality principle" is based on pluralistic values and the ''universalist" principle 
is based on collectivist values. See Yudof, supra note 42, at 446-64. It is contended 
in this section of the Project that judicial direction of desegregation is premised upon 
an accommodation of these ethical principles. 
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by refusing to find state action sufficient to satisfy the fourteenth 
amendment.185 The result is that despite the integrated nature of 
their communities, many Black students are being forced to attend 
segregated schools and are thus denied the benefits of socialization. 
On the other hand, once the courts have found a constitutional viola-
tion, they have often imposed remedies that unnecessarily disrupt 
"tJhe deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their 
public education."186 It is submitted, however, that the courts are 
now re-evaluating the countervailing interests in desegregation and, 
as a result, have begun both to expand the theory of violation and 
to limit the scope of their remedial orders. Thus, courts now appear 
to be gradually achieving an accommodation consistent with that 
reached in other conflicts over access to education. 
The threshold issue in desegregation litigation is, of course, 
whether the plaintiffs have asserted a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. As in equal protection claims for access to academic 
opportunities, the state has no duty to desegregate racially divided 
schools unless the plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of state 
action.187 In determining whether the requirement has been ful-
filled, courts have traditionally distinguished between de facto and 
de jure segregation and have required a finding of the latter.188 
However, the utility of this doctrinal distinction has been increasingly 
questioned.189 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Cis-
neros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District:100 
The Negro child in Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, New 
York, or any other area of the nation which the opinion classifies 
under de facto segregation, would receive little comfort from the as-
sertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate 
their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto soci-
ety, while the exact same racial make-up of the school system in the 
17 southern and border states violates the constitutional rights of their 
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because they were born 
into a de jure society. All children everywhere in the nation are pro-
tected by the Constitution, and treatment which violates their consti-
tutional rights in one area of the country, also violates such constitu-
tional rights in another area.191 
185. See note 159 supra. 
186. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
181. See note 159 supra. 
188. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748-52 (1974); Keyes v. School 
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1971). 
189. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218 (1973), See gener-
ally Goodman, supra note 179, at 283-98. 
190. 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972). 
191. 467 F.2d at 148, quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 
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The de jure-de facto distinction has had the effect of insulating 
large numbers of Northern schools from court-ordered desegregation 
even though minority students in these -schools are denied the full-
est socialization opportunities of public education. Consequently, 
courts have begun to expand the concept of de jure segregation. In 
Keyes v. School District No. J,192 the Supreme Court found for the 
first time de jure segregation in a school district that had "never been 
operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that mandated 
or permitted racial segregation in public education."103 In one part 
of the school system, the district court and court of appeals had dis-
covered a clear case of de jure segregation in the school board's 
" 'undeviating purpose to isolate Negro students' in segregated 
schools 'while preserving the Anglo character of [other] schools.' "104 
The Court held that these "intentionally segregative school board ac-
tions in a meaningful portion of [the] school system" created a pre-
sumption that other segregated schools within the district were also 
the product of intentional state action.195 By thus placing the bur-
den of proving nonsegregative motive upon the school board, the 
Keyes Court substantially facilitated the proof of state action in large-
scale desegregation cases. 
Although the Keyes Court in this way extended the reach of de 
jure segregation theory, it did not consider how presumptions of seg-
regative intent might be applied to cases in which there is no proof 
of intentionally segregative state action in any part of the school sys-
tem. Thus, the Keyes majority perpetuated the distinction between 
de facto and de jure segregation for most purposes. In his separate 
opinion, however, Justice Powell contended that because "public 
schools are creatures of the state"196 and because the focus of con-
cern in desegregation litigation should be "for those who attend such 
schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
rather than present reality,"197 it should not be constitutionally rele-
vant "whether the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated . . . .mos Thus, he advocated a sharp de-
parture from previous constitutional analysis: 
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer grounded 
in principle, and contributing to ["uneven and unpredictable results, 
380 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir. 1967). See also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND 
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 119-20 (1970). 
192. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
193. 413 U.S. at 191. 
194. 413 U.S. at 199, quoting Keyes v. School Dist No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 289, 
294 (D. Colo. 1969). 
195. 413 U.S. at 208. 
196. 413 U.S. at 227 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
197. 413 U.S. at 219. 
198. 413 U.S. at 227. 
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to protracted and inconclusive litigation, to added burdens on the fed-
eral courts, and to serious disruption of individual school systems"], 
we should acknowledge that wherever public school segregation exists 
to a substantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a constitu-
tional violation by the responsible school board. It is true, of course, 
that segregated schools-wherever located-are not solely the prod-
uct of the action- or inaction of public school authorities. . . . But 
it is also true that public school boards have continuing, detailed re-
sponsibility for the public school system within their district . . . • 
[A]s foreshadowed in Swann and as implicitly held today, school 
boards have a duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is this policy 
which must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard 
to a doctrinal distinction which has outlived its time.100 
In numerous desegregation cases since Keyes, lower courts have 
been required to assess whether segregated schools were the result 
of intentional state action, and a number of courts have adopted Jus-
tice Powell's position on the use of presumptions of segregative in-
tent even in the absence of a showing of deliberate acts of segrega-
tion. Thus, the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits applied such a 
presumption when it was established that school authorities had en-
gaged in acts or omissions, the natural and foreseeable consequence 
of which was to bring about or maintain segregation. 200 School 
boards, therefore, are increasingly being required to prove that "seg-
regative intent was not among the factors that motivated their ac-
tions. 11201 
The growing judicial application of a presumption of intent 
against school boards that maintain segregated schools substantially 
emasculates the concept of de facto segregation and thus should en-
able more plaintiffs to succeed in desegregation cases.202 This trend 
is grounded on the belief that all children are fully entitled to the 
199. 413 U.S. at 235-36. 
200. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 
(2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). The court in Omaha found support for this test 
in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 521 F.2d at 536-37 n.10. See Di-
mond, School Segregation in the North: There ls but One Constitution, 1 HARV. 
CIV. Rimrrs-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1972). But see Johnson v. San Francisco 
Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 
509 F.2d 580, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1974). 
201. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210 (1973); see United States 
v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 
(1975). 
202. Recognition as de jure discrimination of school segregation that results from 
action of a type other than discriminatory conduct of school officials, such as zoning 
or housing laws or practices, would further undercut the concept of de facto segre-
gation. This still appears to be an open question. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717, 728 n.7 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 
1, 23 (1971). But see Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd., 423 
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socialization opportunities of nonsegregated public schools. More-
over, it is consistent with the reciprocity rationale articulated in con-
nection with academic opportunities. 203 Because the state can con-
stitutionally compel children to attend educational institutions to so-
cialize them for meaningful participation in society, it should have 
an affirmative duty to ensure that all children who demand an ade-
quate socializing experience204 receive such an experience "on an 
equal basis to all. "20 rs 
Once the fact of de jure segregation is established, either by di-
rect proof or by unrebutted presumption, school authorities have a 
duty not only to dismantle the dual school system, but also to estab-
lish a "unitary school system" in which the effects of past de jure 
segregation have been eliminated "root and branch."206 In fashion-
ing desegregation orders, courts have usually relied on a combination 
of remedies-student transportation, redrawing attendance zones, 
and other administrative practices-to establish a unitary system of 
education.207 Generally, the goal of such remedies has been to 
achieve a student population :in each school that approximates the 
Black-White ratio in the community as a whole.208 This remedy has 
been increasingly criticized, however, as an attempt to use the public 
schools to further broad and controversial social objectives r.ather 
U.S. 963 (1975) (relying in part on state involvement in housing to find de jure 
discrimination in interdistrict context). 
203. See note 140 supra and accompanying text. 
204. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 225-26 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would now define it as the right, derived 
from the Equal Protection Clause, to expect that once the State has assumed respon-
sibility for education, local school boards will operate integrated school systems with-
in their respective districts") (emphasis original). 
205. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
206. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). 
207. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1971). 
208. See generally Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 457 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Brewer v. School Bd., 434 F.2d 408 (4th 
Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), revd. in part, 
418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 
1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969), affd., 402 U.S. 1 (1971 ). The Supreme Court has ordered 
consideration of Black-White student ratios. See, e.g., Wright v. Council, 407 U.S. 
451, 464-65 (1972); Davis v. School Commrs., 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). This may be 
inevitable if its mandate that all vestiges of de jure segregation be immediately elimi-
nated, see Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968), is to be ful-
filled. See Yudof, supra note 42, at 449-50. However, racial ratios are not constitu-
tionally required: 
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to r~uire, as a matter 
of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mix-
ing . . . we would . . . reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate 
schools does not mean that every school in every community must always re-
flect the racial composition of the school system as a whole. 
. • . [However,] [a]wareness of the racial composition of the whole school 
system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct 
past constitutional violations. 
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than a means of safeguarding ithe individual's interest in adequate 
socializiation. 209 
Until recently, most school desegregation remedies sought only 
to achieve collectivist interests by imposing student ratios, without 
taking into account the countervailing pluralistic interests of parents 
and students. 210 Thus, once a constitutional violation was estab-
lished, the courts devoted their attention almost exclusively to 
achieving socialization. The interest of parents in participating in 
the educational decision-making that affects their children and the 
interest of students in attending neighborhood schools were accorded 
little weight. 211 It appears, however, that courts are now seeking 
to protect these interests at the remedial stage in a manner that is 
consistent with the resolution of other access disputes. By limiting 
their remedial orders, courts are demonstrating increased respect for 
parental involvement in the education process. 
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,212 the 
Supreme Court approved for the first time a remedial order requir-
ing substantial busing in a large metropolitan school district. Swann 
asserted that "the scope of a court's equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
remedies."213 The decision thereby established a precedent for 
large-scale remedial orders that has been followed by lower 
courts.214 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stressed, how-
209. See Goodman, supra note 179, at 388 ("[e]quality of treatment . , . is bet-
ter served by individual option than by forced desegregation • • . . [S]ince a ra-
cially representative classroom is not equally suited to every child • • • the state may 
best treat black children equally by giving them equal opportunity to choose, rather 
than by imposing upon them an objectively uniform school environment ••• "); Yu-
dof, supra note 42, at 457, quoting Novak, White Ethnic, HARPER'S, Sept. 1971, at 
46 ("Blacks, frustrated by the historical experience with integration, have begun to 
challenge the universal ideal and to question the legitimacy of institutions, even inte-
grated institutions, exclusively controlled by whites. White ethnic groups too have 
been critical of '[l]iberal education [that] tends to separate children from their parents, 
from their roots, from their history, in the cause of a universal and superior re-
ligion'"). See also Fein, Community Schools and Social Theory: The Limits of 
Universalism, in CoMMUNllY CONTROL OF ScHOOLS 76, 88-91 (H. Levin ed. 1970). 
210. See, e.g., Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 356 F. Supp. 675 (1973) (denying 
equal protection claim of Black and Spanish surnamed parents that desegregation 
remedy placed too great a burden upon their children); Hart v. County School Bd., 
329 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
211. While courts often paid lip service to pluralistic interests of the parent and 
child, substantive limitations on the collectivist goal of uniform racial ratios were rare, 
See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (requiring trans-
portation of students out of their home districts to achieve racial ratios in the schools 
consistent with those throughout an entire metropolitan area), revd. in part, 418 U.S. 
717 (1974). 
212. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
213. 402 U.S. at 15. 
214. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), alfd., 530 
F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976). 
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ever, that the concept of a unitary school system does not require 
"as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree 
of racial balance or mixing."215 He emphasized that desegregation 
remedies should be the product of a "reconciliation of competing val-
ues. "216 Four years later, in Milliken v. Bradley,217 a majority of 
the Court did in fact limit a lower court's remedial desegregation 
order in part because it failed to accord sufficient weight to pluralistic 
interests in education. 
In Milliken, the plaintiffs sought to desegregate the Detroit 
school system, which had an extremely high percentage of Black stu-
dents. Although the plaintiffs proved the existence of de jure seg-
regation in tlle Detroit schools,218 no showing was made that signif-
icant constitutional violations had occurred in the surrounding sub-
urban school districts or that racially discriminatory acts of any dis-
trict or the state had resulted in interdistrict segregation. 219 Never-
theless, having as its aim the establishment of a unitary school sys-
tem, the district court ordered cross-district busing of students in the 
Detroit school district and fifty-three of the eighty-six outlying school 
districts to achieve a Black-White student ratio in each "school, grade 
[and] classroom" equal to that throughout metropolitan Detroit.220 
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the autonomy of the 
local districts included in the plan should have been accorded sub-
stantially more weight in the formulation of the remedy: 
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional 
violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school dis-
trict lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative 
convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our coun-
try. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted 
than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has 
long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community 
concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educa-
tional process. 221 
Significantly, the Court reaffirmed its position, previously articulated 
in Rodriguez, that local control over the educational process is nec-
essary <to afford "citizens an opportunity to participate in decision-
making, [to permit] the structuring of school programs to fit local 
215. 402 U.S. at 24. See note 208 supra. 
216. 402 U.S. at 31. 
217. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 
44 U.S.L.W. 5114 (U.S. June 28, 1976) (once racial discrimination through official 
action is eliminated from a school system, a district court abuses its discretion in 
requiring year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies). 
218. See 418 U.S. at 724-28. 
219. See 418 U.S. at 745. 
220. 418 U.S. at 733-34, quoting 345 F. Supp. 914,918 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
221. 418 U.S. at 741-42. 
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needs, and [to encourage] 'experimentation, innovation, and a 
healthy competition for educational excellence.' "222 
Thus, the Court's holding in Milliken that a district court can use 
its equitable power to remedy de jure segregation only in districts 
affected by the constitutional violation223 is in effect a new accommo-
dation of pluralistic interests with the goals of desegregation. The 
Court's concern that an interdistrict remedy could adversely affect 
the ability of parents to participate in -t1he educational decision-mak-
ing process was manifested in a series of questions raised by the ma-
jority: ''What would be the status and authority of the present pop-
ularly elected school boards? Would the children of Detroit be 
within the jurisdiction and operating control of a school board elected 
by the parents and residents of other districts? What board or 
boards would levy taxes for school operations in these fifty-four dis-
tricts constituting •the consolidated metropolitan area. . . ?"224 The 
Court's deference to existing school district boundaries was most 
likely based on a reluctance to fashion remedies that restructure state 
and local governmental operations rather than on a determination 
that limiting judicial remedies to the districts where constitutional 
violations occurred is an appropriate accommodation of interests. 22G 
222. 418 U.S. at 742. 
223. 418 U.S. at 744-45. 
224. 418 U.S. at 743. 
225. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 44 U.S.L W. 4480, 4483 (U.S. April 20, 1976) 
("fT]he Milliken decision was based on basic limitations on the exercise of the 
equity power of the federal courts and not on a balancing of particular considerations 
presented by school desegregation cases ... "). Thus, the Gautreaur Court con-
cluded that Milliken was primarily based on separation of power considerations 
that limit judicial equity power rather than on pluralistic interests such as local 
control of schools. The District Court's remedy in Milliken was impermissible 
"not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city 
in which the violation occurred but because it contemplated a judicial decree restruc-
turing the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any 
constitutional violation." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4484. 
In Gautreaux, Black tenants in, and applicants for, public housing in Chicago 
brought separate class actions against the Chicago Housing Authority and the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development. The plaintiffs urged that public hous-
ing sites had been selected within Chicago to avoid placing Blacks in predominantly 
White neighborhoods in violation of federal statutes and the fourteenth amendment. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the district court to require the CHA 
and HUD to provide a comprehensive plan not necessarily confined to the geographi-
cal limits of Chicago to remedy this past discrimination. In upholding the order 
that mandated a comprehensive metropolitan area plan, the Court concluded that 
Milliken did not bar a public housing plan that extended beyond the Chicago city 
limits even though all constitutional violations involved Chicago alone. In Milliken, 
the Detroit school district had no power in suburban school districts and so could 
not have been ordered to act within them. The state of Michigan, also "guilty" 
of de jure discrimination within Detroit, had such power but could not have been 
ordered by the court to exercise it in fashioning a remedy because such exercise 
would have necessarily entailed restructuring the operation of local governmental en-
tities. In Gautreaur, however, HUD had certain limited powers in the Chicago 
suburbs that the court could require to be exercised in fashioning a remedy without 
interfering with local political subdivisions. See 44 U.S.LW. at 4485-86. 
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However, Milliken specifically acknowledges the importance of 
pluralistic interests in the desegregation context and clearly estab-
lishes that parents, both in Detroit and in the surrounding suburbs, 
are entitled to the degree of control over education that present 
school districts provide. 
In school districts with a high percentage of minority students, 
the remedial limitations imposed by Milliken may effectively bar 
such students from schools that have substantial nonminority attend-
ance. 226 Although this phenomenon ,arguably reduces the opportuni-
ties for socialization that come with attending racially mixed schools, 
the Court apparently concluded that :the core collectivist interest in ed-
ucation is limited to providing all children with a nonstigmatizing edu-
cational experience .that prepares them for participation in their com-
munity. 227 The decision :reflects 11:he view that this core interest can 
be satisfied by ensuring that no discriminatory assignment of students 
occurs within the school district where the student resides. It would 
therefore follow that any possible benefits of further socialization 
should be subordinated to the strong parental interest in participating 
in education decision-making at the local level. 228 This result is 
Notwithstanding the Gautreaux Court's denial that the pluralistic interests under-
lying local political subdivisions were determinative in Milliken, the Milliken Court 
had indeed invoked these interests to support its decision. 418 U.S. at 741-42. See 
text at notes 221-24 supra. That these pluralistic interests were mentioned in the 
educational context, yet were explicitly rejected as relevant in the public housing 
context, suggests that the Court, despite its purported exclusive reliance on institu-
tional concerns, was actually accommodating pluralistic and collectivist interests in 
both cases, and that the unique nature of pluralistic interests in education was the 
real difference between the cases. By this analysis, the Court, in directing HUD 
to provide housing units in the greater metropolitan area outside the city of Chicago, 
effectuated collectivist interests in adequate housing and social integration, and did 
not significantly impair pluralistic interests, which would probably be the interests 
in maintaining the social and ethnic composition of neighborhoods. 
In Milliken, the Court similarly accommodated interests, but, unlike Gautreaux, 
found that the pluralistic interests were much stronger. The pluralistic interests in 
Milliken, in essence, involved the integrity of the family unit because granting an in-
ter-district remedy would have impaired .the parental interest in how their children 
would be educated. This interest is arguably more strongly identified with how the 
family unit functions than the interest in what type of neighborhood surrounds the 
family unit. However, where an interdistrict remedy does not seriously threaten 
pluralistic interests in education, courts may search hard for an interdistrict violation, 
which allows a remedy to be granted regardless of the effect on local governments 
and, thus, allows an accommodation of interests similar to that in Gautreaux. See 
Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd., 423 U.S. 963 (1975); text at 
notes 230-34 infra. 
226. See generally Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga.), modi-
fied, 451 F.2d 583 (1971 ), application for stay denied, 409 U.S. 974 (1972). 
227. See text at note 179 supra. 
228. There is increasing awareness of Black pluralistic interests and of the neces-
sary conflict of these interests with the collectivist goal of integration, even among 
those who have worked for and value integration. See Ravitch, supra note 55, at 
217: 
Those blacks who are critical of the current thrust of the integration move-
ment are not separatists; they are professionals who move in a racially mixed 
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analogous :to that· reach in Yoder, in which the Court recognized 
a core collectivist interest in educating individuals to the point at 
which they no longer threaten to be a liability to society. The Yoder 
Court recognized that there is a further interest in preparing indi-
viduals to be assets to society, but it concluded that the autonomy 
of the Amish had greater weight. Similarly, the Milliken Court rec-
ognized the importance of a limited amount of socialization that 
could arguably prevent individuals from becoming community liabili-
ties, but it held ,that socialization with a broader geographic referent 
-could outweigh the benefits of local control.220 
Milliken Tepresents ithe initial judicial effort to accommodate 
meaningfully the conflicting interests in desegregration cases. Subse-
quent interdistrict and intradistrict desegregation decrees show a 
continuing evolution in this accommodation process. Thus, a num-
ber of courts have narrowly construed Milliken's limitation on inter-
district remedies by reading broadly its statement that such remedies 
may be appropriate where there has been "a constitutional violation 
within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in 
another district."23° For example, one three-judge court actually 
held that certain governmental acts-encouraging discrimination in 
the private housing market and providing public housing almost ex-
clusively in the inner city-were "responsible to a significant de-
gree" for the racial imbalance between city and suburbs and consti-
tuted "segregative action with inter-district effects under Milli-
ken."231 These courts have distinguished Milliken on the ground 
that, because their order of an interdistrict remedy would have a nar-
rower geographical scope, it would not create the administrative 
problems, the extensive disruption of education, and the infringe-
ment on parental control that the Supreme Court feared would result 
world and who value integration. They share a common fear that black insti-
tutions will be stigmatized by the implicit insult that whatever is black is infe-
rior. They have been groping for language to express their views without giving 
aid and comfort to the George Wallaces and Louise Day Hickses of America. 
The idea that blacks should reject black institutions has been so deeply ingrained 
that most of the critics feel they must apologize for appearing to be disloyal 
to the spirit of Brown. Each in his own way has been trying to evolve a plural-
ist position for blacks that grants black institutions and organizations the same 
legitimacy as is accorded those of other ethnic groups, without in any way dimin-
ishing the opportunity for full interracial contact. "We will not be free," says 
Charles Hamilton, ''until we have freed ourselves of the mentality of depend-
ency. We must no longer be white America's permanent ward and favorite 
cause." 
229. The accommodation of pluralist and collectivist interests is reflected in the 
Milliken Court's adoption of the existent school district boundaries as the limit on 
the desegregation order. See note 225 supra. 
230. 418 U.S. at 744. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 
F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), af/d., 
423 U.S. 963 (1975); United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo. 1975). 
231. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438 (D. Del. 1975), affd., 423 U.S. 
963 (1975). 
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from a metropolitan remedy in Detroit.232 As the Sixth Circuit re-
cently stated: An "interdistrict [consolidation] in this case would 
not be likely extensively to disrupt and alter the structure of public 
education . . . nor require the creation of a vast new super school 
district, as may have resulted from the broad metropolitan remedy 
considered in Milliken."2:13 Thus, it appears that the lower courts 
are, in effect, interpreting Milliken not as a constitutional ban on 
interdistrict remedies, but as a mandate to consider the pluralistic 
interests of home-school proximity and effective community partici-
pation in public education.234 Upon a determination that these in-
terests can be accommodated within the framework of an interdistrict 
remedy, the courts appear willing to formulate such a decree. 
The courts in single-district desegregation cases also appear to 
be giving greater consideration to pluralistic interests while deem-
phasizing the achievement of specific racial ratios. Two recent dis-
trict court orders exemplify this trend. In Morgan v. Kerrigan, 235 
the highly publicized Boston desegregation case, the court expressly 
recognized that the collectivist interest in racially mixed schools inev-
itably conflicts with "legitimate concerns of the community."236 Ac-
cording to the coum, an appropriate remedy must both "reflect the 
primacy of the need to achieve equal opportunity in education,"2:17 
and "recognize the central importance of minimizing the distance be-
tween the student's home and [his] assigned school"238 and of al-
lowing the student to "maintain ties developed in school while in [his] 
home [neighborhood]."239 To this end, the court devised an elab-
orate desegregation plan that would encourage voluntary desegrega-
tion by offering special programs of study in "magnet schools,"240 
ensure a continuity of school-neighborhood contacts by assigning stu-
dents to schools on a neighborhood rather than an individual basis, 241 
and minimize home-school distances by establishing desegregated 
community school districts. 242 
Similarly, the district court in Bradley v. Milliken,:!.4:i upon re-
mand from the Supreme Court, put considerable emphasis on the 
importance of accommodating "the legitimate concerns of the school 
232. 510 F.2d at 1359-60; 393 F. Supp. at 446-47; 388 F. Supp. at 1060. 
233. 510 F.2d at 1360. 
234. See note 225 supra. 
235. 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aftd., 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976). 
236. 401 F. Supp. at 233. 
237. 401 F. Supp. at 233. 
238. 401 F. Supp. at 240. 
239. 401 F. Supp. at 241. 
240. 401 F. Supp. at 246-48. 
241. 401 F. Supp. at 240-42. 
242. 401 F. Supp. at 236, 250-56. 
243. 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975). 
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system and the community at large, [which include] the undesirabil-
ity of forced reassignment of students achieving only negligible de-
segregative results" and "the overriding community concern for the 
quality of educational services available in the school district. "244 
Thus, it refused to adopt any plan that required all schools to achieve 
rigid racial ratios245 because the majority of schools would necessarily 
have been between seventy-five and ninety per cent Black even after 
massive intradistrict transportation, due to Detroit's large Black pop-
ulation. 246 The Court did stress that all "racially identifiable" White 
schools had to be eliminated;247 but instead of focusing on the racial 
compositions of each school in the system, it sought to "balance the 
practicalities that affect the system as a whole."248 As a result, the 
court's remedial guidelines emphasized the importance of secondary 
desegregation procedures, such as community relations programs de-
signed to encourage "a cooperative flow of information from the 
school to the community and from the community to the school."240 
Thus, those recent cases that have granted both intradistrict de-
segregation orders and interdistrict remedial orders indicate that 
since Milliken the lower courts have paid increasing attention to 
pluralistic interests in education. At the same time, as was previ-
ously noted, the lower courts have been increasingly willing to de-
clare the deprivation of core-community socialization opportunities 
unconstitutional if segregation in the schools can be demonstrated, 
even when traditional state action is difficult to prove. 2G0 These two 
trends suggest that courts are beginning to reach an accommodation 
between collectivist and pluralistic interests analogous to that 
achieved in other conflicts concerning the universality of and access 
to education. 
III. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE PUBLIC 
ScHOOL SYSTEM 
Courts do not only determine when the state can require educa-
tion or can be required to provide education; they must also fre-
quently find an appropriate accommodation among the various par-
ties who have an interest in determining the specific content of the 
educational experience provided by the public school system. Par-
244. 402 F. Supp. at 1102. 
245. "In our analysis, we have been mindful that rigid and inflexible desegrega-
tion plans too often neglect to treat school children as individuals, instead treating 
them as pigmented pawns to be shuffled about and counted solely to achieve an ab-
straction called 'racial mix.'" 402 F. Supp. at 1101. 
246. 402 F. Supp. at 1102. 
247. 402 F. Supp. at 1126, 1127, 1132. 
248. 402 F. Supp. at 1133. 
249. 402 F. Supp. at 1143. 
250. See text at notes 187-205 supra. 
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ent-state conflicts are particularly common. On the one hand, the 
state seeks to instill through the educational system certain values 
and traits in its citizens. To achieve collectivist goals of academic 
achievement and socialization251 school boards are empowered to 
prescribe curricula252 and to regulate conduct within the schools. 
But parents may differ with the educational decision-makers on the 
values that should be inculcated in their children and on the best 
means of utilizing the schools to guide their children's development. 
When confronted with school procedures and policies with which 
they do not agree, parents must often seek judicial vindication of 
their interests in shaping the character and attitudes of their children. 
Numerous factors may affect the courts' readiness to protect the 
interests of parents who are opposed to decisions of school authori-
ties and who desire to be free of the system's regulatory power in 
a given area. First, the state has an important interest in ensuring 
that the schools are operated efficiently so that the essential function 
of educating students is not disturbed. 253 Accordingly, the parental 
desire for diversity of educational experience may be ignored if any 
deviation from standardized procedures or policies would signifi-
cantly impair the administration of the school system. Second, the 
process of accommodating rights and interests and of choosing reme-
dies often entangles courts in educational judgments that they do not 
feel competent to make. Rather than overrule the school board on 
a particular controversy involving the literary merit of a book or the 
appropriateness of an innovative teaching method, ,the cou.r,t will 
probably defer to ithe board's judgment because of its "professional 
expertise" or its "democratic" mandate. 254 
Finally, because a school system consists of numerous parties 
other than the school board and parents, such as students, teachers, 
and administrators, obeisance to parental demands may infringe not 
only on the interests of the state but on those of other groups as 
well. For example, a parent's attempt to insulate his child from ex-
posure to a certain book may conflict with a teacher's interest in dis-
cussing it or with another student's interest in reading it. When con-
fronted with such a dispute, courts frequently conclude that the best 
way to protect the rights of unrepresented groups is to defer to the 
school board, whose judgment ostensibly represents the best inter-
ests of the entire community. Such deference is manifested not only 
when judgments requiring expertise are involved, but also when the 
interests of conflicting parties must be reconciled. Yet board judg-
ments should not be considered sacrosanct, for they may infringe on 
251. See note 48 supra & text at notes 48-50 supra. 
252. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 340.583 (1976). 
253. See text at note 467 infra. 
i$4. See, e.g., text at notes 31-41 supra, 272 i11fra. 
1422 Michigan Law Review fVol. 74:1373 
interests that merit safeguarding even from a genuinely democratic 
institution that reflects the majority of its constituents. 
Despite the tendency of courts toward deference to school board 
decisions, increasing numbers of parents, students, and teachers are 
challenging the power of schools to influence the minds of students 
and the lives of both students and teachers. The following section 
of the Project will examine such claims and see how they are re-
solved. It will first analyze challenges to substantive curriculum25 r, 
and then will discuss conduct regulation and disciplinary proce-
dures. 256 
A. Challenges to the Substantive Curriculum 
In September 1974, parents of elementary, junior high, and high 
school students in Kanawha County, West Virginia, protested the de-
cision of the county school board to use new English textbooks in 
the schools. Few observers foresaw that this conflict would develop 
into a protracted and turbulent struggle over control of the curricu-
lum. The degree of parental concern was reflected in the intensity 
of the dispute; before the year ended, the superintendent ·had re-
signed, the school had been boycotted, and one school had been 
bombed.257 The parents who objected to the new texts argued that 
the books encouraged permissiveness and .thus posed a threat to tradi-
tional Amerioan morals and values. They further contended that their 
children would not receive a good education because of purported 
deficiencies in the contents of the books. 258 Those who supported 
255. See section III-A infra. 
256. See section III-B infra. 
257. See TIME, Nov. 4, 1974, at 88; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 4, 1974, 
at 61. 
258. Mike Wallace, Sixty Minutes (CBS Television Network), August 31, 1975. 
A similar textbook controversy is raging in Florida. See Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 
1976, § G, at 12, col. 1; id., Oct. 19, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1. The increasing willing-
ness of parents to challenge curriculum decisions in court rather than at school board 
meetings can be partially attributed to fundamental changes in national attitudes. 
Americans no longer place unfettered faith in the ability of administrative agencies 
to solve the nation's problems. See Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends 
in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 612-14 (1970). See gener-
ally United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 
412 U.S. 669, 692 (1973); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The debate 
over who should be responsible for making educational policies, see generally Gold-
stein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers To Determine 
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976); The Great Anti-School Cam-
paign, in THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 167 (R. Hutchins & M. Adler eds. 1972); Miller, 
Teachers Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom, 8 GA. L. REV. 837, 847-
48 (1974), is part of an upheaval in social, political, and cultural values that has, 
in fact, brought into question the efficacy of education. Cf. Rabin, Lawyers for 
Social Change: Perspective on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 224 
(1976). See generally T. RoSZAK, WHERE TIIE WASTELAND ENDS: POLITICS AND 
TRANSCENDANCE IN POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1972); P. SLATER, THB PURSUIT OF 
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using the texts asserted that the books prepared students to handle 
problems of adulthood and hence contributed to a meaningful edu-
cation. 
Parents sought an injunction against the use of the challenged 
texts, claiming that the school board's decision had violated their own 
rights of free exercise of religion and family privacy and the per-
sonal privacy rights of their children. 259 In denying relief, the 
United States District Court for West Virginia stated that because 
the plaintiffs' claim was essentially only a disagreement with the 
values being taught in the schools, the complaint did not allege a 
violation of constitutional rights. The parents were thus left with 
a remedy whose inadequacy had brought them to court in the first 
place: the opportunity to exert political pressure on the school board 
for redress of grievances. 260 
The dispute in Kanawha County highlights the central issues that 
are raised in controversies over curriculum: the right of teachers, 
parents, and students to affect school board decisions; the right of 
parents to insulate their children from policies with which they dis-
agree; and the appropriateness of judicial intervention in such dis-
putes. This section of the Project will first examine the sources and 
uses of school board power over curriculum and the historical back-
ground of curriculum litigation. It will then analyze the constitu-
tional challenges of parents and teachers to board decisions--chal-
lenges based on the first amendment's establishment and free exer-
cise clauses, a parental nurture right, the equal protection clause, a 
"free thought" right of children derived from the free speech clause, 
and a free speech right of teachers. 
1. The Nature of School Board Authority over Curriculum 
Except where restrained by the federal Constitution, the states 
possess plenary power over the public school curriculum. 261 Ac-
cordingly, all states have enacted statutes that either require, pro-
LoNELINESS: AMERICAN CULTURE AT nm BREAKING POINT (1970). Critics have 
alleged that the school system fails either to educate children adequately or to prepare 
them to cope with modern-day pressures. See Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L REV. 612, 
supra, at 613. See generally Hutchins, supra, at 154. In particular, the ability of 
the school system to provide a meaningful education for Blacks has been severely 
questioned. See Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L REV. 612, supra, at 613; Note, Education 
Vouchers and Curriculum Control: The Parent Versus the State, 52 B.U. L. REV. 
262, 264 (1972). 
259. Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 94 (S.D.W. Va.), affd., 530 
F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975). In its one-paragraph affirmance of the trial court deci-
sion, the court called the plaintiffs' complaints "bald assertions." (Civil No. 75-1455, 
Dec. 3, 1975). 
260. 388 F. Supp. at 96. 
261. E. RBUITER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 109. See generally sec-
tion I-A supra. 
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hibit, or permit certain subjects to be taught in the public schools. 202 
Although the legislatures have generally established basic require-
ments, the bulk of authority with respect to curriculum matters has 
been either expressly delegated to the local school ,boards203 or sus-
tained on an implied delegation of powers theory.204 
States and school boards have exercised this plenary power to 
make the curriculum an effective instrument of socialization to the 
norms of the community, at least as these are perceived by the edu-
cational decision-makers. 205 Pursuant to .their authority to require 
courses "plainly essential to good citizenship" and to prohibit 
courses "manifestly inimical to the public welfare,"200 states gener-
ally have mandated a "highly prescriptive and noncontroversial" 
curriculum. 267 The subject matter required in civics, government, 
and literature courses is selected ito perpetuate and reaffirm "basic 
Am:erican ideals."268 Moreover, religiousity is considered an in-
tegral part of American life and thus frequently is emphasized in 
the curriculum. American history courses often dramatize the re-
ligious spirit that has purportedly influenced the nation's develop-
ment. 260 The hard-working, prudent, God-fearing individual is por-
trayed as the dominant force in the nation's growth. 270 Thus, the 
262. Reutter, The Law and the Curriculum, 20 LAW & C0NTEMP, PROB. 91, 92-
95 (1955). See Seitz, Supervision of Public Elementary and Secondary School Pupils 
Through State Control over Curriculum and Textbook Selection, 20 LAW & CON· 
TEMP. PROB. 104, 105-08 (1955). 
263. G. JoHNSON, supra note 34, at 81-83. 
264. E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 110. 
265. See R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 147 (1969); Intro-
duction, THE "!NEQUALl1Y CoNTROVERSY" (D. Devine & M. Bane eds. 1975), The 
transmission of selective knowledge has been accomplished through both the "hidden" 
and substantive curriculum. The "hidden" curriculum, the rules and regulations that 
are necessary for the efficient and safe operation of schools, has implicitly conveyed 
to students the values of order, discipline, and authority. D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, 
supra note 46, at 126-34. See R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra, at 163; Berkman, 
Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America, in EDU• 
CATION AND TIJE LEGAL STRUCTURE 35, 37 (Harv. Educ. Rev. Reprint Series No. 6, 
1971). Critics of the school system assert that schools foster such traits as competi-
tiveness and conformity, as well as passivity. See C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY 131 
(1972). 
266. E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 112. See Seitz, supra 
note 262, at 123. 
267. F. WIRT & M. KIRST, THE PoLmCAL WEB OF AMERICAN ScHOOLS 29 
(1972). See C. JENCKS, supra note 265, at 54. 
268. R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra note 265, at 147, citing V. KEY, JR,, Pun-
uc OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317 (1961). See P. GOODMAN, supra note 
126, at 87, in which the author describes the school system "with its increasingly 
set curriculum, stricter grading, incredible amounts of testing" as a "vast machine 
to shape acceptable responses." 
269. See generally R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra note 265, at 147-67; D. KIRP 
& M. YuooF, supra note 45, at 88-134. 
270. See generally P. SLATER, supra note 258; w. TAYLOR, CAVALIER AND YANKEE 
21 (1961). 
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public school curriculum can be used to transmit and foster particu-
lar values deemed by some as essential to achieving the collectivist 
goal of developing good and productive citizens.271 
When the social, political, and religious values expressed through 
the curriculum are not shared by some parents, judicial conflict-reso-
lution may be necessary. In curriculum controversies, courts have 
traditionally deferred to the vast discretionary authority of the school 
board.272 However, during two distinct periods of judicial activism, 
courts have questioned whether legislatures and school boards are 
willing -to establish curriculum content that does not infringe upon 
fundamental individuaJ. liberties.273 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the pre-
vailing judicial philosophy emphasized the protection of individual 
rights against governmental encroachment.274 In this period, courts 
eagerly scrutinized the use of legislative powers and, accordingly, cir-
cumscribed legislative authority. Because statutory grants of power 
were generally construed narrowly, courts held that a number of 
local school rules and regulations exceeded the delegated authority 
of school boards. 275 Constitutional doctrine reflected this suspicion 
of the exercise of legislative power. Recognition of personal sub-
stantive due process rights imposed the first significant limits on com-
pulsory education276 and on the power of states to prescribe curric-
ulum. 277 
The demise of substantive due process made curriculum litiga-
tion a rarity between the 1930s and the late 1960s.278 The judicial 
retreat from performing what were perceived to be exclusively leg-
islative functions279 resulted in judicial deference to school board au-
271. R. DAWSON & K. PREWIIT, supra note 265, at 178. Education has been 
a powerful agent of political and social control because ideas and values can be dis-
seminated through a centralized and uniform system. Id. at 179. See E. FRIEDEN-
BERG, COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA 49, 168 (1965); Berkman, supra note 265, at 
37; Hutchins, supra note 258, at 200; cf. M. KATZ, supra note 43, at 117. 
272. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The 
Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479 (1972). See text at notes 31-
41 supra. 
273. See Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, supra note 258, at 612-14. 
274. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
275. See, e.g., Holman v. School Trustees, 77 Mich. 605, 43 N.W. 996 (1889) 
(penalties for accidentally damaging school property). But compare Wright v. Board 
of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922), with Wilson v. Board of Educ., 233 
Ill. 464, 84 N.E. 697 (1908) (membership in secret societies). 
276. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
277. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 
612, supra note 258, at 615. 
278. The religion cases are the only exception. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach 
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
279. See B. ScHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 159-63 (1974). 
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thority. This deference was consistent with a general faith in admin-
istrative agencies, professionals, specialists, and most importantly, 
the over-all quality of American education. 28° Courts professed a 
lack of competence to formulate educational policy and thus acceded 
to the "expertise" of educators and administrators, particularly where 
judgments of educational value were ["equired.281 Furthermore, courts 
were conscious of their own undemocratic nature and consequently 
were reluctant to overturn local school board decisions that suppos-
edly reflected community values. 282 
The second period of judicial activism began with the 1954 Su-
preme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,283 which 
marked the emergence of judicial concern for the problems of public 
education and of judicial willingness to scrutinize the decisions of 
local school boards. Brown illustrated the loss of faith in American 
schools that would soon produce a new wave of curriculum litiga-
tion. 284 Since the late 1960s, the frequency of litigation has intensi-
fied. Parents and teachers, seeking judicial protection of their right 
to control the classroom curriculum, have brought an unprecedented 
number of suits. Parents have most frequently been motivated by 
fear and dislike of the values taught in the schools. 28r. Teachers, 
on the other hand, have resorted to litigation to clarify their proper 
role in the educational system, 286 for the instability in institutional 
rules and values has created uncertainty about their freedom to de-
viate from traditional pedagogical techniques. Although parents and 
teachers are linked together by a common, though amorphous, feel-
ing of personal oppression, the courts have not yet clearly articulated 
a unified constitutional doctrine that embraces their claims. 
2. Constitutional Challenges to the Curriculum 
a. Pure establishment and free exercise clause challenges. During 
the 1940s and early 1950s when ,public school cumculum was 
not challenged directly in the cour.ts, a number of first amend-
ment ,religion cases defined the public school's power to incul-
cate, or sometimes accommodate, religious values. 287 Since these 
280. Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, supra note 258, at 613. 
281. See Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 
1050,(1968) [hereinafter Developments]. 
282. See Miller, supra note 258, at 847. 
283. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
284. See text at note 273 supra. 
285. See, e.g., Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va.), afld., 
530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974). 
286. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. 
Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
287. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of 
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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suits helped frame a relatively clear body of law limiting school 
board discretion, the establishment and free exercise clauses have 
subsequently provided the basis for most curriculum challenges, in-
cluding bona fide religious claims and claims in which the underlying 
disagreement concerns a nonreligious value conflict between parents 
and the school board. These decisions provide particular insight into 
the scope of school boards' power to determine what ideas, values, and 
traditions can be transmitted to American children through the pub-
lic school curriculum. 
The majority of successful suits against the school boards have 
been based on the establishment clause, 288 which has sometimes 
been viewed as erecting a "wall of separation between church and 
state"289 that prohibits any introduction of religion in the schools. 200 
Thus, as articulated in Everson v. Board of Education, "[n]either 
a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid 
one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another. 
"
291 The Court in Zorach v. Clauson,292 however, implicitly 
recognizing that schools necessarily shape values and attitudes and 
believing that a requirement of indifference or hostility to religion 
would actually result in a preference of nonreligion over religion, 
held that some accommodation of religion in the public schools was 
needed. 211=1 In upholding the practice of releasing children from 
public schools during the school day so that they could attend re-
ligious instruction, the Court observed that . 
[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We 
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual 
needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part 
of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets 
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal 
of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or co-
operates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public 
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For 
it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates 
the public service to their spiritual needs. 294 
288. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1479. 
289. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), citing Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
290. See generally Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 
MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1049 (1963); Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public 
Schools: A Second Consumption?, 27 VAND. L. REV. 209, 214 (1974). 
291. 330 U.S. 1, 15 ( 1947). 
292. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
293. 343 U.S. at 314. 
294. 343 U.S. at 313-14. The Court, in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963), reaffirmed this view: "It is true that religion has been closely 
identified with our history and government . . . . It can be truly said, therefore, 
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In recognizing that religiosity is a part of the "national" tradition and 
should be tolerated in the schools,295 the Zorach Court did not apply 
the absolute neutrality standard but instead sought to determine the 
extent to which government may accommodate certain religious the-
ories.296 
In the religion cases courts have had difficulty defining the rela-
tionship between the duties and limitations of the state under the 
establishment clause and the rights of individuals under the free ex-
ercise clause. The need to maintain a proper balance is apparent, 
since untrammeled protection of free exercise could conceivably re-
sult in the establishment of religion. As the Court noted in Abing-
ton School District v. Schempp: "While the Free Exercise Clause 
clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny rights of free exercise 
to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machin-
ery of the State to practice its beliefs."297 Although interpretations 
of the interplay between the establishment clause and free exercise 
clause have shifted periodically, the parameters of permissible re-
ligious activity in the schools now seem relatively clear. 
Courts will not permit religious activity that might engender sec-
tarian divisiveness, exacerbate consciousness of religious differ-
ences, 298 or exert psychological pressure on the nonparticipants to 
attend the religious activities. 299 In his concurring opinion in Mc-
Collum v. Board of Education, Justice Frankfurter stressed that 
"[i]n no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive 
forces than in its schools. "300 Thus, free exercise of religion must 
be limited if it has the effect of either coercing minorities or giving 
official governmental support to a particular denomination or be-
lief. 301 The establishment clause is breached even if participation 
that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people •••• " 
374 U.S. at 212-13. Zorach thus undermined the absolutist notion of separation es-
tablished in Everson. See Kauper, supra note 290, at 1049. The free exercise clause 
was interpreted to be a limitation upon the establishment clause. Id. at 1049. 
295. 343 U.S. at 312-13. See Kauper, supra note 290, at 1049; text ai notes 
269, 270 supra. 
296. Cf. Kauper, supra note 290, at 1053-54. 
297. 374 U.S. 203,226 (1963) (emphasis original). 
298. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of );!due., 333 U.S. 203, 227 ( 1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). 
299. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frank• 
furter, J., concurring). 
300. 333 U.S. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
301. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 ( 1963); 
DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. 
Mich. 1965); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 262 A.2d 
21 (Ch. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). 
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in the religious exercise is voluntary302 and the activity causes only 
a minor encroachment on the nonparticipants' rights.303 However, 
free exercise rights are accommodated to the extent of allowing chil-
dren to leave school early to attend religious classes;304 apparently 
the Court did not believe that this practice is unduly divisive or puts 
psychological pressure on the children who remain in school. 
The cases further reveal that activity presented in a purely "re-
ligious" as opposed to a "secular" context is forbidden. 305 Although 
the boundary between religious and secular activity is often nebu-
lous, courts attempt through this demarcation to encourage the stu-
dent's exposure to a diversity of ideas but to prevent his indoctrina-
tion to a single set of religious beliefs. 
The released time306 and prayer3°7 cases demonstrate how the 
courts distinguish between objectionable "pure" religious activity and 
permissable secular activity. The ban on religious observances ex-
tends to officially composed prayers, 308 the Lord's Prayer, 309 and even 
to pr-ayers that do not refer explicitly to God. 310 However, recitation 
of "patriotic" passages containing references to God is clearly per-
mitted. 311 Moreover, while school facilities cannot be used by 
private teachers for religious instruction312 and the Bible cannot be 
302. See, e.g., State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 NJ. Super. 564, 580-
82, 262 A.2d 21, 29-31 (Ch. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). 
303. See DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). However, one district court has found 
the following program to be permissible: the prayer is to be voluntary, conducted 
at least five minutes before or after the regularly scheduled class day, in a classroom 
other than the regular homeroom, and not signified by a bell. Reed v. Van Hoven, 
237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965). 
304. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
305. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,435 n.21 (1962). 
306. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 
333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
307. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vi-
tale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
308. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
309. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court 
summarily affirmed its position a year later in Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of 
Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 401 (1964). Several district courts have reconsidered this 
issue as a result of the recent impetus to reinstitute prayers in the public schools. 
See, e.g., Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973). 
United States District Judge Arnow recently issued a temporary injunction prohibit-
ing the practice of requiring teachers in Okaloosa County, Florida to begin each 
school day with Bible readings. The injunction, which upset a long-established 
school board policy, has created great controversy. See Miami Herald, Dec. 18, 
1975, § A, at 1, col. 1. 
310. See DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). 
311. See Engel v. Vitale, 310 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962). 
312. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The Court held that 
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used as part of religious ceremony in the schools, 313 an objective 
study of the Bible in a secular educational program does not offend 
the establishment clause. 314 
The nature of the distinction has also been explored in a series 
of cases involving the teaching of evolution in the public schools. 
These cases reveal that courts will not permit the introduction of 
religious ideas in the schools that show a preference for one religious 
group over another. In Epperson v. Arkansas,315 for example, a 
teacher requested a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of 
an Arkansas statute making it unlawful in any state-supported school 
or university to teach or use a textbook that included evolutionary 
theory. The challenged law was similar to the Tennessee statute up-
held in ithe celebrated Scopes "monkey" trial.316 It was unclear 
whether the Arkansas statute prohibited any explanation of the theory 
of evolution or merely proscribed teaching that the theory was true. 
The Court concluded that under either interpretation the statute was 
intolerable because it was based solely on the religious convictions 
of a particular sect: 317 "The State's undoubted right to proscribe 
the curriculum in its public schools does not carry with it the 
right to prohibit . . . the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine 
where that prohibition is based on reasons that violate the First 
Amendment."318 Although the Court noted the importance of pro-
the released time program, which allowed religious teachers employed by private re-
ligious groups to give religious instruction in the public school classroom on a weekly 
basis, violated the establishment clause. Commentators have disagreed over which 
aspect of the program the Court found determinative of unconstitutionality. Nole, 
The "Released Time" Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Dccisio11maki11g, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1202, 1225 (1974). At least five factors appear to have contributed to the 
Court's decision: the use of the state's tax-supported public school buildings for the 
dissemination of religious doctrines; the use of the state's compulsozy machinezy to 
induce students to participate in religion classes; the close cooperation between 
church and state government officials; sectarian divisiveness and consciousness of 
religious difference engendered by the program; and the psychological pressure on 
the nonparticipants to attend the religious classes. Id. at 1225 n.132. 
In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court upheld a New York school 
program that allowed the release of students, with the permission of parents, during 
the school day, so that they could attend religious centers for training or devotional 
exercises. Zorach is distinguishable from McCollum since neither the expenditure 
of public funds nor the use of public school buildings was involved in Zorach. See 
Note, supra, at 1226. Zorach is indicative of the doctrinal shift in the interpretation 
of the establishment clause: Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Zorach, 
interpreted the separation mandated by the establishment clause less stringently than 
did Justice Black in Mccollum. See text at notes 290-96 supra. 
313. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963). 
314. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,225 (1963). 
315. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
316. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). 
317. 393 U.S. at 107-08. 
318. 393 U.S. at 107. 
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tecting teachers and students from arbitrary restrictions on their aca-
demic freedom, 310 it avoided this rationale and rested its decision 
upon the narrower grounds of the establishment clause. 320 
The resurgence of the creationist movement has given new vital-
ity to the controversy over the teaching of evolution. 321 In Daniel 
v. Waters,322 public school teachers, some of whom were also par-
ents, successfully challenged a Tennessee statute that explicitly fa-
vored the creationist view of evolution. 323 A consistent result was 
reached in Moore v. Gaston County Board of Education,324 a dispute 
over the discharge of a teacher, who, in response to student ques-
tions, had approved Darwinian theory and agnosticism and had chal-
lenged the literal interpretation of the Bible. In granting the teacher 
relief, the court also preferred to base its decision upon the establish-
ment clause rather than upon principles of academic freedom. 325 
The court warned that if the teacher were discharged because his 
ideas did not conform to local community beliefs, the students would 
be indoctrinated to a particular religious orthodoxy, which would 
amount to impermissible official approval of local religious values. 326 
The evolution cases demonstrate the clear preference of courts 
for the certainty and simplicity of the establishment clause as a basis 
for limiting school board discretion. By relying on the historical 
principle of separation- of church and state, courts can intervene in 
curriculum decisions without having to make the difficult assess-
ments of educational value required by a free speech analysis or the 
equally difficult determinations concerning the importance and sin-
cerity of -individuals' religious beliefs required by a free exercise ·anal: 
ysis. The establishment clause protects society against the imposi-
tion of a state religion. The remedy for its breach is a complete 
prohibition of the offending practice. In contrast, the free exercise 
clause protects individuals from infringement of the right to practice 
their religious beliefs. The remedy here is the creation of a curric-
ulum exemption specifically tailored to curtail the particular kind of 
encroachment on the individual's religious right. Yet the courts are 
aware that a single exemption causes disruption in the school and 
319. 393 U.S. at 106. The court cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
( 1923), as establishing the academic freedoms of teacher and student. 
320. 393 U.S. at 106. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION 605, 606 (1970); LeClercq, supra note 290, at 217. 
321. See LeClercq, supra note 290, at 209-10. 
322. 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975). 
323. 515 F.2d at 487. 
324. 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
325. See 357 F. Supp. at 1043; Moskowitz & Casagrande, Teachers and the First 
Amendment: Academic Freedom and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 39 ALBANY L. REV. 661, 670-71 (1975). 
326. 357 F. Supp. at 1043. 
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that numerous exemptions may seriously impair the efficiency of the 
public school system. Thus, it is not surprising that very few suc-
cessful challenges to the state's control over curriculum have been 
based on the free exercise clause. 327 
One notable exception to this pattern is Wisconsin v. Yoder. 328 
Although primarily a compulsory education exemption case, Yoder 
can also be read as the most significant successful attempt by parents 
to shield their children from the public school curriculum. 329 The 
decision, which upheld the right of Amish parents to remove from 
school ·their children who had completed eight grades, rested heavily 
on the special religious interests of ,the Amish community. 330 The 
unique facts of Yoder made it unnecessary for the Court to rely on 
the establishment clause; it could grant a free exercise exemption 
because the extreme remedy of complete exemption from school dis-
rupted -the daily operations of ithe school system less ithan did other 
more limited remedies. The effect of the remedy for the plaintiffs 
in this case was analogous to the relief granted for establishment 
clause violations-absolute prohibition from an offending practice. 
Yoder suggests the very difficult and somewhat capricious dis-
tinctions that courts must draw in granting religious free exercise ex-
emptions from subjection to the school system. A judge must ini-
tially determine whether the group seeking relief has a bona fide 
religious belief. Although the Court recognized that what consti-
tutes a "religious practice" entitled to constitutional protection is a 
"most delicate question,"331 Yoder does articulate certain standards. 
Objections cannot be based on either purely personal values332 or 
on a mere disagreement with the method of education in the schools. 
It seems certain, however, that predispositions of judges will influ-
ence their determination of the sincerity and importance of an indi-
vidual religious belief.333 In Yoder, their approval of the law-abid-
ing history of the Amish people, whose nonconformity imposed no 
burdens on society, must have influenced the majority to find the 
327. Two of the cases in which a free exercise violation has been found are Mit-
chell v. McCall, 143 S.2d 629 (Ala. 1962) (student was granted a limited exemption 
on the ground of a free exercise claim; she was compelled to attend physical educa-
tion classes but was not forced to wear the required uniform or perform exercises 
which would be immodest in regular attire); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 
54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921) (forced participation in school dancing program 
violated both the free exercise and establishment clauses). 
328. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
329. See text at notes 95-109 supra. 
330. See 406 U.S. at 210, 211, 216, 219. 
331. 406 U.S. at 215. 
332. 406 U.S. at 216. 
333. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1381, 1419 (1967). Cf. G. GuNTIIER, supra note 112, at 
1480. 
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Amish beliefs sincere and important. 334 Thus, the success of a free 
exercise challenge may d~pend on whether a religious group es-
pouses philosophies or fashions a lifestyle with which the majority 
of the court empathizes. 
Once a bona fide religious belief is established, there must next 
be a balancing of state and individual interests, a process in which 
judges are also apt to interject their own values. The (1) sincerity 
and importance of the religious belief and (2) the degree of in-
fringement on the practice required by the belief must be balanced 
against (1) the state's interest in requiring certain educational activ-
ity, (2) the reasonableness of the educational requirements with re-
spect to the underlying interest, and (3) the impact that a particular 
exemption would have on the requirement. 335 In measuring state 
interests, courts must reach conclusions on the merits of different 
aspects of the state's educational program. Yet most judges clearly 
lack the expertise necessary to make these evaluations. Conse-
quently, the Court in Yoder urged that the judiciary exercise caution 
in weighing the necessity for a free exercise exemption against the 
state's legitimate interest in providing a basic education: "[T]he ob-
vious fact [is] that courts are not school boards or legislatures, and 
are ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete aspects of 
a State's program of compulsory education."338 This warning, in ef-
fect, operates to constrain the use of the free exercise exemption. 
As analyzed above, the parental challenges to curriculum that 
have defined '1:he scope of first ,amendment rights have typically 
involved bona fide religious disputes. Yet a number of challenges 
are not based on pure religious objections but rather reflect disagree-
ment of parents with nonreligious values implicit in the curriculum ap-
proved by the school -board. In some of the complaints, the underly-
ing value dispute is disguised through the use of first amendment 
establishment or free exercise clause language, while in others, differ-
ent constitutional grounds are articulated. 
b. Value-oriented challenges claiming religious and other consti-
tutional violations. The notion of a parental right ,to control the up-
bringing of children emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries337 during the first period of judicial activ.ism in education. 
In the majority of cases, courts upheld the school boards' selection of 
courses.338 However, several decisions affirmed the right of parents 
334. See 406 U.S. at 222; Recent Development, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 18 VILL. 
L. REV. 955,960 (1973). 
335. See Giannella, supra note 333, at 1390. 
336. 406 U.S. at 235. 
337. See text at notes 53, 274-77 supra. 
338. See, e.g., Samuel Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801, 36 
S.E. 920 (1900) (students refusing to write compositions and enter debates may be 
disciplined by school authorities); State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 
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to select courses on the ground that parents were better able to know 
what was best for their children. 33n 
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of parents to con-
trol the education of their children in Meyer v. Nebraska.340 The 
Court invalidated a statute that prohibited teaching German to chil-
dren who had not completed the eighth grade. Its opinion recog-
nized both the parental right and the teacher's right to teach, 341 and 
apparently viewed the fourteenth amendment as the source of both 
rights: 
Without doubt, [the four-teenth amendment] denotes not merely free-
dom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to con-
tract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, 
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free men. 342 
The collectivist purposes of the statute, fostering American ideals 
and preparing a citizenry for intelligent participation in civic matters, 
were considered permissible; however, the means adopted were 
deemed to exceed the powers of government. 343 The view of the 
parental right advanced in Meyer was affirmed in Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters. 344 A statutory requirement that all children from eight 
to sixteen years of age attend public schools, which was intended 
8 N.E. 708 (1886) (school authorities not required to readmit student who had been 
dismissed for failure to participate in a music class); Sewell v. Board of Educ., 29 
Ohio St. 89, 1 W.LB. 338 (1876) (failure to participate in prescribed rhetoric in-
struction could be ground for suspension); E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra 
note 25, at 110; Note, Sex Education: The Constitutional Limits of State Compul-
sion, 43 s. CAL. L. REV. 548, 556-57. 
339. See, e.g., Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 3039 (1914) (father 
has right to make a reasonable selection of courses for his child; upon father's re-
quest, the child was permitted to substitute music lessons for the required home eco-
nomics course); State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 
393 (1891). The father in Sheibley refused to permit his child to study grammar 
because grammar was not taught when he went to school. The court, upholding 
the parent's right, stated: "The right of the parent ... to determine what studies 
his child shall pursue ·is paramount to that of the trustees or teacher • • •• 
[N]o pupil attending the school can be compelled to study any prescribed branch 
against the protest of the parent that the child shall not study such branch ••• ," 
31 Neb. at 556-57, 48 N.W. at 395. 
340. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Accord, Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 
(1927). In Farrington, Hawaii's laws prohibiting instruction in a foreign language 
were held to infringe the fifth amendment rights of the owners of the Japanese 
schools and parents whose children attended the schools. The Court, citing Meyer 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), concluded that enforcement 
of the law would deprive the parent of his right to direct the education of his own 
child without unreasonable interference. 
341. 262 U.S. at 400. 
342. 262 U.S. at 399. 
343. 262 U.S. at 402. 
344. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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to "standardize" children, was deemed to interfere "with the liberty 
of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control."345 The Court emphasized both the 
parental right and duty to educate their children: "The Child is not 
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct 
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare him for additional obligations."346 
The decline of substantive due process347 in the 1930s weakened 
the doctrinal foundation of the parental right. Although the contin-
uing vitality of personal substantive due process theory is apparent 
in recent cases developing the constitutional right of privacy,348 the 
precise scope and strength of the right is still unclear. Consequently, 
current litigants generally buttress their objections to prescribed cur-
ricula by raising a combination of establishment, free exercise, 
parental nurture and privacy claims. It is difficult, therefore, to cal-
culate what potency the parental nurture right would possess if as-
serted by itself. However, even when the parental nurture right is 
advanced in combination with other constitutional claims, plaintiffs 
have had little success either in obtaining individual exemptions from 
curriculum requirements or in changing school board policy as a 
whole. 
A recent example of an unsuccessful challenge to the public 
school curriculum that combined a parental nurture right claim with 
a free exercise claim is Davis v. Page. 349 According to the tenets 
of the Apostolic Lutherans, the plaintiffs' sect, it is a sin to watch 
or hear movies, television, radio broadcasts, or images produced by 
audio-visual equipment. 350 Hence, the parents charged that the 
children's exposure to audio-visual equipment interfered with the 
free exercise of religion and the parental right to control the chil-
dren's education. The court held that when the audio-visual equip-
ment was used for educational purposes, the children could not leave 
the classroom, although the children could be excused when the 
equipment was used for entertainment purposes. The parents also 
claimed that the health and music courses impinged on their free 
exercise right, but the court concluded that this was not a significant 
burden. 
Because the parents' free exercise and nurture rights mandated 
345. 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
346. 268 U.S. at 534. 
341. See B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 279, at 163. 
348. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade,- 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). 
349. 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974). 
350. 385 F. Supp. at 397-98. 
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the same standard of review, the court considered the rights conjunc-
tively. The court was persuaded that allowing the children to leave 
the classroom every time audio-visual equipment was used would se-
riously impair the quality of the educational experience, although 
limited excuses were deemed permissible. Thus, an important fac-
tor in the decision was the court's concern that attempts to restrict 
the scope of education would frustrate the state's objective of expos-
ing children to a "broad educational spectrum, . . . where . . . gen-
eral knowledge is the right of all and not the privilege of a few."3G1 
Davis and Yoder are similar in that the parents in both cases 
based their claims for relief on the parental nurture and free exercise 
rights. Yet in Yoder, but not in Davis, the Court concluded that 
this combination presented a sufficiently strong claim to justify an 
exemption from the public school curriculum for the children. 3112 
This result is not surprising, for despite the similarity of the as-
serted claims, the judicial approaches in these cases differ signifi-
cantly. 3113 In Davis, .the coutt interpreted the interests of the state 
and the child to be coterminous and in opposition to the parental 
interest. The assumption underlying this alignment is that the state 
has a duty to protect the child from the idiosyncratic religious views 
of his parents. This approach directly conflicts with Yoder, which 
upheld the parents' right to mold children's religious beliefs. 311 i 
Yoder held that once the state's interest in exposing the child to basic 
skills and social norms is fulfilled, the parents should have at least 
some control over whether the child must receive advanced or spe-
cialized education. 355 Davis attempted to distinguish Yoder on the 
ground that the involvement of elementary school children necessi-
tated greater state control, 3156 but the distinction is inapt. The as-
pects of the curriculum to which the plaintiffs in Davis objected, the 
use of audio-visual equipment and the health and music classes, were 
clearly less essential to a basic education than post-eighth grade 
351. 385 F. Supp. at 400. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
352. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). See Knudsen, supra note 
47, at 1510. 
353. The court distinguished Yoder, in which the interests of the child were con-
sidered to be synonymous with those of his parents. It refused to believe that the 
child understood the "ramifications of his religious beliefs": 
It would be naive for this court not to recognize that the children's asserted 
freedom of exercise of religion is, in essence, that of their parents. In fact, 
the freedom asserted is the right of the parents to inculcate and mold their chil-
dren's religious beliefs to conform to their own without the children being sub-
jected to school programs and materials which the parents deem offensive and 
subversive of their beliefs. 
385 F. Supp. at 398. 
354. 406 U.S. at 233. 
355. 406 U.S. at 221-22. 
356: 385 F. Supp. at 398. 
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study, an interest that Yoder held did not outweigh that of the Amish 
parents. 357 Certtainly if Yoder did not -align ithe state interest with 
that of the child, then Davis should not have done so. 
However, even if the Davis court had remained consistent with 
Yoder, it might not have granted a remedy for any" one of several 
independent reasons. 368 First, considerable concern was expressed 
regarding the potential impact of an exemption on the school. The 
court was primarily concerned with maintaining an integrated educa-
tional program and the "operational efficiency" of the school: "To 
allow students and parents to pick and choose which courses they 
want to attend would create a stratified school structure, where divi-
sion and derision would flourish."359 The remedy sought by the 
plaintiffs, a limited exemption from particular aspects of the curric-
ulum, would impinge on the interests of other students and the 
school system in general. In contrast, the complete exemption rem-
edy in Yoder did not burden the internal workings of the school sys-
tem. 
Second, even though the plaintiffs asserted a bona fide free ex-
ercise claim, the court was unsympathetic. Refusal to give relief 
may have stemmed from doubts concerning the sincerity and impor-
tance of the religious belief or from a judgment that infringement 
had not been severe. Since -the sincerity of .1Jhe plaintiffs religious 
belief seems clear, the court's skepticism might be attributable to a 
simple inability -to empha:thize with this particular sect. 
Third, the court's belief that the plaintiffs' objection was based 
on a disagreement with values taught in the schools360 is most signif-
icant, since it appeared to temper the court's general attitude toward 
the plaintiffs. The court thought that a limited free exercise exemp-
tion was an inappropriate remedy in such a situation. It was "reluc-
tant to become involved with school curriculums and educational phi-
losophy"361 and stated that the proper forum for presentation of 
351. See 406 U.S. at 224. 
358. The court asserted, for example, that attendance of separate classes in which 
the objectionable teaching methods would not be used was a violation of the estab-
lishment clause. 385 F. Supp. at 401. Given the fact that courts do accommodate 
interests in establishment clause cases, see text at notes 292-94 supra, this conclusion 
is not self-evident. Separate classes would be no more divisive and would impose no 
greater psychological pressure than the released-time practice approved in Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), discussed in note 312 supra. Furthermore, the plain-
tiffs did not request that their beliefs be taught in the school. If the Davis plain-
tiffs had sought to have their religious beliefs taught in school, the case would have 
been similar to Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), or McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
359. 385 F. Supp. at 405. 
360. 385 F. Supp. at 402-04, 405-06. 
361. 385 F. Supp. at 406. 
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these parental objections to curriculum was the public school board 
meeting. 362 
Even though the approaches adopted by the courts differ, the 
result reached in Davis is not inconsistent with Yoder. In Yoder, 
the rejection of values taught in the schools did not preclude granting 
a remedy, since rejection of mainstream values and complete separa-
tion from worldly influence are essential to salvation in the Amish 
faith. 363 Apparently, only objections to contemporary values wholly 
founded upon and inextricably connected with religious doctrine are 
entitled to religious protection. 
Davis illustrates the predicament of a parent whose challenges 
to the general curriculum on constitutional grounds disguise an un-
derlying disagreement with the values taught in school. Numerous 
constitutional theories have similarly been used by parents to attack 
specific courses. For example, the school board's authority to pre-
scribe sex education courses has been challenged. Many such 
claims have alleged violations of the free exercise clause, but courts 
have rejected them using three different rationales: (1) the first 
amendment does not protect a religious sect from any or all objec-
tionable views;364 (2) the first amendment neither requires nor per-
mits the state to tailor its courses or programs of instruction to the 
religious principles of one sect; courts must protect freedom of 
speech as zealously as freedom of religion;365 (3) the possibility of ( 
conflict with religious beliefs in one area of the curriculum does not 
outweigh the governmental interest in establishing a course with a 
- wholly secular purpose. 366 
Even when the parental right to control the child's education is 
asserted in combination with the religious claim, courts have held 
that the parental interest does not outweigh the broad authority of 
school boards to require sex education. 367 Contentions that parents 
have an exclusive constitutional right to teach their children about 
sexual matters368 and that sex education classes unnecessarily in-
362. 385 F. Supp. at 405. 
363. 406 U.S. at 209-12. 
364. See Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 344 (D. Md. 1969), 
affd., 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970). 
365. See Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 
3d 1, 14, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 79 (1975); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii 436, 444, 
478 P.2d 314, 319 (1970). 
366. See Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 411, 289 A.2d 
914, 922 (1971). In general, courts have accorded less weight to the free exercise 
claim if the challenged sex education program allowed parents to choose whether 
their children would receive sex education instruction. See Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 
52 Hawaii 436, 442-43, 478 P.2d 314, 316-17 (1970). 
367. Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 344 (D. Md. 1969), affd., 
428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970). 
368. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 
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fringe upon the constitutional zone of privacy369 have also been re-
jected. Equal protection objections have been dismissed on the 
ground that the sex education program applied equally to all students 
of varied religious beliefs.37° Finally, one court rejected the argu-
ment that a statutory excusal feature in a sex education program cre-
ated an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. 371 
Parents have not only objected to courses but also challenged the 
use of particular novels in literature classes on purported religious 
grounds. In Todd v. Rochester Community Schools,372 the parents 
claimed that religious references m Kum: Vonnegut's novel, Slaugh-
terhouse Five, violated free exercise rights. The court responded 
that "[b]y couching a personal grievance in First Amendment lan-
guage, one may not stifle freedom of expression";373 a book's mere 
reference to religious matters was not a violation of any right.374 The 
court warned that if the parents' claim were upheld, children would 
be deprived of the opportunity to study great masterpieces: "Our 
Constitution does not command ignorance; on the contrary, it assures 
the people that the state may not relegate them to such a status and 
guarantees to all the precious and unfettered freedom of pursuing 
one's own intellectual pleasure in one's own personal way."375 
Similarly, in Rosenberg v. Board of Education,376 a court rejected 
the request to prohibit the use of Oliver Twist and The Merchant 
of Venice in the secondary schools. The plaintiffs asserted that the 
literature tended to engender anti-Semitic feelings, 377 but the court 
concluded that suppression would not necessarily remedy bigotry and 
would have the undesirable effect of interfering with learning and 
free inquiry in the school. Suppression, the court stated, would be 
32-33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 91-92 (1975); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. 
Supp. 397,411, 289 A.2d 914, 922 (1971 ). 
369. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 
30-32, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 89-91 (1975); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii 436, 438-
41, 478 P.2d 314, 315-16 (1970). 
370. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 
28, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 88 (1975); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 
397, 411, 289 A.2d 914, 922 (1971 ). 
371. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 
28-29, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 88-89 (1975). 
372. 41 Mich. App. 320,200 N.W.2d 90 (1972). 
373. 41 Mich. App. at 329, 200 N.W.2d at 93. 
374. 41 Mich. App. at 328, 200 N.W.2d at 93. 
375. 41 Mich. App. at 329, 200 N.W.2d at 93-94. The court criticized the 
trial judge for substituting his own ideas of morals and rightness for those of the 
school community. 41 Mich. App. at 339, 200 N.W.2d at 99. "It is for the lawfully 
elected school board . . . and its teachers to determine the local school's curriculum. 
The judicial censor is persona non grata in [the] formation of public education." 
41 Mich. App. at 340,200 N.W.2d at 99. 
· 376. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
377. 196 Misc. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345. 
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justified only if a book were written with the explicit purpose of fos-
tering hatred toward a particular group. 378 
In the cases that challenge the general curriculum, courses, or 
books, parents have sought protection, under the guise of free exer-
cise, parental nurture, privacy, or other theories, of their right to so-
cialize their children according to their own values. In response, 
courts have expressed an overriding concern that the personal atti-
tudes and values of individual parents must not be allowed to stifle 
the free interchange of ideas in public school classrooms needed to 
achieve the educational system's goals. 
Until recently, the notion that education serves to develop the 
critical inquiry and open-mindedness necessary for democracy has 
been considered applicable only to universities. 879 The secondary 
school environment has been distinguished from the university set-
ting in several ways: the secondary school acts more "in loco pa-
rentis with respect to minors";380 secondary school teachers fre-
quently lack the "independent traditions," broad discretion over 
teaching methods, intellectual qualifications, and experience of the 
university faculty; and secondary students and sometimes teachers 
are less intellectually and emotionally mature than their university 
counterparts. 381 
While still emphasizing the indoctrination function of secondary 
schools, 382 educators and courts in the last several decades have rec-
ognized that maximum exposure to ideas is also an important con-
cern not only at the university level but also at lower levels of public 
education.383 As a result, judicial reluctance to allow parents to 
378. 196 Misc. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46. But see Presidents Council, 
Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 998 (1972), in which the court affirmed the school board's decision to 
remove a novel claimed by parents to be obscene from the junior high school li-
braries. The court stated that academic freedom was "scarcely fostered by the intru-
sion of three or even nine federal jurists making curriculum or library choices for 
the community of scholars." 457 F.2d at 292. 
379. See Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("[11he [uni-
versity] classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' in which the exposure of 
students to a robust exchange of ideas is essential"); Developments, supra note 281, 
at 1050. 
380. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), affd., 448 F.2d 
1242 (1st Cir. 1971). 
381. 323 F. Supp. at 1392. 
382. See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), alfd,, 
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). 
383. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Parducci v. Rut-
land, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 
11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Note, School Boards, Schoolbooks and the Freedom To 
Learn, 59 YALB LJ. 928, 943 (1950); Note, Academic Freedom in the Public 
Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1176, 1181 (1973). 
This broad view of education has been justified by its tendency to strengthen 
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censor classroom discussion is understandable. Citizens for Parental 
Rights v. San Mateo School Board,384 a recent California appeals 
court case, epitomizes the nature of the parental challenge and judi-
cial response. The court rejected a parental privacy claim that was 
based on Meyer385 and Pierce:386 
Meyer and Pierce are supportive of the explicit freedoms of speech 
and press rather than the penumbral right of privacy. Citing these 
two cases, the Supreme Court drew the following conclusion in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut [citation omitted]: "In other words, the State 
may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract 
the spectrum of available knowledge." Yet, this is the very thing that 
the plaintiffs would have this court do. They seek to "contract the 
spectrum of available knowledge" by enjoining the county from con-
tinuing with its family life and sex education program.381 
The court's primary emphasis on free speech is appropriate in the 
curriculum setting. Although recognizing a privacy right to with-
draw entirely from public school would merely limit the knowledge 
of the individual claimant, allowing parents to alter the public school 
curriculum would encroach on the rights of other members of the 
school community to teach, learn, and speak. Thus, courts have sub-
ordinated the interest of individual parents in fashioning a curricu-
lum to reflect their own values not only because satisfaction of all 
diverse desires would oe administratively impossible, but also be-
cause satisfaction of the individualistic interest would be paradox-
ically counterproductive to preserving free expression. 
Free expression is therefore necessary for the creation of an at-
mosphere in which the.school boards can effectively carry out their 
collectivist functions of academic achievement and socialization. The 
exchange of ideas and exposure to diversity within the school cur-
riculum prepare the student for life in a democratic society that 
values a certain degree of heterogeneity. They are a prerequisite 
to good citizenship, and it is in the state's interest to expose all chil-
dren to the experience. 
and reaffirm the pluralistic nature of American society in which "knowledge is the 
right of all and not the privilege of a few." Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 400 
(D.N.H. 1974). See Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (N.D. Ind. 
1970), affd., 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). Courts also have increasingly stressed 
the importance of education to the success and welfare of the child: "In these days, 
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of an education." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493 (1954). See, e.g, San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Davis v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (E.D. Mich. 1970). 
384. 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975). 
385. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
386. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
387. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 
32, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 90 (1975) (all emphasis of California court). 
1442 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1373 
Recognition that the free exchange of ideas is a fundamental 
value in the public schools does not, however, mean that individuals 
have no right to challenge the established curriculum. Clearly, 
school board policy may be as parochial and destructive of individual 
inquiry as parental censorship. When the public school curriculum 
serves as an instrument for the oppression of minority groups or for 
the suppression of ideas, it may violate the fourteenth amendment 
equal protection clause, the first amendment free speech clause, or 
both. 
c. Direct challenges: equal protection and free speech claims. 
An order to cease violating -the equal protection clause could 
arise from two different types of claims. First, a group might assert 
that it did not receive an education equivalent to that of other groups 
because the public school curriculum was used to portray it unfairly 
and prejudicially. As the court indicated in Rosenberg v. Board of 
Education, 388 elimination from the curriculum of a book or a course 
that fosters hatred or preaches the inferiority of a particular group 
would be justified. 380 
A variant of this type of equal protection claim is that the group 
has been stereotyped in the textbooks. The stereotyping of women 
in texts as wives and mothers arguably denies female students equal 
protection of the law by providing them with a substantially different 
and inferior education to that provided male students. aoo Ethnic or 
religious groups might make similar claims. For example, due to 
the failure of the school system to give proper credit to Blacks in texts 
and classes, 391 Blacks may have been unable to develop the self-es-
teem necessary to function effectively in society and to take advan-
388. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
389. 196 Misc. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346. See text at notes 376-78 supra. 
390. It has been demonstrated that people rise to what is expected of them. See 
R. RosENrnAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1968); Milgram, Be-
havioral Study of Obedience, 61 J . .ABNORM. & Soc. PSYCH. 371-78 (1963), Expecta-
tions are often communicated to the child through school textbooks. Several studies 
have revealed that women and girls are given very limited roles in school texts and 
that boys are the main characters in most of the stories. While girls are depicted as 
passive and dependent, boys are portrayed as being adventurous, skillful, and creative. 
Women seldom have exciting jobs, while men are employed in a variety of interesting 
jobs. See generally U'Ren, The Image of Women in Textbooks, in WOMEN IN SEXIST 
SOCIETY (V. Gornick & B. Moran eds. 1971); Note, Teaching Woman Her Place: 
The Role of Public Education in the Development .of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 
1191, 1199-202 (1973). The contributions of famous women are rarely acknowl-
edged in textbooks. In one text, Madame Curie is portrayed as a lab assistant to 
her husband, U'Ren, supra, at 222. Due to the inadequate representation of girls 
and women in texts, girls' aspirations and their potential for achievement are limited. 
See Note, supra, at 1202. See also Comment, Sex Discrimination: The Textbook 
Case, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1338 (1974). 
391. Cf. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN, L. Rt;v, 
489,525 (1973). 
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tage of the "amazing world of diversity."392 Claims alleging such 
injuries from stereotyping have not yet been litigated; moreover, 
courts might be reluctant to engage in the psychological, sociological, 
and educational analyses necessary to decide these issues. It ap-
pears, however, that organized minority groups have successfully 
brought this problem to the attention of local boards and textbook 
manufacturers and have effected significant changes without judicial 
assistance. 
The second type of equal protection claim involves a challenge 
to "sex tracking," the designation of different curricula for girls and 
boys in an attempt to train girls for certain occupations and boys for 
others. 393 In Robinson v. Washington, 394 the court held that the 
plaintiff's challenge to a regulation making home economics a degree 
requirement only for female high school students did not present a 
substantial federal question under the equal protection clause. How-
ever, in Sanchez v. Baron,395 the court reached a contrary conclusion 
on similar facts. The plaintiffs contended that a policy that excluded 
women from industri:al arts classes resulted in •a denial of fourteenth 
amendment rights by "arbitrarily channelling women, controlling their 
education and ,therefore, limiting their options in careers and life 
roles."396 In a preliminary hearing to determine whether the case 
should be certified as a class action, the court agreed that . "girls in 
junior and senior high schools . . . are being discriminated against 
because of their sex."397 
The equal protection claim, like the free exercise and parental 
nurture claims, is in a sense an oblique attack upon the school 
board's power to socialize students. A more direct approach, which 
has not yet been attempted, would challenge on free speech grounds 
the board's power to shape and influence children's minds through 
the academic curriculum. Parents might assert, based on the princi-
ples articulated in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,398 
a right on behalf of their children to be free from interference with 
thought. 
The disputed school board regulation in Barnette required stu-
dent participation in a flag salute ceremony and imposed penalties 
for refusal to participate. The Court held the regulation invalid as 
applied to a child of the Jehovah's Witness sect. Although the flag 
392. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in 
part). 
393. See Note, supra note 390, at 1212. 
394. Civil No. 9576 (W.D. Wash., April 6, 1971), cited in 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
LAW RPTR. 42 (1972). 
395. Civil No. 69-C-1615 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
396. Note, supra note 390, at 1212. 
397. Civil No. 69-C-1615 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
398. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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salute conflicted with a religious principle forbidding all forms of 
idolatry, Justice Jackson's majority opinion emphasized that the deci• 
sion was based upon a general right of freedom of thought rather 
than upon freedom of religion:399 "Nor does the issue as we see 
it tum on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincer• 
ity with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees' mo• 
tive for enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, 
many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a 
compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual."400 
The Court found that the statute compelled either an affirmation of 
belief or a simulation of assent;401 such coercion was held to invade 
the sacred sphere of intellect that the first amendment was designed 
to insulate from official and political control. "One's right to life, 
liberty, and property, to free speech, to free press, freedom of wor• 
ship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submit• 
ted !<;> vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."402 
lj'he court noted that in the educational setting, individual rights 
may be particularly vulnerable to infringement because local school 
boards "may feel less sense of responsibility to the Constitution" than 
do other units of government. 403 Despite its admitted lack of exper• 
tise in public education, the Court concluded that it must intervene 
when such constitutional invasions occur rather than defer to the 
school board: 404 "[E]ducating the young for citizenship is reason 
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individ• 
ual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach 
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes."405 While the Court noted, as it had in Meyer and 
Pierce, that the collectivist goal of national unity was permissible, 
it held that coercion of thought was an impermissible means. 400 Such 
coercion was particularly objectionable in the public schools because 
"[p]robably no deeper division of our people could proceed from 
any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doc• 
trine and whose program shall compel youth to unite in embrac• 
ing."407 
The student who is indoctrinated to the beliefs and values es• 
poused by the school board and transmitted through the curriculum 
is arguably coerced no less than the student in Barnette. As dis• 
399. See Kauper, supra note 290, at 1062. 
400. 319 U.S. at 634-35. 
401. 319 U.S. at 633. 
402. 319 U.S. at 638. 
403. 319 U.S. at 637-38. 
404. 319 U.S. at 640. 
405. 319 U.S. at 637. 
406. 319 U.S. at 640. 
407. 319 U.S. at 641. 
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cussed earlier,408 the educational system's socialization function is 
well established and control by the board over the curriculum is a 
permissible means of discharging it. However, when the core collec-
tivist interests of the state are not at stake, limits on the educational 
authorities' power to manipulate the curriculum's content may be 
reached, and the countervailing right of individual freedom of ex-
pression should be invocable. The student, compelled to attend 
school, is forced to learn the ideas approved ·by the school board; 
the child's mind could be shackled if no provision is made for ex-
posure to different and opposing ideas. In both Barnette and the 
curriculum cases, diversity is sacrificed to the state's demands for id-
eological conformity. 
A complicating factor in determining how school board power 
should be limited is that, unlike the parental nurture and free exer-
cise rights, the right of freedom of thought belongs to the child. 400 
Of course, when the child is very young, the parent must bring the 
action to moderate board control over socialization on the child's 
behalf. However, it is at least arguable that since the process of social-
ization acts directly upon the student, and since education is primar-
ily intended to benefit the child instead of the parent, a child of ap-
propriate age should be allowed to assert independently his own 
rights and opinions. As Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in 
Yoder, "It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essen-
tial if we are to give full meaning to what we have said about the 
Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of their own 
destiny."410 Douglas relied on Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,411 which held that students were "per-
sons" possessing fundamental rights under the Constitution. In the 
language of Tinker, students are not "closed-circuit recipients of only 
that which the state chooses to communicate. "412 It is difficult to 
determine, however, when children would be capable of asserting 
the right on their own behalf. The children in Tinker were sixteen-
year-old junior high school students, but Justice Douglas believed 
that even a fourteen-year-old child generally possesses the necessary 
408. See text at notes 251-52 supra. 
409. Although this issue has not been decided by the courts, there seems to be 
no procedural problem if a child who does not have parental approval wishes to 
litigate. Federal practice provides that the "[c]ourt shall appoint a guardian ad 
litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action 
or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant 
or incompetent person." FED. R. Crv. P. 17(c). This provision has been broadly 
construed. Thus, when an infant's interests conflict with those of ·his parents, the 
court has power to appoint a special representative. See C. WRIGIIT & A. MILLER, 
6 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1570, at-774 (1971). 
410. 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972). 
411. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
412. 393 U.S. at 511. 
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emotional and intellectual maturity to exercise judgment with respect 
to his education. 413 
A court that recognizes the child's right to be free from interfer-
ence with thought should fashion a remedy that minimizes the social-
ization impact of the curriculum. Because a degree of socialization 
is inherent in the compulsory education system, 414 an absolutely neu-
tral curriculum is not possible and therefore could not be mandated. 
Indeed, a totally neutral curriculum would not be desirable; there 
are strong state interests to be furthered through socialization that 
must necessarily outweigh the individual right.415 However, spe-
cific curriculum changes could be made that would help safeguard 
the interest of the child. For example, schools could be required 
to give parents and students greater choice in the exposure of stu-
dents to socially and politically charged subjects, such as sex educa-
tion and the potentially role-defining studies of industrial arts and 
home economics. In courses such as history and political science 
that traditionally have emphasized consensus values, the state could 
be compelled to expose the student to a balanced presentation of 
ideas. A judicial requirement that students be exposed to a diver-
sity of ideas would, in effect, represent a declaration that free expres-
sion is a consensus value and that the schools, by setting an example 
of openness to diverse ideas, must communicate it to the students. 
The recognition of a right of free thought, however, would pre-
sent problems similar to those that restrained courts in the religion 
and privacy cases, but which did not exist in Barnette.41° In the 
curriculum indoctrination situation, for example, courts must assess 
educational policies and values to determine a violation and fashion 
a remedy. It would be difficult, however, to determine when ex-
posure has become indoctrination or when a balanced presentation 
of ideas has occurred. Such determinations require an understand-
ing of subtle interactions and relationships in the educational system, 
including the manner in which various subjects, ideas, and tech-
niques influence students. Clearly, courts do not possess the level 
of expertise necessary to make such judgments. In Barnette, on the 
other hand, the parents attacked the required observance of a ritual, 
which was merely an adjunct to the content of the curriculum. In 
that case, the determination of unconstitutionality was based primar-
ily upon a judgment of good citizenship, which the Court felt 
413. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing in part); Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973) (tenth-grade children considered to be capable 
of forming independent judgments). 
414. See text at notes 265-72 supra. See generally K. DAWSON & K. PREWITI, 
supra note 265, at 45, 164; D. KmP & M. YUDOF, supra note 46, at 85-134. 
415. See note 48 supra and text at notes 48-50 supra. 
416. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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uniquely competent to make. Thus, the court's lack of competence 
in educational matters was less important. -
There are, moreover, several problems with the proposed rem-
edy for curriculum indoctrination. Separate programs for dissenting 
children could create detrimental divisiveness, which has been a con-
tinuing concern of the courts in religion cases417 and was further reit-
erated in Barnette.418 Further, the efficiency of school operations 
and the quality of education might be seriously impaired by a com-
plex system of exemptions and special classes.419 
Thus, while the right to be free from interference with thought 
appears to have been given a sound theoretical foundation in Bar-
nette, the courts' relative inexpertise in the field of education and 
the practical difficulties of formulating a remedy are likely to prevent 
them from recognizing such a claim, thereby leaving intact the school 
boards' pervasive control of curriculum. 
3. Free Speech Protections of Teachers' Rights 
In contrast to the courts' refusal to protect students in curriculum 
disputes is their recent willingness to make the protection of the 
rights of teachers the only area in which school board authority has 
been successfully challenged on free speech grounds. This new def-
erence towards teachers' rights and the departure from traditional so-
licitude toward school board authority are consistent with the increas-
ingly recognized role of the school as a "marketplace of ideas."420 
Although <the right to teach was recognized in Meyer v. Ne-
braska,421 the free speech right of teachers has long been limited 
because of their unique position in the classroom. 422 On the one 
hand, the teacher serves as the "mouthpiece" of the educational au-
thorities and must thereby implement prescribed policies and curric-
417. See text at notes 298-304 supra. 
418. See text at note 407 supra. 
419. But see Miami Herald, Oct 19, 1975, § A, at 1, 26, col. 2. Some members 
of the Florida legislature favor mandating alternative programs, thus preferring class-
room disruption to the encroachment upon the right of parents to control their child's 
upbringing. 
420. See text at notes 379-83 supra. 
421. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See Moskowitz & Casagrande, supra note 109, at 
678, 681-82; Case Note, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1973). 
422. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (while teachers 
have "the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will 
. . . [i]t is equally clear that they have no right to work for the school system 
on their own terms");~Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Scopes v. 
State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). However, the notion that employees 
could be compelled to relinquish constitutionally protected rights as a condition of 
public employment has since been rejected. See, e.g., Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1494-95. See also 
Comment, The Dwindling Rights and the Closing Courthouse Door, 44 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 511 (1975); Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1176, supra note 383. 
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ulum. On the other hand, in his tutorial role, the teacher often iden-
tifies with the interests of the child and may thus be brought into 
conflict with administrators. Moreover, the teacher deals directly 
with parents and may consequently become entangled in disputes be-
tween parents and administrators concerning educational policy and 
values. Whatever his relationship to competing forces outside the 
classroom, within it the teacher wields extraordinary power. As a 
"role-model"423 and primary disciplinarian, 424 the teacher has a pow-
erful socializing influence on his pupils. 425 Because the state com-
pels his students to attend school, he addresses a "captive audi-
ence,"426 and the force of his ideas are not counterbalanced by the 
views of any comparable authority.427 While generally the teacher 
utilizes his power as the transmitter of the board's prescribed values 
and ideas, his special status allows him to modify the official curricu-
lum, thus making the teacher a potential counterweight to the paro-
chialism of an unchallenged school board program. 
Obviously, the teacher stands at the crossroads of the educational 
. system. 428 Through him, the rights and interests of all members of 
the educational community can be thwarted or vindicated. The fail-
ure of courts to develop a unified theory of academic rights and obli-
gations that accommodates all of the "unique institutional demands, 
social policies, and personal interests involved in the educational sit-
uation"429 is most evident in the case of teachers, who have been 
423. Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 111S (1st Cir. 1974); Comment, su-
pra note 422, at S11. 
424. See R. DAWSON & K. PREWIIT, supra note 26S, at 1S8. 
42S. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 48S (1960); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 
F. Supp. 3S2, 35S (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
426. See Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 35S, 360 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Van 
Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 
8S6. 
427. Van Alstyne, supra note 426, at 8S6. Moreover, students are not free to 
respond to the teacher for fear of his sanctions. Id. at 856. 
428. See generally Miller, supra note 258, at 839-40. The unique position of 
the teacher illustrates the potential countervailing interests of the state, parents, and 
students in the teacher's classroom expression. Since the state's ultimate interest is in 
the development of its children, it is therefore concerned with both how the teacher 
conducts class and the subject matter to which the child is exposed in the classroom. 
The parents' interest is in the intellectual and emotional development of their chil-
dren. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1493; Note, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, supra 
note 383, at 118S. Finally, the student has a right to be exposed to a broad use 
of knowledge as well as to a classroom environment that will foster his intellectual 
and emotional development. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1494. In Minarcini 
v. Strongsville City School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), students 
claimed that the school board's text selection contrary to faculty recommendations 
violated their first amendment learning freedoms. The court noted the fairness of 
the selection process and found for the school board. The court, emphasizing "the 
professional teacher's obligation to utilize individual teaching methodology," im-
plicitly recognized students' academic learning rights as encompassing exposure to 
a variety of ideas. 384 F. Supp. at 707 (emphasis added). 
429. Case Note, supra note 421, at 1348 n.40. 
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accorded rights only in piecemeal fashion. Still, as indicated earlier, 
the free speech right has at least been recognized, and the cases have 
evinced certain standards that identify its scope. 
While some courts have recognized only the teacher's procedural 
right not .to ·be dismissed without prior notice that his methods are 
unacceptable, 430 several have overcome their fear of inexperitise in 
questions involving educational judgment and have recognized a sub-
stantive right of academic freedom. 431 In these cases, courts balance 
the state's interests in the students' welfare and in operating an effi-
cient school system against the teacher's freedom to conduct his 
classes in the manner he believes will most effectively implement 
the curriculum and stimulate critical thinking. 432 Thus, the teacher's 
right is not absolute. For example, courts have generally rejected 
attempts by teachers to discuss matters completely unrelated to the 
subjects that the teachers were hired to present.433 In certain cases, 
430. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), affd., 
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). 
431. See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 354 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
Similarly, in Sterzing v. Fort Bend lndp. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex.), 
vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972), the court 
recognized 
the substantive rights of a teacher to choose a teaching method, which, in the 
court's view, on ti}e basis of expert opinion, served a demonstrated educational 
purpose, and the procedural right of a teacher not to be discharged for the use 
of a teaching method which was not proscribed by a regulation or definite ad-
ministrative action, and as to which it was not proven that he had notice that 
its ~se was prohibited. 
376 F. Supp. at 662. But see Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Olicker, 25 Cal. App. 
3d 1098, 1109, 102 Cal. Rptr. 421, 429 (1972), in which the court stated that its 
sole function was to determine whether the teaching technique disrupted or impaired 
discipline in the classroom; it was not to assess the academic merit of the pedagogi-
cal technique. 
432. See generally Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176, supra note 383, at 1176. 
433. Where the topic in controversy was considered relevant to the teacher's as-
signed curriculum, teachers' rights have been upheld. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 
F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher's right to introduce the word "motherfucker" in 
context of discussion of article from Harpers magazine, in senior English 
class upheld); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 
(N.D. Iowa 1972) (drama teacher's use of words "damn" and "son of a bitch" were 
deemed reasonably relevant to the subject matter she was employed to teach); Ster-
zing v. Fort Bend Indp. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex.), vacated for 
reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972) (damages for value 
of reinstatement granted to high school civics teacher who was dismissed because 
he raised and discussed controversial · issues, used contemporary anti-war literature, 
and implemented a six-day section on race relations); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. 
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). But see Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. 
Mass.), affd., 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (teacher who had written "fuck" on 
the blackboard and asked students to define it during a discussion on societal taboos 
was reinstated; however, the court held that if a teacher uses a method that is rele-
vant to the subject matter and approved by some experts but not by a preponderance 
of the teaching profession as having a serious educational purpose, he may be dis-
charged if he was put on notice that the method was not permitted). 
When the teacher's deviation from the established curriculum was deemed to be 
more substantial, dismissals have been upheld. See Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 
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courts have also circumscribed the right by insisting that the teacher 
give a balanced presentation of ideas to avoid indoctrination or pros-
elytization of the students. 434 
In assessing the educational value of pedagogical methods, courts 
have relied heavily upon whether the disputed language or concept 
is available to the student either in books in the school library435 or 
in other accessible literature, 436 and whether the student already 
might be familiar with the controversial language or subject. 437 
While courts have sought the expert opinions of administrators, pro-
fessors, and teachers on these matters, 438 reliance upon parental ob-
jections has been conspicuously absent. 439 
. Parducci v. Rutland440 illustrates the general judicial approach 
in teachers' rights cases. In Parducci, a high school teacher assigned 
Kurt Vonnegut's story "Welcome to the Monkey House" to her jun-
ior English class. Three students asked to be excused from the as-
signment, and several parents complained. The superintendent, de-
scribing the story as "literary garbage," ordered her not to teach it. 
She was subsequently dismissed on the ground that her assigned ma-
terials had a "disruptive effect" on the class. The court held that 
the dismissal violated the teacher's first amendment right of aca-
demic freedom. The court noted that although the right to teach 
was not one of the enumerated rights of the first amendment,441 it 
had been acknowledged by many courts as fundamental to the pres-
ervation of democracy. The court emphasized that first amendment 
protection of the right of academic freedom was necessary because 
unwarnanted invasions would otherwise have a "chilling'' effect on 
F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (dismissal of three 
teachers for distributing a poem that referred to the pleasures derived from smoking 
marijuana and urging students not to accept the discipline and moral tenets imposed 
on them was held not to violate the first amendment); Ahern v. Board of Educ., 
456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972) (teacher drafted corporal punishment regulation during 
economics class); Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (teacher's 
class statements concerning prostitutes and other illegitimate topics were not pro-
tected by the first amendment); Robbins v. Board of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. 
III. 1970) (dismissal of English teacher because of her chronic tardiness, leaving 
class unattended oil several occasions, discussion of disciplinary action taken against 
another teacher, use of offensive sexual references during class, and inadequate teach-
ing methods held not to violate first and fourteenth amendments). 
434. See generally Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High Sc/zoo/ 
Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1048 (1971). 
Cf. Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 353 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
435. See Note, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1176, supra note 383, at 1187 & n.78. 
436. See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356 (M.D. Ala. 1970), 
437. See Note, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1176, supra note 383, at 1187 & n.78. 
438. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass.), alfd., 
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). 
439. See Nahmod, supra note 434, at 1052. 
440. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
441. 316 F. Supp. at 355. 
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other teachers.442 However, cognizant of the disproportionate influ-
ence of the teacher and the "state's vital interest in protecting the 
impressionable minds of its young people from any form of extreme 
propagandism in the classroom,"443 the court acknowledged the need 
to temper the teacher's right in certain circumstances.444 In Par-
ducci, the decision .to protect ithe teacher's right to assign the story 
was based on two factors: no substantial disruption resulted from 
the teacher's action and the story was, in the judgment of the court, 
appropriate for high school students. 445 
Parducci was the first case to apply the standard articulated in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District446 of 
"material and substantial interference with school work or discipline" 
in the context of teacher free speech. 447 The student's response in 
the classroom, which the court characterized as apathetic, was the 
sole basis for finding that there was no substantial disruption; pa-
rental objections were not considered. 448 Rather than assess com-
munity and parental sensibilities to determine whether the story 
chosen for classroom study was obscene, the court focused on student 
maturity, sophistication, and experience.449 
The court's assessment of the educational value of the classroom 
materials markedly contrasts with the typical approach used in pa-
rental challenges. In agreeing with the teacher that the story had 
literary and social merit, the court in effect substituted its judgment 
of educational value for ,that of the school board. 450 Apparently the 
442. 316 F. Supp. at 355. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 
1969). 
443. 316 F. Supp. at 355. 
444. 316 F. Supp. at 355. See Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 355, 360 
(N.D. Fla. 1973); Sterzing v. Fort Bend lndp. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 661 
(S.D. Tex.), vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
445. See Markowitz & Casagrande, supra note 325, at 680. 
446. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
447. 316 F. Supp. at 355. See Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indp. School Dist., 376 F. 
Supp. 657, 662 (S.D. Tex.), vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Tinker involved behavior outside the classroom. Thus, its use in Parducci is sig-
nificant, since a distinction has generally been drawn between classroom and out-of-
classroom contexts. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1492. 
448. 316 F. Supp. at 356. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st 
Cir. 1969). 
449. 316 F. Supp. at 356. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 
1969). 
450. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1502. The fact that the story was clearly 
within the assigned curriculum, however, appears to have been important to the 
court's determination. See Nahmod, supra note 434, at 1044. 
One commentator bas suggested that the court in Parducci may have disre-
garded the school principal's literary judgment because it was "based not on educa-
tional considerations but rather on parental complaints alone." Id. at 1038. The 
implication that parental opinion should not influence the board's "educational" judg-
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court found it easy to judge independently the story's educational 
value in this case because the school board's position was entirely 
arbitrary. The board had failed to articulate any standards to guide 
teachers in selecting literature for classroom study. In fact, incon-
sistency pervaded the entire system.451 The court noted that both 
the school library and the English department's recommended read-
ing list contained books with philosophies and language far more 
controversial than any to be found in the Vonnegut story.4112 Be-
cause of the absence of standards, the teacher received no prior no-
tice that her action violated Board policy, and, therefore, the dis-
missal violated her right of due process.453 Although the court was 
generally reluctant to interfere with the decision-making of the 
school board, it could not on the facts of the case "find any substan-
tial interest of the schools to be served by giving defendants unfet-
tered discretion to decide how the First Amendment rights of teach-
ers are to be exercised. "454 
Although the teacher's right of academic freedom is receiving 
increasing support in the courts, it appears that the judiciary is not 
intervening solely to protect teachers. For example, their references 
to student needs when determining the scope of a teacher's academic 
freedom455 indicate that courts are also concerned that prohibition 
of controversial subject matter might diminish the intellectual oppor-
tunities of students. 456 When the curriculum content issue is framed 
in terms of teacher rights, the teacher, in effect, becomes the guard-
ian of academic freedom for the entire school community. 
Parducci also highlights the conflict between the academic free-
dom of teachers and the right of parents to influence their children's 
education. Ostensibly, a teacher's right of free speech, like all con-
stitutional rights, should be immune from popular pressure. For ex-
, 
' 
ment contraverts the basic political premise upon which the system is founded: par• 
ents would be denied access to the school board, the intended forum for parental 
communication of grievances. 
451. 316 F. Supp. at 357, 358. 
452. The English Department provided a reading list for teachers and students 
for each grade. The court concluded that J.D. Salinger's Catcher in the Rye, a rec-
ommended novel on the junior English reading list, contained far more controversial 
language than the assigned story. 316 F. Supp. at 357. 
453. 316 F. Supp. at 357. This reasoning seems consistent with Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The statute in Meyer forbidding foreign language 
instruction for students who had not passed the eighth grade was held to be "arbi-
trary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State." 
262 U.S. at 403. Emphasizing the sanctity of the right to teach, the Court stated 
that the legislature had "attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern 
language teachers." 262 U.S. at 401. See LeClercq, supra note 290, at 237. 
454. 316 F. Supp. at 357. 
455. See text at notes 435-39 supra. 
456. See Nahmod, supra note 434, at 1049. Cf. Minarcini v. Strongsville City 
School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698, 707 (N.D. Ohio 1974), discussed in note 428 supra, 
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ample, parental objections should not be sufficient to justify a dis-
missal for teaching evolution; such action would violate the teacher's 
rights under the establishment clause.457 Even so, parents do have 
a legitimate interest in the curriculum. They are understandably 
frustrated when the values they teach at home are undermined by 
a teacher who commands significant attention and respect from their 
children. This dissatisfaction is frequently manifested in parental 
objection to school board policy. Ignoring parental desires and 
granting teachers absolute freedom to control the content of class-
room discussion would risk omitting from the children's educational 
experience important political and social values about which parents 
are properly concerned. Accordingly, the court in Parducci recog-
nized that the teacher's right of free speech was not unlimited, 458 
although it considered itself better able to define the scope of the 
right than either the Board or the parents. 469 
Clearly, when assessing the merit of challenges to the curricu-
lum, courts must not limit themselves to the judgments of profession-
als who, in designing educational policies, may overlook constitu-
tional values. Rather, courts must scrutinize and reject arbitrary ed-
ucational policies if constitutional rights are to be adequately pro-
tected. However, courts should also retain a degree of sensitivity 
to the reasonable concerns of parents. In Adams v. Campbell 
County School District, 460 for example, the court indicated that pa-
rental concerns could be considered in setting school policy. The 
court stated that although the teacher's pedagogical method may 
have had educational value, the teacher did not necessarily have a 
constitutional right to adopt the method. Particularly in small com-
munities, it concluded, the board possesses the right to require the 
teacher to use a more orthodox approach.461 Apparently, a school 
board action that amounts to an obvious surrender to parental pres-
sures will be condemned by the courts without even an evaluation 
451. See text at notes 315-26 supra. 
458. 316 F. Supp. at 355. 
459. The court concluded: "We do not question the good faith of the defendants 
in believing that some parents have been offended. With the greatest of respect 
to such parents, their sensibilities are not the full measure of what is proper educa-
tion." 316 F. Supp. at 356, quoting Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st 
Cir. 1969). 
460. 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975). 
461. 511 F.2d at 1247. See generally Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 
v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); Drown v. Ports-
mouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 
972 (1972) (nonrenewal of a teacher for being "'too innovative and unconventional' 
would be proper under the wide discretion afforded the school board"); Parker v. 
Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), affd., 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). 
1454 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1373 
of the action on its merits.462 However, a change in school board 
policy that is responsive to reasonable parental involvement is usually 
presumed valid. 
4. Conclusion 
Because of their reluctance to review school board policy, courts 
have assumed a limited role in most curriculum matters. As a result, 
school board policies have been affirmed in the majority of cases. 
Courts have intervened only to protect certain fundamental rights: 
freedom from an established religion, free exercise of religion, equal 
protection of the law, and especially freedom of expression. Both 
by rejecting parental efforts to censor classroom discussion and by 
upholding teacher's rights of academic freedom, courts have con-
sistently recognized the value of a "wide exposure to that robust ex-
change of ideas which discovers 'truth' out of a multitude of tongues 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."463 
Even though the value of a free exchange of ideas has been 
stressed, courts have not addressed directly the problem of school 
board indoctrination. Many courts assume that the classroom is and 
should be an open intellectual community. Unfortunately, the ideal 
of academic freedom for teachers and students is still limited by the 
general presumption of validity accorded school board policies and 
curricula. Certainly the protection of free speech rights of teachers 
ensures some diversity, thereby mitigating the effects of school board 
indoctrination. However, even though it is apparent that a curricu-
lum itself may embody a particular set of values, courts have not ob-
jected to the transmission of these values to students. The concern 
in the academic freedom cases is for protecting impressionable young 
minds only from the indoctrination of values not fostered by the 
state.464 In the final analysis, students, teachers, and parents who 
share the school board's value orientation are generally protected by 
the board's preferred position in curriculum litigation. However, 
those students, teachers, and parents whose values differ significantly 
from those of the majority in a community and who accordingly can-
462. The question of what impact parental preference should have on a teacher's 
rights also arises when a school board tries to dismiss a tenured teacher on the 
grounds of incompetency or inefficiency. In Beebee v. Haslett Pub. Schools, 66 
Mich. App. 718, 239 N.W.2d 724 (1976), the court held that a disagreement over 
teaching philosophy was not "just and reasonable cause" for dismissal under the ten-
ure law. The court noted that a teacher who was criticized by all parents "would 
surely have an effect on the school detrimental enough to jeopardize his or her ten-
ure." However, the suggestion that a teacher had to be liked by evezyone was "ri-
diculous on its face. Some parents will always criticize a teacher, especially one 
who utilizes methods different from those used when they went to school." 66 Mich. 
App. at 727, 239 N.W.2d at 729. 
463. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
464. See generally Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960); Parducci v. Rut-
land, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (1970). 
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not influence school board policy are, for the most part, left unpro-
tected by the courts. 
B. Control over Conduct, Behavior, and Discipline 
in the Public Schools 
Conflicts arise not only over what values and attitudes .should be 
communicated through the academic curriculum, but also over com-
munication through noncurricular activities. Thus, this subsection 
will examine the rules that govern the daily operations of the school 
and control the conduct of teachers and students. The educational 
authorities use this system of regulation of grooming, sexual be-
havior, noncurricular speech and other behavior no less than they 
use the academic curriculum to transmit particular values and atti-
tudes. Moreover, because certain rules, such as limits on hair 
length, necessarily affect the individual outside of the school environ-
ment, conduct regulation involves even greater intrusion into the 
personal affairs of students and teachers. 
Local school boards derive their power to establish such rules 
and to discipline teachers and students from state legislation that ei-
ther proscribes specific conduct465 or delegates broad disciplinary au-
thority to the boards. 466 Such statutes often place the disciplinary 
power in the context of · the school board's general operational pow-
ers, thereby emphasizing the relationship between conduct regula-
tion and the concern for safety and operational efficiency.467 
In addition, courts have implied disciplinary power over students 
under the theory that schools act in loco parentis. 468 By establishing 
a connection between school board authority and the responsibility 
of parents for the social development of their children, this doctrine 
in particular reflected the socialization purpose of many rules of con-
duct, especially those governing sexual and social behavior. The ar-
tificiality of this rationale for school disciplinary authority was appar-
465. Specific statutes proscribing conduct are rare. An example, however, is spe-
cific legislation prohibiting student membership in fraternities, often with provisions 
commanding or allowing expulsion. See, e.g., Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 
57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), affd., 323 U.S. 685 (1945); Burkitt v. School 
Dist No. 1, 195 Ore. 471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952). 
466. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 279.8 (1975); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.290 
(1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 353, 356 (1976-77 Supp.); NEB. REv. STAT. 
§ 79-443 (1971). The Iowa statute, for example, provides that "[t]he board shall 
make rules for its own government and that of the directors, officers, teachers, and 
pupils, and for the care of the schoolhouse, grounds, and property of the school cor-
poration, and aid in the enforcement of the same, and require the performance of 
duties by said persons imposed by law and the rules." IOWA CODE § 279.8 (1972). 
461. See text at note 253 supra. 
468. For a review of the in loco parentis doctrine as it applies te the school's 
plenary disciplinary power over pupils while in school, see Goldstein, The Scope and 
Sources of School Board Authority To Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-
constitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L REv. 373, 377-84 (1969). 
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ent to many observers, since it is the parents who challenge the 
school's disciplinary action in court.469 With the demise of in loco 
parentis theory, the school's power to regulate student conduct has 
been weakened considerably.470 Accordingly, students and teachers 
have been increasingly successful in recent years in challenging 
school rules and disciplinary procedures. In rare instances courts 
have struck down a local rule because it exceeded the statutory 
power of the school board471 or because it was unconstitutionally 
vague.472 The majority of successful claims, however, have alleged 
violations of substantive constitutional rights, such as freedom of ex-
pression, substantive due process, and privacy. 
This section of the Project first explores the scope of substantive 
rights of teachers and students in the areas of noncurricular free 
speech, grooming, and sexual behavior. It concludes with an exami-
nation of the scope of students' procedural rights, giving particular 
emphasis to the implications of expanded procedural safeguards for 
the school community itself. 
1. Noncurricular Speech and Communicative Conduct 
Students and teachers spend a considerable number of hours 
each day in school. Obviously, during this time a substantial amount 
of communication between teacher and student transpires that is not 
related to the substantive academic curriculum. While the distinc-
tion between curricular speech473 and noncurricular communication 
is often tenuous, it is apparent that very different considerations do 
in fact influence the regulation of noncurricular or "casual" speech, 
469. For a criticism of the doctrine as an inadequate explanation of the legal 
relationship between the student and the school, see Developments, supra note 281, 
at 1144-45. This study points out that the doctrine has met with disfavor because 
it confers powers but not responsibilities on the schools, because it artificially usurps 
power when parents expressly refuse their consent, and because it condones excessive 
regulation of conduct. 
470. When the in loco parentis theory was at its height, courts upheld a variety 
of school board regulations, subjecting them to only minimal scrutiny. See, e.g., 
Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) (excluding 
married persons from extracurricular activities held reasonable); State ex rel. Idle 
v. Chamberlain, 12 Ohio Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961) (excluding a preg-
nant girl held reasonable); State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ,, 
202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957) (temporary suspension of married pupils is 
reasonable); Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass, (8 Cush.) 160 (1851) 
(excluding a female student because of her immoral monetary connections with men 
held reasonable). 
471. See, e.g., Alvin Indp. School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1966) (exclusion of a mother held ultra vires). One commentator argues that 
this approach should be'used more often. See Goldstein, supra note 263, at 376-77. 
472. See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 
F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), affd., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
839 (1975) (dismissal of a nontenured teacher for being a practicing homosexual). 
473. See section III-A supra. 
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once it is so identified, in the classroom. For example, although the 
school board clearly has a strong interest in ensuring that noncurric-
ular activity does not obstruct the communication to students of the 
subject matter embodied in the curriculum, courts are less inclined 
to defer to the school board on issues that do not necessitate apprais-
ing the educational value of the prescribed curriculum and hence 
require no "professional expertise."474 
Just as the content of the academic curriculum can be adjusted 
to socialize students to particular values, 475 so, too, can noncurricular 
communication. To further the collectivist interest in training patri-
otic citizens, schools typically attempt to instill respect for flag and 
country. School programs generally include the recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance, the singing of the National Anthem and other 
patriotic hymns, and the performance of nationalistic rituals. Yet 
individuals have an interest in freely expressing their attitudes and 
ideas and in resisting standardization of beliefs. Students and teach-
ers may, for example, seek to state their views on a broad range 
of issues and subjects concerning both the school and events outside 
the school's premises. They will be thwarted unless the school is 
viewed as a community whose functions and influences reach far be-
yond the mere imparting of knowledge to students. 
The interest in resisting standardization of belief was supported 
by the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, 4711 in whioh •the notion of a right of "freedom of thought"477 
for students was first articulated. The Court held that a student 
could not be expelled from public school for refusing to participate 
in a compulsory flag salute ritual, resting its opinion on the ground 
that the state could not constitutionally compel either belief or the 
appearance of belief through ritualistic conduct designed to inculcate 
certain values in its captive student audience. 478 In distinguishing 
the flag salute ritual from academic instruction in American history 
and civics that would " 'tend to inspire patriotism and love of coun-
try,' "4711 the Court said that "[t]he issue here is whether this slow 
474. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 
n.12, 637-38 (1943). 
475. See text at notes 265-71 supra. 
476. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
477. 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
478. The distinction between teaching and secular study on the one hand, and 
compulsion or proselytizing on the other, had also arisen in the context of es-
tablishment and free exercise of religion in the schools. See, e.g., Abington 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The courts are unanimous that the 
latter is an unconstitutional infringement of individual rights, but in practice the line 
is not an easy one to draw. The problem is particularly acute when a teacher, who 
clearly exerts great influence over students, see text at notes 422-27 supra, exercises 
his right of free expression in the classroom. 
479. 319 U.S. at 631, quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 
604 (Stone, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
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and easily neglected route [academic instruction in civics and his-
tory] to aroused loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by substi-
tuting a compulsory salute and slogan."480 
Russo v. Central School District No. 1481 presented a similar fact 
situation to that in Barnette except that the plaintiff was a teacher 
instead of a student. School officials discharged the teacher because 
she stood silently at attention in front of her class during flag cere-
monies instead of saluting ,the flag 1and reciting :the Pledge of Alle-
giance as required by school regulations. The court framed the 
issue as whether the teacher's constitutional rights relative to those 
of students were lessened due to her voluntary presence in school 
and her function as a socializing agent of the state. 482 It then main-
tained, 
There is little room in what Mr. Justice Jackson once called the "ma-
jestic generalities of the Bill of Rights," West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette . . ., for an interpretation of the First 
Amendment that would be more restrictive with respect to teachers 
than it is with respect to their students, where there has been no inter-
ference with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the opera-
tion of the school, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District. 
• • .483 
The court recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in instill-
ing a healthy respect for symbols of the national government in 
young minds, 484 but concluded that in this case the teacher's free 
expression of her personal beliefs had not undermined the state's 
interests: No class was disrupted and the students were not pre-
vented from reciting the pledge, 480 since the ceremony proceeded 
under the supervision of a second homeroom teacher.486 Further-
more, the court noted that because the tenth-grade students were 
approaching the age when they "form their own judgments,"487 they 
were not susceptible to undue influence by their teacher's nonpartic-
ipation. 
Both Barnette and Russo demonstrate that courts will not allow 
the state, in its attempts to inculcate certain basic values in students, 
to force individuals either to share the beliefs of the majority or to 
give the appearance of shared belief. The accommodation of the 
collectivist function of education with individual interests in diversity 
in these two cases parallels the accommodation achieved in Pierce 
480. 319 U.S. at 631 (footnotes omitted). 
481. 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 ( 1973 ). 
482. 469 F.2d at 631. 
483. 469 F.2d at 631-32 (citations omitted). 
484. 469 F.2d at 632. 
485. 469 F.2d at 633. 
486. 469 F.2d at 625, 626, 633. 
487. 469 F.2d at 633. 
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v. Society of Sisters.-iss The state may seek a moderate amount of 
general socialization but may not use its power to regulate the 
schools to achieve standardization of belief. As Barnette and Russo 
indicate, the state's ability to control behavior and conduct within the 
school is limited by the individual's interest in freedom of belief and 
thought. 
The strength of ,the individual's mterest in active expression489 of 
beliefs is, however, another matter. Active expression of an individ-
ual's ideas raises the possibility, as recognized in Barnette, that the 
rights of other groups in the school community might be infringed 
and that disruptive influences might be created. Several cases have 
dealt specifically with the active free expression rights of both stu-
dents and teachers. 
The Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dis-
trict, 4110 for ex,ample, declared that "students in school as well as out 
of school . . . are possessed of fundamental rights which the State 
must respect,"491 but indicated that limits on the right of free expres-
sion are imposed "in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment."492 In that case, the Court held that a student could 
not be suspended for wearing an armband to protest the Vietnam 
war. In so holding, the Court affirmed the meaning of Barnette-
that the state may not use its power to regulate conduct in the schools 
to standardize belief-as applied to a student's active expression of 
belief. However, the Court noted that the student's right of free 
speech493 could be overridden upon a showing that the state's core 
interest-preserving order in the schools to permit educating and so-
cializing students-has been seriously jeopardized: 
[The student] may express his opinions, even on controversial sub-
jects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without "materially 
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline on the operation of the school" and without colliding with 
the rights of others. . . . [C]onduct by the student . . . that mate-
488. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
489. "Active" expression refers to expression that requires an affirmative act on 
the part of the communicator. This distinguishes the "passive" expression in Bar-
nette, in which the student took no affirmative steps to communicate an idea. 
490. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). There is considerable literature on Tinker. See, e.g., 
Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 
35 (1969); Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: "Tinker'' Distinguished, 
59 GEO. L.J. 37 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Law: Freedom of Expression in 
Student Demonstrations, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 168 (1969); Comment, Constitutional 
Law: Regulation Prohibiting War Protest in High School ls Unconstitutional, 54 
MINN. L. REV. 721 (1970). 
491. 393 U.S. at 51 I. 
492. 393 U.S. at 506. 
493. The Court characterized the armband as tantamount to "pure" speech, dis-
tinguishing cases on skirt length, clothing, hair style, or deportment in that none 
of these constituted pure speech. 393 U.S. at 507-08. 
1460 Michiggrz Law Review [Vol. 74:1373 
rially disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion 
of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of speech .... 494 
Infringement upon noncore state interests will not suffice: "[U]n-
differentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression."4911 A reasonable 
forecast of a substantial disruption is necessary. 
In thus affirming individual interests in active expression, the 
Court emphasized that public schools cannot be viewed solely as a 
conduit for teaching academic skills. Instead, the school serves a 
variety of other functions, including the facilitation of personal inter-
communication among students, all of which are integral parts of the 
educational process. 490 By imposing no conditions of age or matur-
ity on the students' rights of free expression, 497 the majority accorded 
significant strength to the value of a free exchange of ideas in the 
school community. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, had 
urged that protection be limited to students "possessed of that full 
capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First 
Amendment guarantees, 498 thereby recognizing the right only when 
students themselves are undeniably old enough to appreciate it. Al-
though this approach has been rejected, the students' age might be 
a factor in forecasting disruption when appraising the extent to which 
the state's interest in avoiding disturbances in the school is threat-
ened. Even so, the majority opinion presumes that all students, 
through communication with their peers, are able to contribute to 
the educational process; Tinker, therefore, stands for the proposition 
that all students regardless of age have a strong individual interest 
in expressing their views within the school community. 
This same accommodation of the rights of students with the in-
terests of the educational authorities also appears in lower court 
opinions that uphold the students' right to publish "underground" lit-
erature and distribute it in the schools. Although a conflict exists 
among the circuits over whether schools may constitutionally require 
students to submit the publication for review prior to distribution, 499 
494. 393 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted). Justice Fortas earlier alluded to what 
these rights might be: "the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." 
393 U.S. at 508. 
495. 393 U.S. at 508. 
496. 393 U.S. at 512. 
497. The children involved in the case were of different age and grade levels: 
15- and 16-year-old high school boys and a 13-year-old junior high school girl. 
498. 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
499. The Seventh Circuit has prohibited all forms of substantive prior approval. 
See Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). Other circuits 
have been less sweeping in their treatment of the issue. The First Circuit, for exam-
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courts have uniformly placed a strict procedural burden on school 
officials to insure that arbitrary censorship does not occur. 50° Courts 
also agree that the school may impose reasonable regulations on the 
time, place, and manner of distribution, and punish students who 
publish and distribute obscene or libelous literature. 501 While the 
courts have occasionally approved regulations that effectively elim-
inate the underground student press from the schools, 502 a showing 
of substantial harm or disruption to the school community is re-
quired. School officials thus are not allowed automatically to stifle 
student publications merely because they claim possible disruptive 
influences: "Perhaps it would be well if those entrusted to adminis-
ter the teaching of American history and government to our students 
began their efforts by practicing the document on which that history 
and government are based. "503 
The teacher's active right of free expression in the schools has 
also been recognized, 504 for example in Tinker, in which •the Su-
preme Court indicated that the teacher as well as his students retains 
pie, has called for efforts to minimize the adverse effects of prior restraints. See 
Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 ( 1st Cir. 1971). The Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits have invalidated a prior restraint that lacked procedural safeguards but have 
indicated that appropriately fashioned rules for students could be upheld. See Quar-
terman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Shanley v. Northeast Indp. School 
Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit has upheld a prior re-
straint rule that was accompanied by elaborate procedural safeguards, but found that 
its provisions were not met on the facts. See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 
F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the 
issue of prior restraints in an appeal from a Seventh Circuit case involving alleged 
obscenity in student publications, but declined to do so on the ground of mootness. 
Board of School Commrs. v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1974). Justice Douglas dissented 
saying, "In allowing the Board to reimpose its, system of prior restraints on student 
publications, we raise a very serious prospect of the precise sort of chilling effect 
which has long been a central concern in our First Amendment decisions." 420 
U.S. at 134. 
500. See, e.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971). 
501. See, e.g., Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972). 
502. See, e.g., Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 
996 (1971). In Katz, a complete ban on solicitation of money in primary and secon-
dary schools was upheld despite its impact as an effective ban on certain student 
publications. The rule was not aimed at expression but at the probability of harm 
to the students (especially those too poor to afford a donation) from multiple solici-
tations. 
503. Shanley v. Northeast Indp. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 978 (5th Cir. 1972). 
504. The distinction between "active" and "passive" expression, see note 489 su-
pra, is more attenuated with regard to teachers. It may be that a teacher who stands 
silently at attention during a flag salute ceremony, for instance, transmits values as 
directly as a teacher who wears an armband to class, as in James v. Board of Educ., 
461 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), discussed in note 507 
infra. A distinction may be that in the former case the teacher makes no effort 
to transmit the value to the student. Instead, the school system requires the teacher 
to perform a certain communicative (although nonacademic) act and the teacher 
passively resists. In the armband situation the teacher affirmatively seeks to commu-
nicate an idea. 
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constitutional rights in the classroom. 505 However, the teacher cases 
are distinguishable from the student cases in the important respect 
that different interests must be accommodated. Thus, the state has 
no core collectivist interest in inculcating basic societal values or in 
promoting the academic achievement of a teacher, and, of course, 
parents have no countervailing interest in nurturing attitude and per-
sonality development. Instead, courts must consider the state's in-
terest, articulated in Tinker, in avoiding disruption in the school's 
institutional functions as well as the special "interest of the State as 
an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees. "500 
The scope of the teacher's right of active free expression was 
dealt with in James v. Board of Education,507 in which the Second 
Circuit held that the dismissal of a teacher who wore a symbolic arm-
band in class violated his right of free speech. The facts of James 
paralleled those of Tinker, and the court accommodated the coun-
tervailing interests in the same manner. The court expressly noted 
that the interest of the school in maintaining order and discipline 
was the same with respect to both students and teachers. 008 Because 
there was no showing that the teacher's action actually disrupted or 
threatened to disrupt classroom activities, the school had failed to 
justify its restriction on the teacher's freedom of speech. 
The James court confirmed that all public education, curricular 
and noncurricular, serves fundamental collectivist interests: "[A] 
principal function of all elementary and secondary education is in-
doctrinative-whether it be to teach the ABC's or multiplication ta-
bles or to transmit basic values of the community."000 Thus, one 
of the teacher's affirmative duties is to inculcate certain values010 that 
educational authorities have deemed desirable. 511 Because his special 
status in 1:he classroom and unique relationship with students enables 
the teacher to exert powerful influence upon students, 512 the teacher 
may obstruct rather than assist ·the state in transmitting designated 
basic values to students. The court thus ,recognized that a teacher 
must not abuse his special relationship with students, but, in this 
instance, the court held that James had not done so. Wearing the 
505. 393 U.S. at 506. 
506. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). There is ample 
literature on Pickering. See, e.g., Note, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Outside 
the Classroom: An Analysis of the Application of "Pickering" and "Tinker'', 8 GA. 
L. REV. 900 (1974); Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' Speech: The Aftermath 
of Pickering, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1256 (1974). 
507. 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). 
508. 461 F.2d at 572. 
509. 461 F.2d at 573. 
510. See text at notes 48-52 supra. 
511. 461 F.2d at 573. 
512. See text at notes 423-27 supra. 
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anti-war armband did not i:Q:terfere with J runes' teaching function, 
and there was no suggestion that his teaching was deficient in any 
respect. He had made no effort to proselytize hls students, who re-
garded the •armband as no more -than a benign symbolic expression. 513 
Moreover, the court observed that the students were eleventh graders 
on the "eve of their first venture into the voting booth,"514 and indicat-
ed that a policy of shielding students from political controversy would 
•be foolhardy: "Schools must ,play a central role in preparing their 
students to think and analyze and recognize the demagogue. Un-
der the circumstances present here, there was a greater danger that 
-the school, by power of example, would appear ito the students to be 
sanctioning the very 'pall of orthodoxy' ... which ·chokes freedom of 
dissent."516 The fact rthat ,1Jhe school authorities had tolerated o1Jher 
types of in-class teacher e~pression, including display of a pro-war 
bumper sticker, 616 was not decisive. Rather, the col.ll.1t's primary con-
cern was that the teacher have -the right to express his ideas freely 
though not-to 1Jhe point of propagandizing his students. 517 
The accommodation of interests achieved in James parallels that 
reached in the cases dealing with academic curriculum.518 Just as 
the teacher cannot present a course or book that advocates a particu-
lar political value to the exclusion of all others, a teacher cannot in 
noncurricular speech advocate a particular political view and sup-
press dissent. Thus, although schools do indoctrinate through the 
academic curriculum and through regulation of noncurricular be-
havior, and, although they have broad discretion to set classroom 
standards, they cannot infringe upon society's interest in freedom of 
speech. 
The Supreme Court decisions in Barnette and Tinker when read 
in conjunction with the Second Circuit decisions in Russo and James 
create a very broad right of freedom of expression for students and 
teachers in the classroom, although the right may be limited to pre-
vent interference with the functions of teaching academic skills and 
socializing students. A student may, for example, freely express his 
beliefs by wearing an armband or button or by printing and distrib-
uting political literature if these actions are not likely to cause vio-
lence or other disruptions, although the student may be required to 
submit his material to a school official for prior approval. The 
teacher may also wear an armband or button to class and can even 
explain its meaning so long as he does not attempt to use his position 
513. 461 F.2d at 574. 
514. 461 F.2d at 574. 
515. 461 F.2d at 574. 
516. 461 F.2d at 575. 
517. See text at notes 433-43 supra. 
518. See text at notes 423-27, 433-43 supra. 
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to propagandize values inimical to the core collectivist interests of the 
state and does not cause disruptions in the school's operations. 
Thus, these courts have viewed the public school classroom as a rela-
tively open environment in which intellectual exchange and diversity 
are to be protected under the first amendment. 
Not all courts, however, have arrived at an accommodation of 
the countervailing interests of the educational community that simi-
larly safeguards free expression. One example is Guzick v. Dre-
bus, 519 in which the court held constitutional the suspension of a sev-
enteen-year-old, eleventh-grade student for refusing to remove a 
button soliciting participation in an anti-war demonstration. Unlike 
the impermissible ad hoc response of the school official in Tinker 
to the student's armband demonstration, the court stated, the prohi-
bition against buttons in Guzick was a long-standing, uniformly en-
forced rule that applied to all cause-supporting buttons not related 
to school activity. Most importantly, the school in Guzick, whose 
population was seventy per cent Black, had a history of racial dis-
turbances catalyzed by racially inflammatory buttons. 520 Although 
the message on Guzick?s button was not considered to be racially 
offensive, the court maintained that "abrogation of the rule would 
inevitably result in collisions and disruptions which would seriously 
subvert Shaw High School as a place of education for its students."li21 
The court also noted the administrative difficulties in attempting to 
distinguish between permissible and impermissible buttons, 522 and 
therefore reasoned that "school authorities should not be faulted for 
adhering to a relatively non-oppressive rule that will indeed serve 
our ultimate goals of meaningful integr.ation of our public schools."623 
The question that faced the court in Guzick-how to accommo-
date the state's interest in avoiding disruptive influences with the in-
dividual's interests in free expression-is identical with that raised 
in Tinker. The court in Guzick appeared to believe that the state's 
interests would be so extensively infringed by allowing the student 
to wear an anti-war button that his right of free expression had to 
be curtailed. The court, however, stated this conclusion in the fol-
lowing language: "Unless [the buttons] have some relevance to 
what is being considered or taught, a school classroom is no place 
for the untrammeled exercise of such a right. "624 Such language 
is needlessly overbroad. Its apparently neutral ban on all political 
519. 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971). 
520. 431 F.2d at 596. One such racially antagonistic button read "Happy 
Easter, Dr. King" (the late Dr. Martin Luther King having been assassinated during 
the Easter season). 
521. 431 F.2d at 598. 
522. 431 F.2d at 598-99. 
523. 431 F.2d at 597. 
524. 431 F.2d at 600-01. 
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expression ignores the standard articulated in Tinker that only ex-
pression that substantially disrupts or risks substantial disruption in 
the classroom should be restricted. The court rejected as adminis-
tratively impossible a less restrictive alternative of requiring prior ap-
proval of all buttons, although such an alternative has been approved 
and used successfully in some cases involving student newspapers. 525 
The court's language essentially appears to condone total prohibi-
tions of noncurricular free expression in the classroom. 526 Yet, if 
the state's interests in maintaining order are not impaired by the ex-
pression, such prohibitions are unnecessary and a different accom-
modation of interests is appropriate. 
Another reading of Guzick is plausible. By upholding the ban 
on all buttons, a rule originally designed to avoid racial disruption 
and thereby to promote integration, the court might be viewed as 
·attempting ·to promote racial :balance. 527 However, while such an 
objective might justify suppression of racially inflammatory buttons, 
it provides no rationale for prohibiting buttons with no racial over-
tones.1528 Thus even under this interpretation of Guzick, the total 
limitation on noncurricular free expression in the classroom appears 
extreme and unnecessary. 
Although courts have strongly supported the right of students 
and teachers to express their beliefs freely in the schools, 529 they 
have curtailed this right when certain state interests, such as the com-
munication of fundamental social values and the preservation of 
order in the schools, are infringed. Not surprisingly, the process of 
accommodating the countervailing interests in these cases concerning 
noncurricular communication parallels that employed in the compul-
sory education and substantive curriculum cases. Even so, it is ap-
parent that courts are not always consistent in what strength they ac-
cord the competing interests. 
2. Student and Teacher Behavior 
Schools also further conformity to social norms as defined by the 
525. See note 499 supra. 
526. This may simply be the result of ill-chosen language. Earlier in the opinion 
the court did recognize the state's interest in avoiding disruption and appeared to 
be applying the Tinker disruption test. If so, a more appropriate conclusion would 
have been to hold that on the facts of Guzick the particular noncurricular expression 
would have caused substantial disruption, rather than that all noncurricular expres-
sion in the classroom is impermissible. 
527. One newspaper analysis of school desegregation in Detroit, headlined 
"Tough Discipline Helps Make Busing Work," Detroit Free Press, April 19, 1976, 
§ A, at 4, col. 2 (metro ed.), reported that a school characterized by "freeness" 
in discipline had been "tom by tensions, fear and declining faculty morale." The 
principal was replaced by someone who would exercise stricter control. 
528. See 431 F.2d at 601 (McAllister, J., dissenting). 
529. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indp. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
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educational authorities through rules that attempt to regulate student 
and teacher behavior. Most litigation involves challenges to either 
hair530 and grooming codes531 or to rules governing social and sexual 
behavior. In each of these areas, courts have disagreed about 
whether there is a constitutional right of privacy or liberty that pro-
tects the proscribed conduct.1132 Moreover, even when courts have 
recognized that a constitutional interest is at stake, they have dis-
agreed about the extent to which such interests are protected within 
the school environment. 
The question of the constitutionality of haircut and grooming reg-
ulations came before the Supreme Court for the first time in Kelley 
v. Johnson, r;sa a recent case involving policemen rather than teach-
530. Compare the decisions of four circuits: Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th 
Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970), with those of five other circuits: Zeller v. Donegal 
School Dist Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975); Kan v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 
609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 
(10th Cir. 1971); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied sub nom. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 
(1972); Jackson v. Donier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
850 (1971). With steadily increasing intensity, Justice Douglas dissented from the 
denials of certiorari in Jackson, Olff and Kan. 
531. Compare Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Miss. 1972), wit/1 
Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). See, e.g., Braxton 
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Lucia v. Duggan, 
303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cat. 
App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). 
532. The point of transition from conduct that will trigger a free speech analysis 
to conduct concerning which such an analysis is inappropriate is by no means clear-
cut. For instance, some courts have characterized the individual's interest in the 
choice of personal appearance as a free speech interest. See, e.g., Finot v. Pasadena 
City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (teacher's right 
to wear a beard), a case predating Tinker. While Tinker specifically distinguished 
cases on skirt length, clothing, hair style, and deportment on the basis that none 
involved "pure speech," 393 U.S. at 507-08, Tinker itself has been characterized by 
Justice Marshall as a case in which personal appearance merely took on a first 
amendment dimension. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 n.2 (1976) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In isolated haircut/grooming cases a free speech 
analysis might be tenable. Consider, for example, an American Indian stu• 
dent who wishes to wear his hair in braids as a demonstrable symbol of his heritage. 
Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974), a case presenting this fact 
situation, was argued not on behalf of the student seeking vindication of his free 
speech rights, but on behalf of the parents claiming that their rights to rear their 
children according to their own rf;ligious, cultural, and moral values had been vio-
lated. The Court held that there was no basis in the Constitution for such a claim. 
But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed in text at notes 95. 
109 supra. See generally text at notes 340-87 supra. The student himself probably 
did not challenge the haircut regulation on the ground of free speech because the 
Tenth Circuit had barred that possibility in Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260-
61 (1971). See note 530 supra. The constitutional right of privacy rather than 
of free speech better accommodates the teachers' and students' interests in lifestyle 
and personal appearance. 
533. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
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ers. In upholding the regulations of New York's Suffolk County Po-
lice Department, the Court did not decide, but assumed arguendo, 
that "the citizenry at large has some sort of liberty interest within 
the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal appearance 
•••• "
634 However, applying the principle that the rights of a state 
employee are necessarily qualified by the demands of his employ-
ment, 636 the Court held that the general liberty interest did not out-
weigh the police department's need for "discipline, esprit de corps, 
and uniformity."536 The Court noted that the regulations were enti-
tled to a presumption of validity because they were "unquestionably 
at the core of the State's police power .... "1137 
The Kelley opinion is ambiguous in its implications for the reg-
ulation by schools of teachers' and students' personal appearance. 538 
Most of the justifications asserted by Justice Rehnquist for regulating 
the appearance of police do not apply to teachers, even though both 
534. 425 U.S. at 244. 
535. 425 U.S. at 245. 
536. 425 U.S. at 246. 
537. 425 U.S. at 247. 
538. Kelley could be based on any of three independent rationales: (1) a special 
presumption of validity and special restrictions appropriate in the context of uni-
formed police employees, 425 U.S. at 247; (2) the general power of the state 
to restrict even fundamental rights of public employees, 425 U.S. at 245; or 
(3) a holding that the interest in personal appearance has a constitutional basis only 
in the broad principles of substantive due process as distinguished from the funda-
mental right of privacy involved in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See 425 U.S. at 244. See also 
425 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The first basis for decision would 
produce a very narrow holding. The second would have ramifications for teachers 
but not for students. The third, by requiring only minimal scrutiny of the infringing 
regulation, would · signal a retreat from the expansion of constitutional personal au-
tonomy that could affect all privacy interests. 
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent in Roe v. Wade: 
If the Court means by the term "privacy" no more than that the claim of a 
person to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions may 
be a form of "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no 
doubt that similar claims have been upheld in our earlier decisions on the basis 
of that liberty. . . . But that liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against depri-
vation, only against deprivation without due process of law. The test tradition-
ally applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not 
a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a valid state objective. 
410 U.S. at 172-73 (emphasis added). If Kelley means that Justice Rehnquist has 
persuaded a majority of the Court to accept his view that privacy is really only sub-
stantive due process in modem dress, the Court will have come full circle in its 
analysis of personal liberty, returning to the approach of cases like Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to study German in private school), and Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate one's child in private 
school). This view would stop the expansion of the fundamental right of privacy 
that began in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of access of mar-
ried couples to information on contraceptives), evolved slowly through Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 551 (1969) (right to possession of obscene materials in the pri-
vacy of the home), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmar-
ried adults to use contraceptives), and culminated in the potentially expansive abor-
tion decision in Roe. 
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are public employees. Teachers are generally not expected to ex-
perience and are not trained to deal with situations that require "dis-
cipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity." The teaching profession 
is not a "uniformed civilian service"539 in which uniformity in per-
sonal appearance assists public recognition.540 It is revealing that 
other aspects of police regimentation that the Court apparently ap-
proved, such as the requirement that a uniformed police officer 
salute the flag, and that he not actively participate in local political 
affairs, 541 have already been held unconstitutional when applied to 
teachers. 542 
Nevertheless, the opinions in Kelley are relevant as models of 
the accommodation of countervailing interests that would have been 
employed had the Court faced the issue of teacher grooming regula-
tions. Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, vig-
orously argued that the individual's interest in personal appearance 
is of fundamental significance543 and possibly is derived from first 
amendment free expression guarantees. 544 Justice Marshall is prob-
ably correct that none of his colleagues would uphold a law regulat-
ing the appearance or hair length of the general population. 646 How-
ever, a teacher is not merely a member of the general population; 
he is also a public employee expected to assist in the transmission 
of the community's values to students. The majority would thus pre-
sumably ask if the grooming regulation for teachers bears a rational 
connection to any core interest of the state. 546 
This was the question raised in Miller v. School District No. 
J 67, 547 in which the Seventh Circuit held that "the impact of teacher 
appearance on the educational process, and on the associational in-
539. 425 U.S. at 248. 
540. 425 U.S. at 248. 
541. 425 U.S. at 245-46. 
542. See Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (fail-
ure to salute the flag); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (activity 
in political affairs). 
5_43. Justice Marshall advances an interesting argument, supported by records of 
the debate on the Bill of Rights, that the interest in personal appearance was omitted 
from the express guarantees only because it was unthinkable that any democratic 
government would try to infringe so fundamental a right of personal liberty. 425 
U.S. at 251-52. 
544. 425 U.S. at 251 n.2. 
545. Although Justice Rehnquist, by assuming arguendo an individual interest in 
personal appearance, did not reach this issue, Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, 
found "no negative implication in the opinion with respect to a liberty interest within 
the Fourteenth Amendment as to matters of personal appearance." 425 U.S. at 
249. 
546. Justice Powell's separate opinion in Kelley bypasses the difficulties of choos-
ing strict, minimal or "intermediate" scrutiny and asserts that when a state interest 
exists it must simply be balanced against that of the individual. 42.5 U.S. at 249, 
547. 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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terests of the children for whose educa,tiion they are responsible"1148 
made promulgation of a grooming regulation by local school boards 
legitimate. Judge, now Justice, Stevens, writing for the court, accorded 
the school boards' policy a strong presumption of validity and main-
tained that, even if a particular appraisal of the need to regulate a 
teacher's appearance was incorrect, "the importance of allowing 
school boards sufficient latitude to discharge their responsibilities ef-
fectively" outweighed the individual's interest in determining his 
own appearance. u49 The court recognized that the school board, 
elected by the community, is the institution responsible for protect-
ing the interests of parties who are not represented in the litigation. 
Judge Stevens explained that students "have a valid interest in not 
being compelled to associate with persons they or their parents con-
sider objectionable,"5r.o and thus it is appropriate for the school board 
to choose the teachers with whom the students will associate. 
It is evident that the result in Miller turned more on the weak-
ness of the teacher's interest in personal appearance than on the 
strength of the state's interests: "[W]e merely hold that as long as 
no greater interest than that involved in this controversy is at stake, 
the decision is one that the school board is entitled to make."551 Ac-
cordingly, if the teacher's interests had been stronger, for instance, 
if the teacher's free speech or other constitutional right had been 
infringed, 552 the court would not have deferred to the school board 
but would instead have intervened to protect the teacher's interest. 
When not joined with other rights, however, the teacher's interest 
in setting his own appearance can be regulated in accordance with 
his socializing and role-model functions. 553 
Unlike teachers, students do not voluntarily assume their posi-
tions in school and, of course, are not public employees. Since stu-
dents are compelled to attend school, rules of conduct and behavior 
should be more closely scrutinized for possible infringement of per-
sonal rights.554 Moreover, a regulation governing the appearance 
548. 495 F.2d at 667. 
549. 495 F.2d at 667. 
550. 495 F.2d at 667. 
551. 495 F.2d at 668. 
552. See, e.g., text at notes 440-44 supra. 
553. Some courts have seen the relationship between student and teacher regula-
tion but have gone the other way to strike down student codes where teachers were 
unregulated. See, e.g., Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 101 (N.D. Ill. 1969) 
("[I]t is a clear stroke of arbitrariness to operate on the basis that the appearance 
of a student with long hair would be substantially disruptive, when in the same school 
teachers who stand before these 2,500 students wearing hair equally long or longer 
are not disciplined or suspended or made to conform to the school code"). 
554. Some judges believe the fact that a student's long hair follows him home 
is partially dispositive of the question of the regulation's validity. See, e.g., Richards 
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1035, 
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of all public school children should be examined closely since it ap-
proximates the regulation of the general populace that Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan assumed would offend any constitutional concep-
tion of personal liberty. 555 
Any legislation, even under minimal constitutional scrutiny, must 
bear "a rational relation to a valid state objective."556 It is well es-
tablished that mere standardization is not a valid state objective. It 
not only exceeds the state's permissible collectivist interest in moder-
ate socialization657 but also contradicts the principle that schools 
should facilitate diversity in expression and belief. 11118 Thus, it seems 
clear that the school board cannot justify regulation of student hair 
length solely on the rationale that, as the educational body express-
ing the community's majority will, it is empowered to inculcate par-
ticular values in children. 
However, school authorities have advanced other justifications 
for grooming codes that are ostensibly based on the school's interests 
in avoiding disruption and in promoting safety and operational effi-
ciency. Some cases note that students who disapprove of their class-
mates' long hair have caused disturbances in school, such as fights, 
taunting, or even attempts to cut the hair by force. 5e1o By imposing 
restrictions on the student's personal appearance instead of directly 
controlling the -audience-generated disturbance, however, these courts 
,allow short-haired disrupters to deprive the student of the rights 
he seeks to assert. Other cases refer to disruptions caused by the 
student himself, such ,as persistent, distracting combing of long hair 
in class560 and the creation of safety hazards in laboratory classes, Ml 
while still ot:hers point to problems arising when the student represents 
the school in competition. 562 Each of these concerns is legitimate, 
but none necessitates requiring short hair on students. Disruption 
could be dealt with directly, students could wear hair restraints for 
1038 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. 
Supp. 706, 713 (D. Minn. 1969). 
555. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
556. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923). 
551. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
558. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 
637 (1943). 
559. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Indp. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 700-01 (5th 
Cir. 1968). 
560. See, e.g., Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 850 (1971). 
561. But see Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 989 (1972) (rejecting the safety hazard rationale). 
562. See, e.g., Dostert v. Berthold Pub. School Dist. No. 54, 391 F. Supp. 876 
(D.N.D. 1975). 
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laboJ.'latory and sports activities, .and for such activities as band compe-
tition, in which aesthetics may be a factor in scoring, 663 students might 
even wear wigs. 
Each of the rationales in favor of regulating student hair length 
might survive minimal scrutiny by a court. However, if school au-
thorities are actually attempting to impose their personal views of 
proper appearancer,04 under the guise of safety and efficiency re-
quirements, then their actions amount to a general regulation of the 
citizenry, which courts should not condone. Of course, this does not 
mean that schools can never regulate student hair length: "An epi-
demic of lice might conceivably authorize the shearing of locks."565 
Yet, where the essential purpose of a student hair-length regulation 
is standardization of the student body, the student's "liberty interest" 
in his own personal appearance and not the state's collectivist inter-
est should prevail. Indeed, if anyone should limit a student's free-
dom in this regard, it is his parents, who are ultimately responsible 
for the student's nurture and socialization. 
In contrast to regulations on personal appearance, school rules 
governing the sexual and social behavior of students and teachers 
rest solely on the collectivist interest in socializing students to com-
munity views of morality and decency. The scope of constitutional 
protection for the countervailing privacy interest in matters of sex, 
procreation and family life, like the scope of constitutional protection 
for the individual's interest in his appearance, is uncertain. 
Both students and teachers have challenged school regulations 
that attempt to control sexual behavior. The student challenges 
have typically involved rules or decisions that penalize pregnancy, 566 
marriage, 11n7 sexual promiscuity, 568 and motherhood, regardless of 
563. Fear that the entire band or other group would lose points because of the 
appearance of a few students was a motivation for the rule in Dostert. 
564. See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167,495 F.2d 658, 668 (7th Cir. 1974). 
565. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1044 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
566. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 374 n.4. See, e.g., State ex rel. Idle v. Cham-
berlain, 12 Ohio Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961); Perry v. Grenada Municipal 
Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (dictum). 
567. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); 
McLeod v. State ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 S. 737 (1929); Carrolton-Farm-
ers Branch Indp. School Dist. v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); 
Anderson v. Canyon Indp. School Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 
All these courts found regulations excluding the married student from school for all 
or part of the term to be arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore void. Contra, 
State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 
57 (1957). 
Regulations that exclude married students from extracurricular activities have of-
ten been upheld. See Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 
854 (1967); Cochrane v. Mesick Consol. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 
103 N.W.2d 569 (1960) (affirming by an equally divided court order denying peti-
tion for writ of mandamus); State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 
189 N.E.2d 181 (C.P. 1962); Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 
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whether the student is wed569 or unwed. 570 The teacher cases have 
typically involved pregnancy out of wedlock, 671 cohabitation, u72 ho-
mosexuality, 573 adultery,574 and acts of sexual promiscuity, both pub-
lic and semi-public. 575 
Until recently, it appeared that the expansive notion of personal 
autonomy ,articulated in Roe v. Wade576 protected a broad range of 
individual sexual choice. cm However, the Supreme Court's decision 
718 (1"963). Recently, however, such rules have been held to violate equal protec-
tion in the absence of a strong showing by the school of likely moral pollution, 
disruption, or disciplinary problems attributable to the student's marital status. See, 
e.g., Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (D. Mont. 1972); Indiana 
High School Athletic Assn. v. Raike,_ Ind. App.-, 329 N.E.2d 66, 76-77 (1975): 
Bell v. Lone Oak Indp. School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
568. See, e.g., Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160 
(1851). 
569. See, e.g., Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929); Alvin 
Tndp. School Pist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). 
570. See, e.g., Houston v. Prosser, 361 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Perry 
v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969). 
571. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 
27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 
(1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 44 U.S.LW. 4627 (U.S. May 3, 
1976); Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 Ill. App. 3d 481, 311 N.E.2d 710 (1974). 
In the case of married teachers where pregnancy follows marriage, the problem is 
not one of discipline for unattractive conduct or status. Attacks on school board 
pregnancy policies in this area have taken the form of due process issues, with either 
the entire policy or aspects of it being struck down where a conclusive presumption 
of incapacity underlies the compulsory maternity leave. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. 
Va. 1975). 
572. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Meade County Indp. School Dist. No. 101, 387 F. Supp. 
1237 (D.S.D. 1975); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), affd., 476 
F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973). 
573. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 836 (1974); Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 
1973), affd., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 
3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); Sarac v. State Bd. of Educ,, 249 
Cal. App. 2d 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967). 
514. See, e.g., Freeman v. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 49 N.E. 435 
(1898). 
575. See, e.g., Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974) (alleged 
carrying in public view on his property in a lewd and suggestive manner, a dress 
mannequin that he had dressed, undressed, and caressed); Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 
10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 ( 1973) ( oral copulation by female 
teacher on three persons not her husband at a semi-private party); Governing Bd. 
v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974) (oral copulation by 
a sixth grade probationary teacher in a doorless toilet stall of a downtown depart-
ment store's public restroom); Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ., 30 Cal. App. 3d 187, 
106 Cal. Rptr. 201 ( 1973) (sexual solicitation conviction resulting in revocation of 
teaching certificate); Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. 
Rptr. 86 (1972) (masturbating in public view in a public restroom, and touching 
private parts of another male). 
576. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
577. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual 
Conduct, 72 MICH. L REv. 1613 (1974). 
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in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney518 summarily affirmed a lower 
court's judgment that Virginia's sodomy statute was constitutional 
both on its face and as applied to consenting adults practicing homo-
sexuality within their own home. The trial court concluded that the 
state's interest in the "promotion of morality and decency" and in 
the prohibition of conduct deemed "likely to end in a contribution 
to moral delinquency" permitted the exercise of its legislative 
power. 570 In fact, the state's interest was deemed sufficiently strong 
to outweigh the individual's interest in fashioning his own private 
sexual lifestyle. The right of privacy was held not even to protect 
the homosexual act within the seclusion of one's own home. This 
decision appears consistent with the Court's holding in Kelley, in 
which the right of privacy as identified in previous cases involved 
"certain basic matters of procreation, marriage and family life."580 
Thus the current scope of constitutional protection for nonmain-
stream sexual behavior is narrow. Obviously, this type of conduct 
on the part of teachers or students would not be protected under 
present constitutional doctrines. The remaining question is whether 
conduct clearly within the constitutional right of privacy, such as mar-
riage, pregnancy, or even parenthood out of wedlock,581 may be reg-
ulated by schools in furtherance of their socialization function. 
The privacy of unwed female teachers who are pregnant or 
who have children is particu1arly vulnerable. Regulations concern-
ing unwed pregnancy .typically punish only female teachers be-
cause the consequence of the premarital sexual conduct is apparent 
only in the woman. Similarly, rules denying employment to unwed 
parents weigh more heavily against the female, perhaps because 
males less frequently rear their illegitimate children. Courts have 
responded to the inequity 'by finding regulations that deny employ-
ment to parents of illegitimate children to be violative of due process 
and equal protection rights. 582 
Courts have also acknowledged, however, that the state does 
have an interest in creating an environment in the schools that does 
not so offend moral sensibilities as to disrupt the educational proc-
ess. 583 As in the grooming cases, school authorities attempt to jus-
tify regulation of teacher conduct by pointing to student emulation 
of teacher behavior and to the responsibility of teachers to inculcate 
578. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (mem.), affg. 403. F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
579. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. 
580. 425 U.S. at 244. 
581. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972). 
582. Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. 
Miss. 1973), affd., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), 
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 4627 (U.S. May 3, 1976). 
583. 371 F. Supp. at 31. 
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fundamental values in students. 584 In offering this justification, 
school authorities presumably must demonstrate a "compelling" rea-
son for regulating a teacher's constitutionally protected sexual be-
havior, such as a disruptive impact on the school or actual harmful 
influence on student behavior.585 At least two courts have searched 
for such compelling reasons and have been unable to find them in 
cases involving private homosexuality586 and cohabitation. 587 A like 
result was reached on statutory grounds when one court reversed the 
discharge of a tenured teacher who had married when seven-and-
a-half months pregnant. The tenure law's provision requiring dis-
missal for "immorality" was deemed to apply "only where the record 
shows harm to pupils, faculty, or the school itself," none of which 
was demonstrated. 588 
Although courts generally agree that to justify dismissal a teach-
er's conduct must have adverse in-school effects, 589 it is not clear 
exactly what type of harm will suffice. One court, in concluding that 
the dismissal of a teacher for cohabitation did not violate what the 
court identified as her "substantive due process" rights, 690 was per-
suaded that widespread community disapproval of the teacher's be-
havior "would make it difficult for [the teacher] to maintain the 
584. The Fifth Circuit summarized the school's three rationales offered to justify 
the regulation: (1) unwed parenthood is prima facie proof of immorality; (2) unwed 
parents. are improper communal role models; and (3) employment of unwed parents 
as teachers materially contributes to the proqlem of school-girl pregnancies. 507 
F.2d at 614. None of the rationales was sufflcient to support the regulation. The 
third rationale was dismissed as being "without' support, other than speculation and 
assertions of opinion." 507 F.2d at 617. 
585. Because the Fifth Circuit invalidated the rule in Andrews on traditional 
equal protection grounds, it did not reach other substantive constitutional grounds 
such as the right to privacy or the right to procreation. 507 F.2d at 617. 
586. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 
175 (1969) (holding that a teacher could not be discharged for homosexuality unless 
a relationship was established between the conduct and fitness to teach). 
587. Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), holding that discharge 
for conduct unbecoming a female teacher (on several occasions males not related 
to the teacher had stayed in her apartment for periods ranging from one night to 
one week) violated the teacher's rights of association and privacy in the absence 
of proof that her conduct affected classroom performance, her relationship with her 
students, or other state interests. 
588. Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485, 311 N.E.2d 710, 
713 (1974). 
589. The same argument has been successful even where the conduct violates a 
criminal law. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Santa Maria Union High School Dist. 
v. Judge, 50 Cal. App. 3d 920, 123 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1975) (a teacher cannot be 
dismissed from service on grounds of "evident unfitness for service" or "moral turpi-
tude" unless his actions indicate his unfitness to teach, which was not demonstrated 
by conduct that consisted of growing a single marijuana plant). 
590. Sullivan v. Meade County lndp. School Dist. No. 101, 387 F. Supp. 1237 
(D.S.D. 1975). The court implied that the plaintifrs interest in substantive due 
process required at least a minimal scrutiny standard. 387 F. Supp. at 1245. 
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proper educational setting in her classroom."591 Thus, at least for 
this court, concern that majoritarian desires might infringe on impor-
tant individual interests, a concern that has caused community senti-
ment to be largely overlooked when freedom of speech is at stake, 592 
is less important in the area of sexual behavior. 593 Still unresolved 
as well is whether harm to students can be inferred from mere 
awareness of the teacher's behavior or whether it must be empirically 
proved that students have been adversely influenced by the teacher's 
example. 594 
The underlying assumption in the cases involving teacher beha-
vior is that the schools do have a legitimate interest in regulating 
not only the conduct that might adversely affect the social and sex-
ual development of students, but also the actual behavior of students. 
The cases involving direct regulation of student conduct must answer 
two related questions: whether students possess the same ability to 
make decisions about social and sexual matters as adults, 595 and 
whether schools should have significant responsibility in this area. 
The argument that students lack the capacity to make important 
decisions has not persuaded courts to sustain rules that deny married 
students the right to participate in school activities to the same extent 
as students who are not married.596 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
591. 387 F. Supp. at 1247. The court cited a petition signed by about 140 com-
munity members as evidence of the strong community reaction to the teacher's be-
havior. 
592. See text at notes 492-503 supra. 
593. See also Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 
F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), aftd., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975), which held the 
statute authorizing dismissal for "immorality" unconstitutionally vague, but which re-
fused to reinstate the homosexual teacher fearing the disruption that may have been 
engendered within the school district, staff, student body, and community. This hold-
ing was over a dissent that emphasized the dange_rs of majoritarian dictatorship: 
It is clearly inappropriate to consider community resentment in deciding whether 
to reinstate a person to a position from which she was unconstitutionally re-
moved . . . • If community resentment was a legitimate factor to consider, few 
Southern school districts would have been integrated. One of the major purposes 
of the Constitution is to protect individuals from the tyranny of the majority. 
That purpose would be completely subverted if we allowed the feelings of the 
majority to determine the remedies available to a member of a minority group 
who has been the victim of unconstitutional actions. 
512 F.2d at 855-56. 
594. The trend in other cases seems to call for just such empirical proof. See 
Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 
4627 (U.S. May 3, 1976). 
595. Justice Powell, dissenting in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975), 
points to the "long histocy of our law, recognizing that there are differences which 
must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as compared 
with those of adults. • . . Until today, and except in the special context of the 
First Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of children and teenagers 
in the elementacy and secondacy schools have not been analogized to the rights of 
adults or to those accorded college students." 
596. See, e.g., Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972). 
The regulation that barred married students from participating in extracurricular ac-
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has refused to limit the constitutional right of free speech according 
to age. 597 Even so, the view that students who have not reached 
their majority do not enjoy the same constitutional right of privacy 
as adults merits further examination. Sexual activity can arguably 
be distinguished from free speech in that it risks substantial harm 
to the student. Rules that attempt to discourage youthful sex and 
marriage by limiting the educational opportunities available to such 
students reflect a conventional wisdom that young lives will be 
ruined if students assume family responsibilities for which they are 
ill-prepared. Ironically, many of the most destructive effects of 
teen-age marriage-isolation from peers, uncompleted education, 
unemployment-result directly from school policies that ostracize 
married students. 
Even if it is assumed that students are "still in a state to require 
being taken care of by others"598 and that they should be firmly 
guided in their decisions concerning sexual conduct and marriage, 
the question remains whether schools or parents are better suited 
to perform this function. While it may not be realistic to recognize 
a fourteen-year-old's privacy interest in making his or her own deci-
sions in the constitutionally protected area of marriage, procreation, 
and family, it is entirely reasonable to assert that such decisions, 
being within the familial zone of privacy, should be regulated by the 
parents and not by the state. Certainly those parents who do super-
vise the development of their children's social lives expect that 
schools will not undermine their efforts by transmitting different val-
ues. 599 Many parents, however, are reluctant to offer sexual guid-
ance to their adolescent youngsters. These parents would prefer 
that the schools assume both the educational and socialization burden 
in this area. The question of which parental view, if any, should pre-
vail is made even more complex if a privacy right of married or preg-
nant students is recognized; this right may conflict with the parents' 
interest in controlling their children's sexual and social behavior. 
Many courts are inclined to allow schools to resolve these con-
flicts in most circumstances. Even though the decision to marry or 
tivities was based, at least in part, on the contention that the ban was for the married 
student's own good: "Married students assume new and serious responsibilities. 
Participation in extracurricular activities tends to interfere with discharging these re-
sponsibilities . . . • Married students need to spend time with their families in order 
that the marriage will have a better chance of being successful." 350 F. Supp. at 
1182-83. 
597. See text at notes 497-98 supra. 
598. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Meredith ed. 1947). 
599. Cf. Judge Stevens' comment about rights of association in the schools, text 
at note 550 supra. Ironically, because sexuality seems so much more significant than 
haircuts, it may be entitled to greater constitutional protection, although it is also 
more understandable that parents should have something to say about with whom 
their children associate. 
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have children is constitutionally protected, the school has a compell-
ing interest in insulating other children from the influence of sexu-
ally advanced students. 00° For example, one court has held that the 
equal protection clause forbids excluding unwed mothers from 
school unless they are found to be "so lacking in moral character 
that their presence in school would taint the education of the other 
students."601 The court indicated, however, that the school could 
exclude the female student during her pregnancy, for purposes that 
were both "practical and apparent."002 Still another court, while ac-
knowledging that the right of privacy protects a student's decision 
to marry or have children, found reasonable the school board's policy 
of excluding from day classes students who marry or become parents, 
though accredited night school education remained open to them:603 
"[such] students . . . are normally- more precocious than other stu-
dents. Because of their precociousness, it is conceivable that their 
presence in a regular daytime school could result in the disruption 
thereof."604 Some courts, however, have required schools to show 
a strong likelihood that the presence of married students actually 
causes disruption or disciplinary problems. 005 
Generally, parental claims to control exclusively the sexual and 
social behavior of their children have not been successful. This re-
sult parallels the outcome in cases in which parents have challenged 
the academic curriculum. Demands based on the privacy interest 
600. A nineteenth-century case spoke of the duty "to preserve the pure-minded, 
ingenuous and unsuspecting children of both sexes, from the contaminating influence 
of those of depraved sentiments and vicious propensities and habits •.•. " Sherman 
v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160, 167 (1851). 
601. Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist, 300 F. Supp. 748, 753 
(N.D. Miss. 1969). See also Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 
(1929), which held that a school board could not exclude a married mother of a 
child conceived out of wedlock from a public high school absent a showing of "a 
licentious or immoral character." 128 Kan. at 508, 278 P.2d at 1066. In light of 
the state's policy of -encouraging children to become educated and in light of the 
student's desire to reenter school, the fact that the child was conceived out of wedlock 
was insufficient to demonstrate such a character. 128 Kan. at 509, 278 P.2d at 
1066. The holding was over a dissent that the majority, contrary to established prac-
tice, had substituted its judgment for that of the school board. 128 Kan. at 509-
10, 278 P.2d at 1067. 
602. 300 F. Supp. at 753. 
603. Houston v. Prosser, 361 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
Other courts have also been concerned that rules excluding married and pregnant 
students not result in the permanent exclusion from public school of persons of school 
age. See, e.g., Alvin Indp. School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1966). . 
604. 361 F. Supp. at 298-99. See also State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 12 Ohio 
Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961) (upholding rule excluding pregnant student 
on grounds of student's "physical well-being," student morale, and effect on orderly 
daily routine in the school). 
605. See, e.g., Indiana High School Athletic Assn. v. Raike, _ Ind. App. -, 
329 N.E.2d 66 (1975) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a rule excluding 
married students from extracurricular activities). 
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of parents in nurturing their children cannot encroach unduly on the 
free expression rights of other members of the school community.000 
Similarly, although recognition of the right of privacy would allow 
a particular student to decide whether to marry or to procreate, it 
may be necessary to accommodate this interest with the desire of 
parents to insulate their own children from those who make such 
decisions at an early age. 
3. Procedural Rights in Discipline and Conduct Decisions 
The multiplicity of interests that have been accommodated in de-
termining the scope of substantive rights have also been appraised 
and balanced in delineating procedural guarantees. The right of 
teachers to procedural due process in connection with dismissal or 
nonrenewal of contracts is well established constitutionally007 and is 
also protected under state tenure laws. 008 Moreover, other interests 
of teachers are protected by unions or other organizations. 000 Until 
recently, however, the scope of the procedural due process right for 
students was not well defined. Although it was firmly established 
that a public school student was entitled to notice and a rudimentary 
hearing before expulsion or suspension for a period tantamount to 
expulsion, 610 district and circuit courts were split on whether due 
process protections applied to a shorHerm removal from school. 011 
This conflict was resolved in Goss v. Lopez. 012 
In a five-four decision, the Court held rudimentary due proc-
606. See text at notes 349-51 supra. 
607. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (although upholding 
dismissal of untenured teacher, court, in dictum, indicated a tenured teacher could 
demand due process) •. 
608. See note 746 infra. 
609. See section IV-B infra. 
610. See Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972); DeJesus 
v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 
306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969). 
611. Courts of appeals had held the due process clause applicable to a ten-day 
suspension, Black Students of North Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 
470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972), to a three-day suspension, Shanley v. Northeast Indp, 
School Dist, 462 F.2d 960, 967 n.4 (5th Cir. 1972), and to ·"mild" suspensions, 
Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971), but inapplicable to a suspension for 
not more than a few days, Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 
F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973 ), to a seven-day suspension, Linwood v. Board of Educ., 
463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972), and to a three-day 
suspension, Dunn v. Tyler lndp. School Dist'., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), Dis-
trict courts had held the due process clause applicable to a ten-day suspension, Banks 
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 
988 (1971), affd., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971) (mem.), but inapplicable to a 
suspension of eight days, Hatter v. Los Angeles High School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 
1309 (C.D. Cal. 1970), revd. on other grounds, 452 F.2d 673 (9th Cir, 1971), and 
to a suspension of ten days, Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp, 517 
(C.D. Cal. 1969). 
612. 419 U.S. 565 (1915), 
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ess was required for such suspensions from public school. The 
plaintiffs, high school students in Cleveland, Ohio, were suspe!lded 
for ten days for disruptive conduct and disobedience during a period 
of widespread student unrest. The Court found that the students 
had both "property" and "liberty" interests under the fourteenth 
amendment. Because Ohio had extended the right to a public edu-
cation to all people of the plaintiffs' class, the court concluded that 
"the State is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitle-
ment to a public education as a property interest which is protected 
by the Due •Process Clause . . . . "613 In addition, the Court noted 
that recording the charges in a permanent record could damage rep-
utation, relationships with teachers and other students, and later op-
portunities for employment and further education, and therefore 
could result in "arbitrary deprivations of liberty."614 
Having established what the dissent referred to as a "new con-
stitutional right,"615 the Court proceeded to determine the scope of 
that right by defining "what process is due": 616 "[D]ue process re-
quires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the 
student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him 
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authori-
ties have and an opportunity to present his side of the story."617 
Generally, the notice and hearing should precede any disciplinary 
action. However, the Court recognized that in dangerous or disrup-
613. 419 U.S. at 574. The holding was over an objection that the Ohio compul-
sory education statute defines its own due process requirements: "The Court • . . 
disregards the basic structure of Ohio law in posturing this case as if Ohio had con-
ferred an unqualified right to education, thereby compelling school authorities to con-
form to due process procedures in imposing the most routine discipline." 419 U.S. 
at 587 (Powell, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Powell distinguished Goss from Arnett 
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), a civil service case in which he had taken exactly 
the opposite position on statutorily defined due process: "There simply is no analogy 
between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil service employee and 
the suspension of a public school pupil for not more than 10 days." 419 U.S. at 
587 n.4 (emphasis original). 
614. 419 U.S. at 574. The Court held neither interest to be de minimis: "Nei-
ther the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty 
interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions 
may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how 
arbitrary." 419 U.S. at 576. The dissent objected to this reasoning as well on the 
ground that the infringement that arguably existed as a result of the short suspension 
was "too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify imposition of a constitu-
tional rule." 419 U.S. at 586 (emphasis original). 
615. 419 U.S. at 585. 
616. 419 U.S. at 577, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). 
617. 419 U.S. at 581. The Court ruled out more sweeping forms of procedural 
safeguards like right to counsel, right to cross-examine witnesses, and right to call 
witnesses in the case of short suspensions, for practical reasons of administrative feasi-
bility and cost as well as for the reason that such sweeping procedures would destroy 
the effectiveness of disciplinary measures as part of the teaching process. 419 U.S. 
at 583. 
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tive situations, immediate removal would be justified. 618 In those 
cases, due process would only be postponed, not eliminated. Defin-
ing the kind of situation that presents an "ongoing threat of disrupt-
ing the academic process"610 obviously requires the exercise of dis-
cretion that could be abused by school authorities. 626 Even if school 
officials circumvented the requirement of prior due process, how-
ever, the Court noted that they would be obligated to fulfill the no-
tice and hearing requirements as soon as practicable after the sus-
pension. 621 
The real significance of Goss is that it indicates a pronounced 
shift in the judiciary's proclivity to interfere in the public schools. 
Instead of simply setting limits on the actions of school officials, Goss 
tells administrators how they must proceed in certain situations. The 
Court was less willing to defer to the "expertise" of community au-
thorities; indeed, the Court expressed concern that school authorities 
may take "erroneous action"622 in discipline cases. In effect, the 
Court has dictated the manner in which the educational authorities 
perform their discretionary function623 by requiring "at least an in-
formal give-and-take between student and disciplinarian."624 The 
holding, by giving the pupil "the opportunity to characterize his con-
duct and put it in what he deems the proper context,"02G also en-
courages students not to capitulate to authority. While this is not 
likely to invite challenges to the disciplinary authority of teachers as 
feared by the dissent, 626 it does represent a change in how schools 
618. "[T]here are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot 
be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or 
property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately 
removed from school." 419 U.S. at 582. 
619. 419 U.S. at 582. 
620. See, e.g., Sweet v. Childs, 518 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1975). Initially decided 
prior to Goss, Sweet was relitigated to test for consistency with the Supreme Court's 
guidelines. The court held that the Black public high school students' sitdown, class 
disruption, and walkout which resulted in their suspension was "more than an 
'ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process.'" 518 F.2d at 321. The 
post-suspension conferences, in tum, fulfilled Goss' postponed hearing requirement. 
Thus, no violation of procedural due process was found. See also Note, Procedural 
Due Process and Short Suspensions from the Public Schools: Prologue to Goss v, 
Lopez, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 364 (1974). 
621. 419 U.S. at 582-83: 
622. 419 U.S. at 583. 
623. "[R]equiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student 
to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous 
action. At least the disciplinarian will be alerted to the existence of disputes about 
facts and arguments about cause and effect . . . . [H]is discretion will be more 
informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced." 419 U.S. at 583-
84. 
624. 419 U.S. at 584. 
625. 419 U.S. at 584. 
626. ''When an immature student merits censure for his conduct, he is rendered 
a disservice . . . if procedures • . • are so formalized as to invite a challenge to 
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will henceforth perform their socialization functions. 
Virtually any routinized procedure in the schools has some social-
ization effect. Prohibition of violent conduct to prevent harm to per-
sons and property socializes toward peaceful behavior; stressing a 
calm atmosphere in class socializes toward personal discipline and 
achievement; even the chosen procedure for disciplining proscribed 
conduct may socialize toward a particular model of problem solving. 
The procedure of judicial intervention required by Goss emphasizes 
an adversarial system and thus promotes many of the same values 
that were evident in the free speech cases. s2.7 If the schools seek 
to communicate the value of free expression of ideas, an informal 
adaptation of judicial decision-making that stresses rational disagree-
ment seems highly appropriate. 
Although the Goss majority did not allude to the socialization as-
pects of judicial intervention, the four dissenters recognized that the 
decision might change the process and the results of decision-making 
in the public schools. Justice Powell, w:citing for the dissenters, argued 
that because education attempts to further "the inculcation of an un-
derstanding in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience 
thereto," the Supreme Court should not have altered the "lesson of 
discipline" by imposing an adversarial framework on routine class-
room problems. 628 Such an approach, he argued, "misapprehends 
the reality of the normal teacher-pupil relationship. There is an on-
going relationship, one in which the teacher must occupy many roles 
-educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute. It is 
rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the chronically dis-
ruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the teacher must be free to dis-
cipline without frustrating formalities." 629 In contrast, Justice White 
argued for the majority that the required procedures would not be 
inappropriate in the classroom and would, "if anything, [be] less 
than a fair minded school principal would impose upon himself in 
order to avoid unfair suspension."630 
Although Justices White and Powell clearly differ in their per-
ceptions of what is proper disciplinary practice in the public 
schools6:11 and disagree about whether courts should intervene in ad-
the teacher's authority-an invitation which rebellious or even merely spirited teen-
agers are likely to accept." 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
627. See text at notes 518-19 supra. 
628. 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
629. 419 U.S. at 594 (footnotes omitted). 
630. 419 U.S. at 583. 
631. Justice Powell's perceptions may be based on personal experience, since he 
served on the Virginia State Board of Education. However, another experienced edu-
cator, formerly a teacher, principal, superintendent, and deputy state superintendent, 
argues that the procedures outlined in Goss- merely reflect good administrative 
practices. Interview with Dr. Robert H. Jerry, Professor of Education, Indiana State 
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ministrative problems, 632 neither seriously contended that the major-
ity imposes an unusual requirement on the schools. The decision 
simply demands that school authorities adhere to the same standards 
of conduct as officials of other public institutions, notwithstanding 
the dissent's position that the "unique nature of public education" 
requires limited judicial supervision. 633 The Court apparently con-
cluded that neither the need for discretion to maintain order, long 
recognized as a legitimate state interest, 634 nor the socialization in-
terest in "the lesson of discipline" justified risking arbitrary and pos-
sibly erroneous disciplinary judgments. 
A most important question generated by Goss is what other types 
of decisions by school officials, if any, might be subjected to judicial 
superns1on. The dissent expressed concern that students in many 
other situations might claim infringements that would receive consti-
tutional protection: 
Today's ruling appears to sweep within the protected interest in edu-
cation a multitude of discretionary decisions . . . that may have se-
rious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, for example, 
how to grade a student's work, whether a student passes or fails a 
course, whether he is to be promoted, whether he is required to take 
certain subjects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic 
athletics or other extracurricular activities, whether he may be re-
moved from one school and sent to another, whether he may be bused 
long distances when available schools are nearby, and whether he 
should be placed in a "general," "vocational," or "college-prepara-
tory" track. 635 
University. See also WASH. AD. CODE ch. 180-40 (1972). Enacted before Goss 
and Baker, the statute commands the state board of education to promulgate rules 
and regulations concerning substantive and procedural rights of public school stu-
dents. Subsequently, the board promulgated rules uniformly applicable from kinder-
garten to the twelfth grade. The portion of the Washington framework concerning 
procedural rights specifies disciplinary authorities, procedural due process for severe 
penalties (suspension and expulsion), and summary procedures for emergency situa-
tions. While this framework anticipated Goss, enactment of a similar (or broader) 
provision subsequent to Goss in other states would effectively convert that decision 
into a mere statement of the constitutional limits on legitimate discipline rather than 
an affirmative source of authority on the question of appropriate due process. In 
addition to obviating dangers of hostility on the part of educational personnel to 
judicial infringement of their functions, such an approach would avoid the need for 
the kind of judicial line-drawing suggested by Justice Powell. See text at note 635 
infra. For an appraisal of the Washington system, see Note, Due Process for Wash-
ington Public School Students-Wash. Ad. Code ch. 18040, SO WASH, L. REV. 675 
(1975). . 
632. The majority opinion represents a departure from traditional judicial reluc-
tance to intervene in local school matters, see text at notes 622-24 supra, while the 
dissent attempts to justify deference to local school boards and school administrators. 
See Note, Right to Due Process Attaches to School Suspensions, 24 KAN. L. REV. 
202, 218 (1975). 
633. 419 U.S. at 590. 
634. See text at notes 493-95 supra. 
635. 419 U.S. at 597 (footnotes omitted). 
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The Supreme Court has already interpreted Goss to require due 
process in cases of corporal punishment. 636 It is arguable that this 
extension, which mandates that due process be provided in any dis-
ciplinary action regardless of whether exclusion from school is the 
punishment, should become the outside limit of the scope of Goss. 
This would restrict the holding to disciplinary decisions that involve 
a determination of wrong-doing and the fashioning of a remedy to 
punish the wrongdoer. Thus, a purely academic judgment such as 
grading would not require due process protection unless, for exam-
ple, a poor grade were given for misconduct. 637 Similarly, other de-
cisions such as exclusion from athletics or transfers to other schools 
would require due process safeguards only if these actions were in-
tended to be punitive. 638 
Although the general reluctance of courts to question "aca-
demic" or "professional" judgments would suggest that the scope of 
Goss was not intended to be overly broad, the language of the deci-
sion provides no limiting principle. 639 Certainly it is not absurd to 
argue that rudimentary due process guarantees should accompany 
nondisciplinary school decisions. In fact, "later opportunities for 
higher education and employment,"640 which can be as seriously 
damaged by an adverse academic judgment as by a disciplinary ac-
tion, were included in the liberty interest. The deprivation of priv-
ileges may portend as significant an infringement of a student's prop-
erty and liberty interests as suspension from school. For example, 
636. Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (mem.), affg. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. 
N.C. 1975). The three-judge district court held that a liberty interest was involved. 
Due process required that (1) corporal punishment be a policy approved by the prin-
cipal; (2) the student know that the act in question could occasion corporal punish-
ment; (3) a teacher or principal administer corporal punishment only in the presence 
of another school official who is informed in advance, and in the presence of the 
pupil, of the reason for the punishment; and ( 4) upon request by the parents, the 
disciplinarian inform them in writing of his reasons for the use of corporal punish-
ment and the name of the second official. 395 F. Supp. at 303. 
637. See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Con-
stitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 585 (1971). Cf. Developmellts, supra 
note 281, at 1139. 
638. See, e.g., Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School Dist., 391 F. Supp. 358 
(M.D. Pa. 1975), finding, after Goss, that a rule which automatically barred from 
interscholastic athletic competition for one year any student who transferred from 
one school district to another but who did not reside in the transferee district with 
his parents is nonviolative of procedural due process. The underlying objective was 
to prohibit athletically motivated transfers and athletic recruiting. The court said 
that the property interest recognized in Goss extended only to total exclusion from 
the educational process, and that the liberty interest in reputation was irrelevant. 
639. As the dissent stated: "If the Court perceives a rational and analytically 
sound distinction between the discretionary decision by school authorities to suspend 
a pupil for a brief period, and the types of discretionary school decisions described 
[in text at note 635 supra] .•. it would be prudent to articulate it .... " 419 
U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
640. 419 U.S. at 575. 
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the promising athlete who is not allowed to participate in school 
sports could lose his opportunity for a college scholarship and 
eventual employment. 641 
Goss also affirmed the lower court's order that all references to 
the plain~'s suspension be removed from school records, 642 imply-
ing that due process attaches to all permanent notations of censure 
in a student's file. However, as one district court observed, 043 it is 
difficult to distinguish between a professional judgment recorded for 
the benefit of future teachers that a child is a discipline problem, 
and a notation that disciplinary action for punitive purposes has oc-
curred. Because such a notation arguably serves an informational 
function in all cases, it seems impossible to avoid some overlap with 
the professional function of evaluating students. Judicial intrusion 
into the making of these professional judgments might well produce 
ludicrous results. However, since Goss requires only a very informal 
notice and hearing, this conclusion is not self-evident. It is not an 
intolerable burden to require a teacher to explain why a child is a 
discipline problem or why the student has been assigned to a voca-
tional track. Indeed, it may not be unreasonable to require the 
teacher to explain why a student received a poor grade. Since due 
process is a flexible right in the sense that the severity of the notice 
and hearing requirements varies with the strength of the entitlement 
that is infringed, the procedure used to ensure due process need not 
impose an onerous burden on school administrators. 844 
In Tinker, the first case to recognize substantive constitutional 
rights in the school, Justice Black voiced his concern in dissent that 
the decision was the harbinger of "an entirely new era in which the 
power to control pupils by the elected 'officials of state supported 
public schools .. .' in the United States is in ultimate effect trans-
ferred to the Supreme Court.''640 In his dissent in Goss, Justice 
Powell reiterated Black's prophecy646 and expressed his own fear 
that "one can only speculate as to the extent to which public educa-
tion will be disrupted by giving every school child the power to con-
trol in court any decision made by his teacher which arguably in-
641. See Buss, supra note 637, at 584-85; Recent Developments, 20 VILL. L. Rav. 
1069, 1080 (1975). 
642. 419 U.S. at 571. 
643. Einhorn v. Maus, 300 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
644. In the case of a grade or transfer to a new curriculum, the notice require-
ment would be met when the student is given his grade or informed of the change. 
The hearing requirement would presumably be met if it was explained to the student 
that he could express objections to those who made the decision. Of course, to pro-
, tect the student adequately, the notice should also be sent to the parent, as in the 
case with notices of suspension. 
645. 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
646. 419 U.S. at 600 n.22 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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fringes the state-conferred right to education."647 Justice Powell, in 
arguing that active judicial intervention on behalf of the children is 
improper, predicted that "[t]he discretion and judgment of federal 
courts across the land will be substituted for that of the fifty state 
legislatures, the 14,000 school boards, and the 2,000,000 teachers 
who heretofore have been responsible for the administration of the 
American public school system."648 
It is unlikely that parents will bring a sufficient number of suits 
to threaten seriously the discretionary powers of the schoolboards. 
A judicial remedy is likely to serve merely as a valuable, though not 
extensively used, check on the small minority of administrators, who, 
in their zeal to preserve order, needlessly infringe on such basic val-
ues as free expression and equitable treatment of precocious stu-
dents. 
Still, the number of cases in which students allege violations of 
their constitutional rights is increasing, and the prophecies of Justices 
Black and Powell are being at least partially fulfilled. Those who 
believe that the educational system should carry out the indoctrina-
tion of passive students with state-defined values and norms un-
doubtedly will find this tendency unfortunate. 
If, however, ·as Barnette established, students are not mere re-
ceptacles of state-imposed wisdom;649 and if, as espoused in Tinker, 
the school is a community in which certain fundamental collectivist 
values are accommodated with individual rights;050 and if the judici-
ary is sensitive in avoiding the usurpation of the functions of profes-
sional educators, then good faith challenges of school decisions that 
infringe upon basic constitutional rights should be encouraged and 
not feared. 
IV. CONTROL OF EDUCATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
The two preceding sections of the Project have demonstrated 
that the educational system must accommodate a multiplicity of in-
terests. Judicial intervention is sought when the policies of educa-
tional decision-makers, either on questions of exposure to the system 
itself or of specific content of the school experience, intolerably in-
fringe on the interests of one or more groups within the educational 
community. The final section of the Project, in contrast, will deal 
with efforts of members of the community to affect educational de-
cision-making through alteration of the institutional structure or 
through exertion of political and economic pressure. Subsection A 
647. 419 U.S. at 600 n.22 (emphasis original). 
648. 419 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted). 
649. See text at notes 476-80 supra. 
650. See text at notes 490-98 supra. 
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will focus on decentralization of the schools while subsection B will 
briefly examine unionization of teachers. 
A. Demands for Community Control 
All school-district organization schemes attempt to establish 
school boards that are directly responsible to and controlled by the 
general public, of which parents are certainly the most important sub-
group. In practice, however, the ideal of effective local control of 
educational policy is rarely realized. Shortcomings endemic to al-
most all political institutions pervade the school board and make it 
unresponsive to its constituents. 651 First, the apathy that is common 
in our political system except at times of particular controversy af-
fects the system of choosing educational authorities. Thus, in most 
districts, school board positions are not the object of vigorous compe-
tition. Board candidates often run unopposed, thereby avoiding any 
necessity for discussion and critical analysis of educational issues. 
Second, elected school board members are constantly tempted to 
defer to appointed staff personnel who are believed to have superior 
educational experlise. Most school board members ·are not profession-
al educators but instead are laypersons drawn from a fairly narrow 
stratum of the population. 652 The increasing complexity of adminis-
trative and policy problems generates the attitude among elected 
board members that they lack the competence to make policy deci-
sions. The result is deference to an even narrower and less respon-
sive circle of experts who frequently believe that they alone are 
capable of making policy. 653 This has had the effect, particularly 
in large cities, of virtually excluding elected representatives, let alone 
parents, from a significant role in the educational system, thus un-
dermining one of the traditional bases of the public school system. 064 
The unresponsiveness of school boards to the surrounding com-
munities derives not only from reliance of the boards on unelected 
experts but from the structure of the school district scheme itself. 
Ostensibly, if defects in the system's structure could be corrected, 
some of the general problems of bureaucratism might be alleviated. 
The physical boundaries of the school district, as is the case with 
almost all governmental units, are fixed by "self-conscious legal and 
651. See generally Eliot, supra note 39, at 1032-36. 
652. G. LANoVE & B. SMinr, supra note 39, at 12-13. See also Eliot, supra 
note 39. 
653. See M. GIITELL, PARTICIPANTS AND PARTICIPATION: A STUDY OF SCHOOL 
POLICY IN NEW YoRK CITY 55 (1967); Eliot, supra note 39, at 1032-36; Lyke, supra 
note 40, at 138, 167. 
654. M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, supra note 5, at 196; see Eliot, supra note 
39, at 1032-33. See generally Wertheim, The Myth of Local School Control, 102 
INTELLECT 55, 59 (1973). 
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historical considerations. "655 Although these boundaries determine 
the territorial effect of a school board's decisions, they may not be 
coterminous with the residential locations of particular class, ethnic, 
and racial groupings. Each grouping typically embraces different 
values that it desires the school to reflect. When the physical bound-
aries of any one school district encompass several groupings or "com-
munities," all values cannot be fully and absolutely represented. 
Groups with less power whose interests are ignored or superseded 
may feel frustrated and betrayed. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
various socioeconomic 1and :racial groups claim that school boards are 
not responsive to their interests. 
It should be m?ted, however, that how responsive a school board 
is to its constituents depends in large part on the nature of the dis-
trict. For example, the nature of citizen control of board policies 
in a school district composed of the entire metropolitan area of De-
troit, which has more students than the entire state of Mississippi, 
is substantially different from citizen control in a small, rural village 
with a one-room school attended by a few dozen students. 656 In the 
latter case, it is much more likely that the functional community 
boundaries will be coterminous with the physical, legal boundaries 
of the school district. In the former case, such a result is assuredly 
impossible. 657 
Thus, the demand for increased citizen contol of schools through 
decentralization is articulated, for the most part, only in urban areas 
in which the vastness of the metropolis has obliterated any semblance 
of parental supervision of the schools. 658 It is in these areas that 
655. See Pfantz, The Black Community, the Community School, and the Sociali-
zation Process: Some Caveats, in CoMMUNI1Y CONTROL OF ScHOOLS 13, 16-17 (M. 
Levin ed. 1970). 
Although essentially fixed, school district boundaries are not totally static. His-
tory evidences a natural tendency toward fewer and larger school districts-partly 
as a response to population shifts to metropolitan areas and partly from a need to 
both avoid duplication and offer specialized services. See G. JOHNSON, supra note 
34, at 15, 25 n.24; PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 127. 
656. J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 120. The author also points out that neither 
the size of the state nor the population of school age children is significantly related 
to the number of school districts. Id. at 118-19. 
657. The problems of differing local conditions and attitudes within a large urban 
school district have been widely noted. See, e.g., M. Gl'ITELL, supra note 653, at 
50-51: "While parent associations are active in individual schools with regard to 
localized and personalized problems, the highly centralized organization of the school 
system is a serious deterrent to communication between parent groups and policy 
makers." 
658. See D. TYACK, supra note 43, at 284. Historically, decentralization move-
ments have appeared sporadically. Demands for community control of schools are 
generally part of efforts to exert greater citizen influence over gqvemment. See 
Mills, Community Schools: Irish, Italians and Jews, 11 Society 76 (1974); Elazar, 
School Decentralization in the Context of Community Control: Some Neglected 
Considerations, in STATE, ScHOOL AND POLITICS 179, 184 (M. Kirst ed. 1972). 
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parents are most frustrated because of their apparent inability to in-
fluence or alter prevailing school board policies. 1159 
As articulated by its proponents, decentralization involves a real-
location of power between the central authorities, usually a city-wide 
board, and local boards established in the neighborhoods. 1100 Usually 
these proposals envisage substantial autonomy for the local boards 
in such areas as curriculum, budgeting, teacher negotiation, and hir-
ing and releasing of personnel. Essentially, those who support de-
centralization are attempting to assert greater control over educa-
tional policy by moving the locus of power closer to the citizenry.11111 
In particular, those parents who support decentralization desire 
greater control of the socialization of their children. It has been ob-
served that decentralization "has implications for the school's politi-
cal socialization role. . . . [T]he public schools have historically 
inculcated Americanism and allegiance to certain generalized politi-
cal norms. . . . Some of the advocates of community control, how-
ever, reject the white middle-class character of the socialization proc-
ess and clearly hope to use the schools to encourage ethnic solidarity 
and challenge traditional American myths. "1162 Yet for the most 
659. See M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, supra note S, at 196-201. School 
boards may be unresponsive to parental demands for a number of reasons. Members 
are often uncomfortable with their responsibilities because they lack training in edu-
cational policy and, therefore, prefer to occupy themselves with housekeeping details. 
In some cases such outside influences as state boards or departments, professional 
associations, or unions act to prevent innovations. J. KoERNER, supra note 8, at 
124-27. 
660. There are several general approaches to effecting decentralization of schools. 
One approach involves creating local school boards and providing them with substan-
tial decision-making powers, although some sort of city-wide coordination is usually 
retained. This is the pattern in New York City. See text at notes 667-76 infra. 
Another approach is to subdivide the city-wide district into independent, autonomous 
local districts, which have total responsibility for the schools within the district. A 
final approach envisions the development of "education parks," which are groups of 
schools constructed in one large, central campus. This approach has been suggested 
as one means to increase desegregation but has the obvious problem of the high 
costs involved in constructing the necessary facilities. See U.S. COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, EDUCATION PARKS (1967). 
661. This reflects the idea that citizens themselves should set the goals of educa-
tion and the experts should develop means to accomplish them. More often today's 
experts are telling the society or the community what its educational goals should 
be. J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 160-61. 
Suburbanization of our metropolitan cities is, in effect, another form of decentral-
ization. Suburbanization has a political meaning: It can be viewed as another ex-
ample of individuals attempting to exert greater influence over their government by 
moving out of the city and forming smaller communities. This enables them to make 
choices on such subjects as tax rates, types of city services, and, of course, educational 
policy, that would not be possible in the larger city. In part, this ability to make 
one's government more accountable is a result of relative suburban homogeneity, See 
Elazar, supra note 658, at 181. 
662. G. LANovE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 19. School boards have tradi-
tionally been dominated by the middle- and upper-middle classes and have conse-
quently served as a forum for middle-class values. Id. at 15-23. See text at note 
652supra. 
June 1976] Project 1489 
part, proponents of community control do not seek to establish a sep-
arate polity. Instead, these individuals seek to establish and pre-
serve their own identity within the framework of the political system: 
"Most Americans of whatever race, creed or ethnic origin, share 
common values and goals as Americans. What they seek are varia-
tions on 'the American way of life,' not completely separate ways. 
Thus they strive for the kind of local control that makes the main-
tenance of those variations possible, not local separatism."663 When 
viewed in this manner, it is clear that community control is not 
intended to infringe upon the core interests of the state, namely a cer-
tain minimum level of socialization to those consensus values re-
ferred to above, but instead intends only to express pluralistic inter-
ests of ethnic, racial or other groups. 664 
Certainly any effort to shift educational decision-making power, 
even when the underlying motivation is not inconsistent with collec-
tivist interests, will meet with resistance from groups that have a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 665 In those areas in 
which decentralization has occurred, almost all members of the 
school community-administrators, teacher organizations, lay mem-
bers of the boards, and even some of the organized parent groups-
have opposed it. High-level administrators tend to resist the trans-
fer of their power to local authorities while lower-level managerial 
personnel oppose decentralization because they perceive no net in-
crease in their influence when substantial power is transferred to 
nonadministrative community groups. Teacher unions, for the most 
part, prefer to assert their influence at one central location rather 
than to negotiate with a large number of small districts. Unions gain 
strength from centralization and naturally oppose plans that allow 
districts to establish separate policies affecting teaching responsibili-
ties, class size, and other working conditions.666 Finally, because 
major interest groups typically are organized on a city-wide basis, 
their ability to influence policy would diminish if decision-making 
power were less concentrated. 
Many of these difficulties were evidenced during the major de-
663. Elazar, supra note 658, at 181. 
664. For a discussion of core collectivist interests, see text at notes 95-126 supra. 
665. M. GITIELL, supra note 653, at 57-58. Any plan for change must have as 
its first objective the diminution of the power of the professional bureaucracy. In 
large city systems decentralization of the bureaucratic authority is a prerequisite to 
increased influence of citizen groups. M. GITIELL, supra note 653, at 57. Cf. 
M. COHEN, B. LEVIN & R. BEAVER, THE POLITICAL LIMITS TO SCHOOL FINANCE 
REFORM 21-23 (1973). 
666. G. LANOVE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 233. Unions may also correctly 
perceive a major threat to members from increasing demands for greater returns on 
the educational dollar and the general call for teacher accountability. See M. Co-
HEN, supra note 665, at 28; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra 
note 5, at xvii-xviii, 58-62. 
1490 Michigan Law -Review [Vol. 74:1373 
centralization experiment of the last decade implemented in New 
York City in accordance with a 1969 plan of the state legislature. 007 
The city school district, which included the entire city of New York, 
was divided into about thirty community districts008 of at least twenty 
thousand pupils. 669 Each district was to be governed by a commu-
nity school board composed of elected nonprofessionals. 070 Included 
in the broad mandate671 of each community board was the power 
to frame the curriculum and choose textbooks, 672 to name a commu-
nity superintendent673 and hire teachers, 674 to allocate funds and su-
pervise their expenditure, 675 and to launch building programs. 070 
Not surprisingly, the city school board was reluctant to surrender its 
authority to the community districts. Diffusion of control was ham-
pered by provisions in the enabling statute that gave the city 
board, 677 through the chancellor, 678 power to set minimum standards 
in areas such as textbook selection. 679 Effective decentralization of 
power to citizens of small neighborhood units was also impeded by 
teachers' strikes and racial tension. 080 
The New York plan, which has been met with varying appraisals 
as to its success, 681 epitomizes many of the uncertainties raised by 
the debate over decentralization. Even when decentralization is ef-
fectively carried out against its many obstacles, it is unclear whether 
the basic problems of individual participation and institutional re-
667. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590 (McKinney 1970). For a history of the New York 
experiment, see G. LANOVE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 153-224. 
668. Criteria for division included "the common and special educational needs 
of the communities and children involved, transportation facilities, and existing and 
planned school facilities"; the appropriate scale needed for efficient policy making 
and economic management; convenience of location for pupil attendance; a reason-
able number of pupils and heterogeneity of the pupil population; and the relationship 
to the geographic areas for which the city of New York plans and provides services. 
N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-b.3 (McKinney 1970). 
669. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-b.2(b) (McKinney 1970). 
670. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-c.4 (McKinney 1970). In practice candidates en-
dorsed by unions or by religious groups were more successful than candidates of par-
ent associations. G. LANovE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 193. 
671. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney Supp. 1975). 
672. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.3 (McKinney 1970). 
673. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.l (McKinney Supp. 1975). 
674. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.2 (McKinney 1970). 
675. See N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 2590-i.8 (McKinney 1970). 
676. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.ll (McKinney 1970). 
677. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-g.1 (McKinney 1970). 
678. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-h.8 (McKinney 1970). 
679. See Rebell, New York's School Decentralization Law: Two and a Half 
Years Later, 2 J. LAW & ED. 1, 8 (1973). 
680. See N.Y. Times, March 1, 1973, at 45, col. 1 (late city ed.). See generally 
M. BERUBE & M. GITIELL, CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE 215-46 
(1969). 
681. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1973, at 35, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
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sponsiveness are alleviated. Community control assumes that a sub-
stantial consensus about values exists among members of the com-
munity, a consensus that is assuredly absent in the large metropol-
itan districts682 in which certain groups have been visibly "disenfran-
chised." The rationale underlying decentralization is that small 
units can be responsive to particular groups-an unrealizable result 
when a few large districts embrace a large proportion of the student 
population. 683 Yet it is very dubious that metropolitan districts can 
be subdivided884 so that each community district will reflect a homo-
geneous constituency with similar demands and expectations. 685 In 
New York, even in the small school districts, various interest groups 
waged intensive and divisive campaigns to elect people to the boards 
who would be favorable to their positions.888 That experiment failed 
to erase all feelings .that ,the educational structure was unresponsive. 887 
Even if decentralization accomplishes the goal of greater individ-
ual and group involvement in educational decision-making, it is by 
no means certain that basic state interests do not suffer too severely 
in the process. First, opponents of decentralization assert the collec-
tivist interest in ensuring that the educational system adequately pre-
pares citizens to function effectively in society, and claim that with 
neighborhood controls on schooling, this aim cannot be achieved. 688 
It is beyond dispute that financial resources are not evenly distrib-
uted among existing school districts, let alone among neighborhoods 
682. See text at note 656 supra. But see A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL: 
THE BLACK DEMAND FOR PARTICIPATION IN LARGE AMERICAN CITIES 131 (1970) (au-
thor suggests that proponents of community control should avoid homogeneity even 
if neighborhood lines could be drawn to roughly fit ethnic, class or racial groups 
because of the potential explosiveness of the homogeneity question). 
683. One author has observed that half of the nation's local school boards have 
fewer than 300 students, but nearly 200 boards have over 25,000 students apiece. 
New York City's board alone has over l million students, which is a greater student 
population than is found in a majority of the states. He notes that nearly half of 
all U.S. students are under the control of less than 3 per cent of the nation's school 
boards. J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 120. 
684. See G. LANovE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 115-52. 
685. See A. ALTSHULER, supra note 682, at 124-34; Elazar, supra note 658, at 
182-84. 
686. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1973, § IV, at 11, col. 1 (late city ed.). See M., 
March 1, 1973, at 45, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
687. However, the New York experiment clearly eliminated the apathy surround-
ing school board elections, see text at notes 651-52 supra, and apparently shifted 
school board deference as to educational policy from educational experts, see text at 
notes 652-54 supra, to community interest groups. Thus, it clearly seems reasonable to 
argue that the New York experiment erased the unresponsiveness of the educational 
structure, discounting, of course, the inevitable unresponsiveness of any democratic 
structure to voters who supported losing candidates. 
688. There is virtually no evidence that increased parental participation in school 
policy results in increased student achievement. There is a similar absence of evi-
dence that smaller school districts, presumably less bureaucratic, are able to produce 
higher levels of student achievement See G. LANoVE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, 
at 212-15. 
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within those districts. 689 Certain neighborhoods may be so poor that 
they are unable to support a school system that is capable of provid-
ing even a minimal educational program. It is certainly in the state's 
interest to avoid massive discrepancies in the quality of educational 
training, but to prevent such a development, it would be necessary 
for the state to provide financial support to the underdeveloped com-
munities. It is unlikely that central educational authorities will elect 
to underwrite these localities and at the same time surrender con-
trol over how such monies are expended. 690 Although such criti-
cisms of community control have not gone unchallenged, 001 it seems 
clear that any decentralization plan that sacrifices this collectivist in-
terest will be strongly resisted by the school board and other author-
ities. 
Another concern is that decentralization will impair the state's 
interest in integration. 692 Because community schools would be 
small and local, many of them would be within predominantly Black 
neighborhoods. It has been argued, in response, both that neighbor-
hood boundaries need not be drawn to preserve racial, ethnic or class 
689. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON ScHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 
30; San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1973). See 
generally Berke & Callahan, Inequities in School Finance, in SENATE SELECT COMM, 
ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNI1Y, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., ISSUES IN SCHOOL FI-
NANCE 129-63 (Comm. Print 1972). 
690. See K.irp, Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1360 (1970). But cf. Campbell & Gilbert, supra note 34, at 
200-05 (suggesting no direct relationship between the extent of state funding and 
state control). 
691. Gittell, Three Demonstration School Districts in New York City, in 
LoCAL CONTROL IN EDUCATION 39 (1972); A. ALTSHULER, supra note 682, at 19-
61. 
692. Integration, as a collectivist interest, was clearly identified by the President's 
Commission on School Finance: "In any reorganization of school districts .•. 
[a] prime [consideration] . . . is the attainment of diveniity in the school popula-
tion. The most important resource of any distrcit [sic] is the people who are served. 
Economic or ethnic isolation of children reduces the ability of school systems to 
provide equal education opportunity and quality education." THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMMN. ON ScHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at xix. 
The reasons for pursuing integration in public scho.ols are compelling. According 
to the widely publicized Coleman Report, the educational achievement of minority 
pupils, with some exceptions, is lower at every level than the performance of White 
pupils. Furthermore, the difference in achievement widens as grade levels increase. 
See J. COLEMAN, supra note 149, at 20-21. The Report found that Black educational 
achievement can be increased by sending Blacks to schools that are integrated. More-
over, the Report found that sending Blacks to integrated schools could mitigate racist 
attitudes, see id. at 28-30, thereby furthering the state's socialization interests. See 
M. Katz, supra note 43, at 133-34. See generally Symposium-Milliken v. Bradley 
and the Future of Urban School Desegregation, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 751 (1975). 
The controversial findings of the Coleman Report have been widely discussed 
and critically reviewed. See, e.g., ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. 
Monteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972); THE "INEQUALITY" CONTROVERSY (D. Levine 
& M. Bane eds. 1975). 
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homogeneity693 and that community schools would have no greater 
segregation effects than the present centralized systems. 694 If that 
were true, the same dissatisfaction that caused decentralization to be 
demanded initially, namely ·that certain groups have relatively less 
power than others and consider .themselves left out of the decision-
making process, 695 would again be generated. After ,all, much of 
the appeal of decentralization rests on its promise of allowing 
-individual groups to control schools that serve their particular ra-
cial or ethnic orientation.696 In reality, it appears that community 
control and racial balance in the schools are incompatible. 697 In-
deed, as a purely practical matter, it would be easier for dissatisfied 
families to move out of a neighborhood district than it would be to 
leave an entire metropolitan area. If families who consider them-
selves disenfranchised were to flee their districts, then residential 
housing patterns would become even more segregated. Charges 
that decentralization could lead to increased class separation698 were 
buttressed by evidence in New York that the population of some 
community school districts fell after the educational system's reor-
ganization. 699 
Since decentralization may very well ,be counterproductive to inte-
gration, the obvious question is whether community control is con-
stitutional. Indeed, the recent interpretations of the fourteenth 
amendment by the Supreme Court suggest that it may not survive 
judicial scrutiny. 
The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools 
all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Segregation was the evil 
struck down by Brown I as contrary to the equal protection guaran-
tees of the Constitution. That was the violation sought to be cor-
rected by the remedial measures of Brown II. That was the basis 
for the holding in Green that school authorities are "clearly charged 
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary 
693. See A. ALTSHULER, supra note 682, at 131-34. 
694. Id. at 19-28. 
695. See text at notes 658-61 supra. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1973, at 
118, col. 2 (late city ed.) (Blacks complaining that their power had been diluted 
by decentralization). 
696. See id., Jan. 14, 1973, at 118, col. 2 (late city ed.) (proposal for an all-
Black district). 
697. "Community control and integration are incompatible, and for anyone who 
wants both that is a very hard fact to admit. Decentralized community schools must 
of necessity be small and local." M. KATZ, supra note 43, at 133. But cf. A. ALT-
SHULER, supra note 682, at 131-34 (sugges.ting that boundaries need not be drawn 
to create ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods). 
Many supporters of community control admit the incompatibility but think inte-
gration is often impossible in any case. See COMMUNITY CONTROL OF ScHOOLS 6-7 
(M. Levin ed. 1970). 
698. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1973, at 41, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
699. See id., Feb. 5, 1975, at 34, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
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to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would 
be eliminated root and branch .... " 
If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under 
these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked. 700 
It is certain that if a White-dominated school board were to use 
community control to establish or to perpetuate a system of segre-
gated schools, the board action would violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. 701 It is less clear whether a community control scheme ad-
ministered in a racially neutral manner is constitutionally impermis-
sible. This was the specific question left open in Keyes v. School 
District No. J: 102 "We have no occasion to consider in this case 
whether a 'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial or 
ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school authori-
ties have committed acts constituting de jure segregation."703 The 
Sixth Circuit has found constitutionally permissible a board action 
that results in a racial imbalance so long as the action was not in-
tended to have a segregative effect. As rthat court concluded in Deal 
v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 704 nondiscriminatory implementa-
tion of a neighborhood school policy does not possess the "arbitrary, 
invidious characteristics of a racially restrictive system."706 The nec-
essary element of a constitutionally impermissible school board ac-
tion, it stated, is a racial imbalance intentionally caused by discrim-
inatory practices of the board. "When no discrimination is shown, 
racial imbalance alone is no warrant for relief. "700 This view has 
700. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (cita-
tions omitted). 
701. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 212 (1973). The majority 
recognized a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation based on "purpose 
or intent" to segregate. 413 U.S. at 208 (emphasis original). In Keyes, the neigh-
borhood school scheme was promulgated by authorities who were found to have the 
requisite intent to avoid integration. Keyes explained that a school board can rebut 
a prima facie case of de jure segregation by showing either that "segregative intent" 
was not among the factors that motivated its actions or "that its past segregative acts 
did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition." 413 U.S. at 211. 
Thus, for de jure segregation, at least a finding of segregative intent is necessary. 
See United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
402 U.S. 943 (1969). 
702. 413 U.S. 189 (1973 ). In Keyes, the petitioners sought desegregation of 
the public schools in the Denver, Colorado, school district. The Court remanded 
for further findings but held that a finding that school authorities practice de jure 
segregation in a "meaningful portion of the school system" creates a prima facie 
case of intentional segregation in the remaining schools. 413 U.S. at 212. See text 
at notes 192-95 supra. 
703. 413 U.S. at 212. 
704. 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967). 
705. 369 F.2d at 60. 
706. 369 F.2d at 63: 
Appellants' right to relief depends on a showing of more than mere statistical 
imbalance in the Cincinnati schools. They must also expose that added quan-
tum of discriminatory state action which deprives them of their constitutional 
right to freedom of choice. If the school officials, through overt practice or 
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recently been reaffirmed by the Sixth Circuit. 707 
Other courts, however, have taken a different approach. Both 
the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. School District of Omaha,708 
and the Second Circuit, in Hart v. Community School Board of Ed-
ucation, 700 held that segregative intent, and therefore de jure segre-
gation, exist when school authorities engage in acts or omissions, the 
natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of which is to cause 
or to maintain segregation. Such a definition of de jure segregation 
would have profound implications for many systems of community 
control. Decentralization of schools, even though administered in 
a rijcially neutral manner, could well have racial imbalance among 
the districts as a "foreseeable consequence"710 and, accordingly, 
would be constitutionally impermissible if segregation resulted. 
The viability of a community control scheme thus depends on 
which definition of de jure segregation is used by the courts. It is 
very unlikely that an urban area could be decentralized without rein-
forcing racial divisions. Under the Hart and Omaha test, such an 
effort would likely be barred, but under the Deal test, which at least 
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Keyes, 711 
if a community control scheme has segregative tendencies but no dis-
criminatory purpose, the plan could be upheld. 
by subterfuge, have treated students differently solely because of race, then they 
not only must cease doing so, but also must take affirmative action to remedy 
the condition which they have caused. Thus, even if the Negro students were 
distributed uniformly in the schools, if other forms of discrimination were used 
against them they would still be entitled to the aid of the law. When no dis-
crimination is shown, racial imbalance alone is no warrant for relief. 
707. See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 792-93 (6th Cir. 1974); Bron-
son v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 344, 345-47 (6th Cir. 1975). In Higgins, Black 
students and their parents brought a class action charging that the Board was operat-
ing the Grand Rapids schools in a manner designed to perpetuate a segregated sys-
tem. The Board had decided to retain the concept of a neighborhood school system 
to meet the needs of the district, the lines of which were coterminous with the city 
limits. The court found that the school board's decisions were not motivated by 
segregative intent even though many of the schools were predominantly Black. In-
stead, the racial imbalance in the schools was attributed to segregative acts in the 
housing market. The court stated that such a racial imbalance need not be remedied: 
"[T]he law imposes no affirmative duty upon school officials to correct the effects 
of segregation resulting from factors over which they have no control." 508 F.2d 
at 790. 
708. 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975). 
709. 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). 
710. See note 697 supra and accompanying text. 
111. Keyes clarifies how a school board can rebut a prima facie showing of segre-
gative intent, not whether a remedy is necessacy in the absence of intent. The latter 
question was squarely posed in Deal, and the court held that a remedy was not re-
quired. See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 792-93 (6th Cir. 1974). How-
ever, some doubt has been cast on the Deal test of intent by Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717 (1974). In Milliken, the Court affirmed district court findings of de jure 
segregation, some of which were based on the "foreseeable consequence" test. 418 
U.S. at 725-28, 738 n.18. See United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 531, 536 
n.10 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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One commentator has suggested another distinction between 
permissible and impermissible community control schemes that fo-
cuses on whether the central school board has actually relinquished 
decision-making power. No transfer of power has occurred, for ex-
ample, when the school board, without the consent of affected com-
munities, simply assigns teachers or adjusts boundaries in a manner 
that has racially predictable consequences. If the school board 
transfers power to local boards with concentrated ethnic and racial 
constituencies, however, it has not acted in the same ove1"t, 1."acially 
motivated manner.712 Although this distinction is tenuous, it does 
highlight the difference between a racially oppressive plan and one 
which, though leading to the same racial isolation, involves a genuine 
transfer of power and authority. 
It has also been suggested that because integration as mandated 
by Brown v. Board of Education713 does not prohibit voluntary racial 
isolation, community control that results in de facto segregation may 
be possible. 714 Thus, the segregation proscribed in Brown was in-
voluntary, since the plaintiffs had been forced to send their children 
to an all-Black school. On the other hand, a community control plan 
that allows parents to choose as an alternative an integrated educa-
tion at a school other than the one in the neighborhood might not 
be unconstitutional. 716 However, this conclusion is by no means as-
sured. In Green v. County School Board, 716 the Supreme Court 
held that a desegregation plan under which students were allowed 
to choose their school was unconstitutional. The system in question 
had only two schools on opposite sides of the county. One was pre-
viously all-Black and the other all-White, though housing patterns 
were not segregated. To remain eligible for federal aid, the school 
board was required to develop an integration plan. The "freedom-
of-choice" plan adopted by local authorities was struck down because 
it failed to take "whatever steps might be necessary to convert to 
a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated 
root and branch."711 
A plan that provides an alternative to the segregated school in a 
community control scheme is very similar to the freedom-of-choice 
plan in Green. It is true :that ithe situations can be distinguished. In 
Green, the politically dominant White community supported a plan 
that had the effect of perpetuating a dual system of education that in-
712. Kirp, supra note 690, at 1372. See note 707 supra. 
713. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
714. Kirp, supra note 690, at 1362. 
715. See id. at n.27. 
716. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
717. 391 U.S. at 437-38. 
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herently deprived Blacks of ·both power and a quality education~ while 
the underlying rationale of a system of community control is that the 
quality of education will be raised through the involvement of Black 
parents. If isolation of the races ~s to be eliminated, however, this dis-
tinction should not be •adequate to validate ,the scheme. Decentraliza-
tion plans should be upheld only if sufficient numbers of both races 
choose to be educated out of their distci.ct, thereby eliminating segre-
gation. 
In his opinion in Keyes, Justice Powell urged that the de jure-
de facto distinction be abolished. 718 At first glance, this would have 
the effect of invalidating any community control scheme, since all 
such plans are likely to result in de facto segregation. Justice Powell 
noted, however, that "Swann itself recognized limits to desegregative 
obligations. . . . Particular schools may be all White or all Black 
and still not infringe constitutional rights if the system is genuinely 
integrated and school authorities are pursuing integrative steps. 
" 710 In fact, he specifically recognized the vitality of the 
neighborhood school concept: "Neighborhood school systems, neu-
trally administered, reflect the deeply felt desire of citizens for a 
sense of community in their public education."720 In referring to 
the close relationship between the concept of community control and 
the rights and duties of parents with respect to their children's ed-
ucation, Justice Powell concluded that the "Court should be wary 
of compelling in the name of constitutional law what may seem to 
many a dissolution in the traditional, more personal fabric of their 
public schools."721 He thus would accommodate the state's collectiv-
ist interest in integration with the parent's interests in running local 
schools and in supervising more directly the upbringing of their chil-
dren. This process is not unlike the balancing of interests in other 
educational contexts. The unique feature here, however, is that the 
process involves the power to make educational decisions rather than 
the content of the decisions themselves. The outcome of this con-
test will determine the nature of the institutional framework in 
which educational decisions are made. 722 
718. 413 U.S. at 219-36. See text at notes 196-99 supra. 
719. 413 U.S. at 244. 
720. 413 U.S. at 246. 
721. 413 U.S. at 246. 
722. Decentralization is bµt one proposal to increase citizen participation in pub-
lic school policy. Another suggestion is the utilization of parental advisory commit-
tees. See generally J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 146-54; Murphy, supra note 5, 
at 90-91. Many schools have established parent groups, many of which are con-
nected with the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA). Such committees rarely pos-
sess authority over fundamental policy matters but do serve the important function 
of facilitating communication. With the exception of civil rights groups, most or-
ganized parental interest groups are hesitant to be critical of established policies. 
M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, supra note 5, at 199. 
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B. Teacher Unionization 
Parents disenchanted with the unresponsiveness of educational 
decision-makers to their interests urge alteration of the institutional 
framework through decentralization. Teachers, on the other hand, 
have sought to protect their own interests not through institutional 
reform but through the collective pressure of unions on educational• 
authorities. Although teachers have had professional organizations 
for over one hundred years, 728 they have only recently affiliated with 
unions-organizations that engage in collective bargaining and uti-
lize the strike to support their demands. 724 Through unions, teach-
ers are increasingly requesting additional economic and professional 
benefits and demanding a broader role in fundamental policy deci-
sions. 
It is only relatively recently that teachers have been able to bar-
gain with school boards. Initially, the boards possessed virtually ab-
solute power to control the working conditions of their employees. 
Courts held that the school board was "sovereign" in the sense that 
it had to be free to exercise the power, entrusted to it by the citi-
zenry, to control education. To bargain with, let alone capitulate 
to, teacher organizations on matters of educational policy would, pur-
723. The National Education Association (NEA) is the largest and oldest of the 
professional teacher organizations. It was organized in Philadelphia in 1857 by a 
group of superintendents, principals, college presidents and professors. Perry & Wild-
man, The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education, in EVIDENCE FROM nm 
ScH:ooLS 25 (1970). For a detailed history, see E. WESLEY, NEA: THE FIRST HUN• 
DRED YEARS, TuE BUILDING OF nm TEACHING PROFESSION (1957). Because it was 
predominately composed of administrators instead of classroom teachers, early NEA 
efforts were not specifically directed at helping the classroom teacher. See id. at 
329. See also J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 32. The majority of the NEA's 1.8 
million current members are classroom teachers, Economic Crisis in Schools Threat-
ens the Nation, 14 NEA RPTR. 3 (1975), indicating a change in the organiza-
tion's focus. 
724. In contrast to the NEA's concern for professionalism, the American Federa-
tion of Teachers (AFT) has been deeply influenced by organized labor. The AFT 
was founded in 1902 in San Antonio, Texas, and was chartered by the AFL in 1916. 
Because the AFT associated teachers with blue collar workers, it had to overcome 
adverse public, school board, and even teacher opinion. Perry & Wildman, supra 
note 723, at 7-8, 18. In the 1950s, the AFT increased in importance as public sector 
bargaining increased in acceptance. The AFT has been successful in large cities, 
including New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. The AFT is organized specifically 
for the benefit of classroom teachers. M. MosKOW, TEACHERS AND UNIONS 98 
(1966). See also R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, TEACHERS, ScHOOL BOARDS, AND COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF nm GUARD 32-33 (1967). 
The NEA responded to AFT breakthroughs by becoming more activist and by 
attempting to strengthen its union identification. See generally E. SHILS & C. WmT-
TIER, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 21-92 (1968), The 
right to organize a labor union in the public sector was given constitutional protec-
tion in McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). Under certain cir-
cumstances, however, courts have circumscribed this right. See Elk Grove Firefight-
ers Local No. 2340 v. Willis, 400 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See also Local 
No. 201 (AFL-CIO) v. City of Muskegon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197, cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963); Perez v. Board of Police Commrs., 78 Cal. App. 2d 
638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947). 
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suant to this theory, amount to an unauthorized delegation of power. 
This approach, which minimized the influence of teacher organiza-
tions, has, however, been eroded in recent years. Courts initially 
recognized in states without bargaining statutes that school boards 
could voluntarily negotiate with teachers and that agreements would 
not be per se illegal. 725 It is now firmly established that a school 
board may negotiate and bargain with a teachers' organization. 
The extent to which teachers' unions will be allowed to bargain 
about and thereby influence educational policy depends largely on 
the statutes authorizing negotiations that have been passed in many 
states. 726 Where such statutes exist, the school board will generally 
have a duty to bargain over traditional contract items-wages, hours, 
pensions, transfers, conditions of employment-that are within the 
teachers' "worker interest."727 Demands that fall within these cate-
gories may very well have a profound impact on the educational sys-
tem, for the allocation of resources to meet these needs necessarily 
precludes other possible expenditures. 728 Additionally, the special-
ized training that teachers receive gives them a "professional inter-
est" in participation in the selection of teaching materials, the plan-
ning of curriculum and other matters requiring expertise and profes-
sional judgment. 729 These policies may, however, be considered to 
725. See, e.g., Minneapolis Fedn. of Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 
347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966) (suggesting, however, promulgation of a statute for 
procedural purposes); Norwalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 
83 A.2d 482 (1951). 
The right of public employees once organized to bargain collectively has not been 
accorded constitutional stature, however, and courts have upheld statutes that prohibit 
public employees from engaging in collective bargaining. See Winston-Salem/For-
syth County Unit v. Phillips, 381 F. Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Atkins v. City of 
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). Thus, in order to have bargaining, 
either a statute mandating it or a willing employer must exist. See 14 NBA RPTR., 
supra note 723, at 4 (NEA to lobby for federal statute guaranteeing teachers right to 
negotiate). 
726. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.20.550-.610 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
179.61-.76 (Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT.§§ 243.650-.782 (1975). 
727. Prior to the emergence of formal negotiations, school board-teacher com-
munication was conducted on an informal consultation and suggestion basis, in 
which the superintendent was frequently the dominant factor. Gradually, teachers 
began to have more input in school policy. See A. ROSENTHAL, PEDAGOGUES AND 
POWER, TEACHER GROUPS IN SCHOOL POLITICS 3-6, 19 (1969). 
Some states have had systems that involve more than mere consultation but less 
than bargaining. Perhaps the most notable of these schemes was the "meet and con-
fer" system of bargaining in California. See Law of July 23, 1965, ch. 2041, § 2, 
[1965] Cal. Stats. 4660 (repealed 1976); Comment, California's Alternative to Col-
lective Bargaining for Teachers: The Winton Act, 1965-1974, and Proposals for 
Change, 5 PACIFIC LJ. 698 (1974). 
728. See C. PERRY, THE LABOR RELATIONS CLIMATE AND MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
IN URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF PHILADELPHIA W (1974). 
729. See A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 727, at 5-6; National Educ. Assn. v. Board 
of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 752, 512 P.2d 426, 434 (1973). Cf. Wollett, The Coming 
Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1017, 1019-22 (1969). 
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be at the core of school board discretion in a manner analogous to 
management rights in the private sector that "lie at the core of en-
trepreneurial control" and are not mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining. 730 It is not infrequent that the teacher's "worker inter-
est" will justify bargaining where the "professional interest" would 
not, as, for example, in the case of appropriate class size which af-
fects teachers' conditions of employment. 731 Courts have been in-
consistent in their determinations of proper bargaining scope, 732 with 
some insulating school boards733 and others more willing to find par-
ticular areas mandatory subjects of bargaining. 734 
In asserting their interests through collective bargaining teachers 
frequently infringe on -the interests of particular members of the edu-
cational community, who may then challenge the negotiation process 
in court.735 Courts, however, have recognized that collective bar-
gaining is most effective when citizen input is limited. 736 An addi-
tional conflict may arise when a teachers' union, in attempting to or-
ganize, takes actions that jeopardize the interests of other teachers 
or their organizations. 737 Finally, the interests of the union may con-
730. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). See PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1976) 
(excluding from bargaining "matters of inherent managerial policy"). 
731. See West Hartford Educ. Assn. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 
(1972); West Irondequiot Teachers Assn. v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 
358 N:.Y.S.2d 720 (1974). But cf. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Sus-
quehanna Valley Teachers' Assn., 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 
427 (1975). -
732. See generally Note, Determining the Scope of Bargaining Under the Indiana 
Education Employment Relations Act, 49 IND. LJ. 460,481 (1974), 
733. See, e.g., School Comm. v. Curry, _ Mass. App. _, 325 N.E.2d 282 
(1975) (decision to abolish a position); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. 
Assn., 64 NJ. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973) (decision to consolidate departments). 
734. See, e.g., Clark County School Dist. v. Local Govt. Employee-Man-
agement Relations Bd., 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974) (class size, professional 
improvement, student discipline, school calendar, teacher performance, differential 
staffing, teacher load, instructional supplies, and classroom preparation time); West 
Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 
720 (1974); Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 37 
Wis. ~d 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967) (school calendar). 
735. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 
534 P.2d 403, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975). 
736. See Bassett v. Braddock, 262 S.2d 425 (Fla. 1970) (collective bargaining 
could proceed privately); Talbot v. Concord Union School Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 323 
A.2d 912 (1974) (negotiations could be private but final approval must be in public 
session). But see Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 
83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1195 (1974) (arguing that allowing closed sessions prevents the 
full airing of opposing viewpoints). 
737. See Louisiana Teachers' Assn. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., _ La. _, 303 
S.2d 564 (1974). See also S. COLE, TuE UNIONIZATION OF TEACHERS 19-20, 164-
73 (1969); C. PERRY, TuE WOR RELATIONS CLIMATE AND MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
IN URBAN ScHOOL SYsrnMs 88-89 (1974). 
Competition between the NEA and the AFT has been widely publicized and stud-
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flict with those of the entire community. An example was the 
widely discussed controversy at Ocean Hill-Brownsville in 1968, pre-
cipitated by the New York City decentralization plan.738 In giving 
control over personnel to local community boards to enhance the 
quality of education, certain rights bargained for by the teachers' 
union at the city-wide level were compromised. In this instance, 
teachers whose methods and approach did not comport with the com-
munity board's impressions of proper pedagogy were dismissed. 
Thus, the "worker'' and "professional" interests of the teachers were 
pitted against the community's interest in supervising the entire edu-
cational environment. 
The growing power of teachers' ·unions has been sustained, in 
part, by the availability of the ultJimate weapon~the strike. 739 It 
is true that many statutes expressly prohibit strikes by public employ-
ees740 and that, in the absence of such language, courts will generally 
enjoin strikes under traditional equitable principles. 741 Injunctive 
relief, however, is not automatic, 742 for school boards can only obtain 
it if they have "clean hands" and have fulfilled other require-
ments. 743 Moreover, the threat of illegal strikes is a potent weapon 
that lies below the surface of negotiations. Still, the restrictions on 
strikes, when combined with statutes governing procedures for col-
ied. One result of the competition has been a growing militancy of both groups. 
Ironically, the dispute has sometimes caused both postponement of a union election, 
because one group or the other believed it would lose, and the defeat of school legis-
lation. Teachers as a whole may well have suffered from the battle of the rivals 
contending to help them by representation. See M. LIEBERMAN & M. MosKoW, COL• 
LECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS 401-06 (1966); E. SHILS & C. WHITIIER, SU· 
pra note 724, at 539-41. 
738. For general discussions of the Ocean Hill controversy, see Mayer, The Full 
and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, the Teachers' Union and the 
Teacher Strikes of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 18, col. 
1; M. BERU13E & M. GrrrELL, supra note 680; B. CARTER, PICKETS, PARENTS, AND 
POWER: THE STORY BEHIND THE NEW YORK CITY TEACHERS' STRIKE (1971). For 
other aspects of the New York decentralization plan, see text at notes 667-80 supra. 
739. See generally Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employ-
ment, 61 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 61 
MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969); Note, Teachers' Strikes-A New Militancy, 43 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 367 (1968); Recent Development, Legislative Silence and the Function 
of Courts in Teachers' Strike Injunction Suits, 51 WASH. L. REv. 186 (1975). 
740. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 10-153e (Supp. 1976); DEL. CooE ANN. 
tit. 14, § 4011(c) (1975); !ND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-14 (Bums 1975); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 423.202 (1967). 
141. See, e.g., School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Allience, Local No. 930, 
101 R.I. 243, 221 A.2d 806 (1966). 
742. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 
206 (1968). 
743. See Timberlane Regional School Dist v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Assn., 
114 N.H. 245, 317 A.2d 555 (1974); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Assn., 
111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 447 ( 1973). But cf. State v. Delaware State Educ. Assn., 
_Del.Cb._, 326 A.2d 868 (Ch. 1974). 
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lective bargaining744 and the duty of school boards to protect their 
entire constituency,745 serve to limit somewhat the power of unions 
to place the interests of teachers above those of the educational com-
munity. 746 
744. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4001-4013 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 20:1-.27 (Supp. 1976); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 111.80- .97 (1974). The Connecticut law, for example, provides that the public 
employer has a duty to bargain over "salaries and other conditions of employment." 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1976). The omission of hours from this 
formulation is significant; it has been interpreted to exclude discussions over hour-
related matters that otherwise might be considered conditions of employment, such 
as the durations of the class day and school year. West Hartford Educ. Assn., Inc. 
v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 579-80, 295 A.2d 526, 534 (1972). However, specific 
conditions of employment, including hours, are part of several state statutes. See, 
e.g., CAL. GoVT. CoDE § 3543.2 (West Supp. 1976); HAWAll REV. STAT. § 89-9 (Supp. 
1975). 
745. B. EPSTEIN, WHAT Is NEGOTIABLE? 22-23 (1969); Perry & Wildman, supra 
note 723, at 217. 
746. It is important to note that teacher organizations are not the only agencies 
that accord protection to teacher interests. States also play an important role 
through legislative enactments. See generally NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TEACHER AND THE LAW 30-73 (1959). Civil seivice 
laws may specify certain procedures for hiring, firing and promotion policies. See, 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-151 to -15lb (Supp. 1976), amending CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-151 (1967). More important, however, has been the protec-
tion of teachers through tenure statutes. See generally NATIONAL EDUCATION Assoc1-
ATION OF THE UNITED STATES, TRENDS IN TEACHER TENURE THRU LEGISLATION AND 
COURT DECISION (1957); L PETERSON, supra note 9, at 528-66; H. PUNKE, Tun 
TEACHER AND THE COURTS 399-462 (1971). These statutes were originally designed 
to reduce the large turnover in the teaching profession, which was caused in part 
by widespread discharges for political and disciplinary reasons. See Comment, 
Teachers' Tenure Legislation, 37 MICH. L. REv. 430 (1939). Of course, tenure 
relationships between the teacher and the school district may be a product of con-
tract Most teachers, however, are protected by specific statutes. H. PUNKE, supra, 
at 407-13. Tenure provides teachers with a property right in their job; this entitles 
them to a due process hearing pursuant to the fourteenth amendment before their 
job may be taken away. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972). 
Nontenured teachers do not have this property right in their jobs. See Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). See also Lanzarone, Teacher Tenure-
Some Proposals for Change, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 526, 532-35 (1974); Sietz, Due 
Process for Public School Teachers in Nonrenewal and Discharge Sitllations, 25 
HASTINGS L.J. 881 (1974). 
These statutes, of course, do not eliminate the need for union protection. Those 
areas not affected by the statutes, most obviously the rights of nontenured teachers, 
are vital areas of union concern. 
